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Abstract 
Despite apartheid’s 1994 de jure abolition, contemporary university students in South 
Africa transgressively protest for ongoing, radical, de facto “decolonization” that they allege, 
and I agree, has not occurred. My thesis historicizes and analyzes the Rhodes Must Fall 
(RMF) and Open Stellenbosch (OS) protests at University of Cape Town (UCT) and 
Stellenbosch University (SU), respectively. I analyze how university students’ protests drive 
counter-hegemonic social movements locally, regionally, and potentially globally. I highlight 
marginalized students’ imagination and articulation of alternatives to global neoliberalism, 
which is transgressive and perceived as radical.  
I contextualize this case study of contemporary counter-hegemony in South Africa 
through a theoretical-conceptual approach, and a deep, colonial, historical approach. I present 
three critical premises: (1) neoliberalism is de-democratization and covert authoritarianism; 
(2) universities are potential sites of critical democratization; and (3) marginalized university 
students drive a radical, transgressive imagination of alternative worlds.  
I provide critical historical background to situate South Africa within Contemporary 
Globalization before chronicling the emergent themes of ongoing protests.Following my 
South Africa case study, I briefly compare RMF and OS to other university student protests 
around the globe, including California and Germany. I suggest that under Contemporary 
Globalization,  apparently dissimilar social movements share much in common, including 
universities’ simultaneous assimilation into, and potential for resistance against, the  new, 
covert authoritarianism and de-democratization of global neoliberalism.  
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Academic freedom, or the freedom to study whatever one pleases and is equipped to 
study, is a foundational quality of Global North and West concepts of the university. I have 
observed many individuals’ backgrounds influencing their university studies, both in 
physical and in social sciences. This often manifests as a young student whose parents were 
astronauts, and who now studies astronomy, or as a young student of color who dives into 
critical race theory via Chicanx or Black Studies. I entered my MA in Global and 
International Studies program thinking I would study a top-down issue, like states’ use of 
human rights in their foreign policies, and then work in government after graduation. 
However, I realized that after this MA, six years of my life would have been spent studying 
in the UC amidst massive austerity and protests against such policies. The ongoing 
destruction of the University of California (UC) system would remain on my mind. As I 
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spent more and more of my energy supporting student activism while studying human rights 
from a top-down statist perspective, and realizing how slow and ineffective such approaches 
historically were, I could not justify contradictory studies.  
So, I followed the same path as many of my peers and studied an inextricable part of 
my identity: politics and student activism. I acknowledge that I was involved with social 
movements on the side of vocal student protesters with UCSA, UCSB GSA, and 
OS/UCT:RMF for my short time in South Africa. Growing up in California’s Central Valley, 
I was made aware of racialized class and labor divisions, though I lacked the understanding 
of these matrices of domination until this program. Some critical theorists seemed only to 
obfuscate and equivocate in their attempts to explain violence and inequality. Others clarified 
how the poorest and dirtiest part of California produced a majority of the state’s food. I 
learned the academic analyses of how my hometown in the regional periphery was exploited 
to serve the interests of California’s consuming capitalist core in the major metropolises of 
San Francisco and Los Angeles, and wealthy coastal communities like Santa Barbara.  
In formally studying the Global Capital Crisis and the artificial housing market’s 
contribution to the implosion of the globalized economy, I gained new understanding of how 
so much Central Valley farmland was developed into cheap McMansions, sold on subprime 
mortgages to those who couldn’t afford them, and then wound up as acres of empty suburbs 
repossessed by banks. I finally could articulate how Mexican- and Central-American migrant 
laborers were exploited by property developers literally paving over the most fertile soil in 
the world, all so that developers could collude with banks to profitably sell McMansions to 
the petty bourgeois. Clearly seeing how my California community helped prime the entire 
American economy, and indirectly the global economy, for a catastrophic collapse armed me 
 
 
5 
with newfound knowledge of my own history and global positionality. It seemed fitting to 
now apply this critical theory to my own life as a student in the formerly-public University of 
California (UC) system.  
I avow that I am biased, and acknowledging this bias is fundamental to my research. 
Ignoring bias is a perpetuation of Eurocentric fallacies of assuming complete objective and 
apolitical neutrality. As a researcher I attempt to minimize my bias as much as possible. 
However, my critical pedagogy of empathy and my use of Participatory Action Research 
(PAR) aimed to deliberately challenge the established myths that our neoliberal, quantitative, 
positivist, unemotional, Eurocentric, colonial approach to education can be objective or 
unbiased - something that a great many disciplines still insist is true as of 2016, at the cost of 
sacrificing self-reflexive critique of their own work. If I am to move beyond this initial MA 
Thesis, I want to ensure I do my best not to fall into the trappings of academia’s privileged 
delusion of total confidence in Eurocentric methodologies that fail to critique their own 
implicit epistemologies and ideologies. Ultimately, many of the academic theories reviewed 
in this program are prematurely prescriptive and/or broad, and attempted to generate a 
sweeping “theory of everything.” The great majority of this academic literature, and 
academic literature in general, came from the Global North and West, and reflected 
Eurocentric epistemologies and ideologies. Oftentimes, investigations continue to perpetuate 
conventional boundaries and remain trapped in a single context, often national or 
methodological, thus undermining their contribution to an integrated global perspective.  
Additionally, it seems that subconscious or covert ideological biases within academia 
and academic arguments are rarely explicitly acknowledged, implying there is no bias within 
the argument. This seems especially true within strictly quantitative and econometric 
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approaches, as my theory review of Global Studies (GS) addresses. This thesis employs a 
mixed methods approach, in line with the post-/inter-/trans- disciplinary nature of Critical 
GS. This thesis also complements a broad survey of different components of the primary case 
study, from a “deep history” to a brief econometric analysis, with a close, detailed, “thick 
description,”-style (Geertz, 1973) qualitative analysis of the case study itself: the university 
student protesters who drive university social movements. In this way, I acknowledge the 
impossibility of any one discipline or methodology to adequately capture the presumably 
objective “truth” about an issue, while seeking to investigate it to the full extent of 
epistemological and other constraints allow.  
I acknowledge that I am an immensely privileged and biased individual raised in the 
West. I cannot completely de-link myself from my embedded Eurocentric, liberal, secular, 
Global North and West, individualistic human rights-based values and perspectives. 
Furthermore, the 3 nation-states and societies highlighted in my case studies are liberal, 
constitutional representative democracies with close connections to colonialism. While doing 
this research, I encountered many cultural, gender, and political power differences, not the 
least of which was the fact that my own participation in the actions being researched was 
voluntary, compared to those who felt they had no other choice but to protest. Multiple times, 
while discussing the issue of Eurocentric and colonial educational practices that continue in 
today’s academy, I was made even more aware of my privilege as a White American man 
conducting research on political dissidents.  
I endeavored to utilize “decolonizing methodologies” (Smith, 2012) as often as 
possible, primarily relying on Participant Action Research (PAR) with various political 
groups (Ragin, 1989; Adelman, 1993) for field research. Because my research focuses on 
 
 
7 
how globally powerful actors influence the less powerful, I understood extensive care had to 
be given to analyzing and researching such power asymmetries. I acknowledge that my 
research, and publication of its results, may harm humans and communities in ways 
unforeseeable to myself or other academics.  
I took all available precautions. This research did not identify private individuals, 
except a small number of those already active within a public research and/or academic 
institution, who were identified in publicly-accessible documents, and who spoke with me as 
a complement to my research, who I do not quote directly. The primary methodologies for 
this thesis were qualitative analyses of protest groups’ rhetoric, via primary sources 
published on conventional and social media. I also employed qualitative and quantitative 
discourse analysis via secondary sources and established theorists, with especial focus on the 
the global, colonial history of South and Southern Africa, as well as its contemporary poli-
socio-economics. I also participated in student protests for one month of PAR in Cape Town 
in 2015 August, and for 18 months in Santa Barbara, California, from 2015 January through 
2016 June.   
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Introductory Iteration of My Thesis 
 
Throughout this lengthy document, I strive to maintain a consistent style, and to 
bookend each chapter with concise reiterations and clarifications. I begin with critical, 
theoretical overviews, in order to contextualize subsequent specific examples and historical 
events; these, I present in chronological breakdowns of critical historical events. Following 
my first chapter’s introductory iteration of my thesis, I proceed through a self-reflexive and 
critical review of Global Studies (GS) theories, in order to explicate my approach to GS. This 
theory review focuses on divergent perspectives of mainstream GS and critical GS, as the 
field emerged within academia from the 1980s and 1990s through the early 2000s. I then 
present chapter two, my densest critical chapter. Chapter two explicates my three critical 
premises on contemporary globalization, focusing on: (1) contemporary globalization as 
defined by global neoliberalism, violence, de-democratization, and covert authoritarianism; 
(2) the relationship of critical education to authority; (3) the relationship of contemporary 
universities and university students to counter-hegemonic social movements.  
Following these two critical theory-heavy chapters, which provide both the critical-
theoretical and the global-colonial context for my approach, my third chapter summarizes 
South Africa’s history. My third chapter focuses on the role of violence, students, and 
education in counter-hegemonic, anti-apartheid, and post-apartheid power struggles. My 
fourth chapter is my thesis’s primary case study: South Africa’s contemporary university 
student protests, with a focus on Rhodes Must Fall’s necessarily transgressive, radical 
imaginary, which was driven by marginalized university students, and in turn drove 
nationwide protests that culminated in the 2011 “Fees Must Fall” protests that caused a 
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national shutdown. My fifth chapter offers a qualitative comparison of South Africa to other 
ongoing instances of university and university student-driven counter-hegemonic social 
movements. My sixth chapter and its two Appendixes, A and B, provide my references, 
timelines of South Africa’s protests, and a list of all of my charts, figures, and tables, 
respectively.  
My fourth chapter describes in detail and historicizes the dominant themes of South 
Africa’s contemporary protests in an attempt at a “thick description” based on my PAR, 
whereas my fifth chapter provides an analysis of South Africa’s protests in a global context. 
Analyzing the ideologies and rhetorics of university-driven social movements and university 
student-driven protests around the globe reveals simultaneous counter-hegemonic protests 
that share many similarities despite apparent dissimilarities. These convergences present a 
potential set of global university- and student-driven counter-hegemonic social movements 
against the contemporary hegemonic globality of neoliberal capitalism, and what I theorize 
as its inherent, covert authoritarianism. This ideological and rhetorical convergence is 
evidenced through the similar focuses of each social movement, and especially on the issues 
prioritized by the university students driving the protests and/or social movements. Generally 
speaking, the more transgressive and radical protests were, the more they influenced policy 
and other protests and social movements - especially for Rhodes Must Fall. Furthermore, the 
more marginalized the students leading a group, the more transgressive and radical was their 
imagined alternative to global neoliberalism.  
I identify the following five themes in Rhodes Must Fall, an exclusively Black-led 
social movement on behalf of students, South Africans, and all Pan-African and Afro-
diasporic peoples:  
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● Renewed visibility of identity politics, respectability politics 
● Marginalized university students’ “leadership” 
● Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics 
● Performative and artistic protest re-centering narratives 
● Use of both social and conventional media 
 
RMF radically and transgressively resisted the contemporary hegemonic globality 
through visibilizing racial, sexual, and financial violence against students, who they 
categorized as amongst the historically colonized. RMF and most other ongoing university-
driven social movements under contemporary globalization share the following similarities:  
1. Visibilization of, through the prioritization of, issues of racial, sexual, and financial 
violence and exclusion of students;  
2. Prioritization of access to education as something to which humans are fundamentally 
entitled;  
3. Communication of demands in ways described as radical, transgressive, and criminal;  
4. Contestations of their legitimacy by right-wing students and civil society agents.  
 
Each university-driven social movement differs in terms of preferred terminology, 
geographies, global-colonial histories, and political, social/cultural, and economic (poli-
socio-economic) systems.  Despite disparities, the university-driven social movements’ and 
the university students protests’ strikingly similar substantive issues and tactics represent a 
potential global convergence of core issues impacting most public tertiary education systems 
around the global under contemporary globalization. To analyze this potentially global-in-
scale unit of analysis, this thesis is founded upon the following three critical premises.  
1. “Contemporary Globalization” is a distinct and complex post-Cold War time period and 
process that is USA-driven, advanced, neoliberal capitalism, on a global scale, which is a 
form of “New Authoritarianism” that de-democratizes societies through what I term 
“covert authoritarianism” or “governance by capital.”  
2. Universities are potential sites of critical democratization, where imaginaries of “the 
public,” participation, critical thought, and critiques of authority were more likely to 
occur than elsewhere in society; as such, public universities have been targeted by 
neoliberalism and covert authoritarianism.  
3. As universities are destroyed by covert authoritarianism, counter-hegemonic resistance 
may potentially be articulated, but it is likely led by marginalized students who must 
perform in ways perceived as radical and transgressive.  
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Global Studies Theory Review 
 
My thesis begins with an introduction of global studies (GS), ideologies, and powers, 
both in academia generally, and in terms of my thesis’s specific focus. To do so, it reviews 
both mainstream and marginalized GS theories in order to deconstruct and differentiate 
critical and marginalized GS from Mainstream GS, and as such situate my thesis uniquely 
within Critical GS. I then present the temporal focus of my thesis by reviewing the time 
periods historicized in this thesis, with especial focus on Contemporary Globalization c. 
1988-2016, and the 2007-present Global Capital Crisis.  
I then present my first premise on contemporary global democracy, authority, and 
hegemony, with especial focus on covert processes of (de-)democratization under global 
neoliberalism. I then focus on my second premise of universities as sites of democratization, 
and the multivarious local contexts of tertiary educational institutions under global 
neoliberalism. I then finally review theories relevant to my final premise, on counter-
hegemonic social movements, with especial emphasis on suitable case studies for university-
driven social movements, and within those, university student-driven protests. 
Situating Global (and International) Studies 
Implicit in this thesis, and any argument made within academia’s emergent global 
(and international) studies, is the existence of something truly super- or post-national, or 
approaching a globality: a world-system that is global in scale, design, and/or impact. Global 
Studies (GS) as a formal academic field, practice, and/or possibly a discipline or department, 
continues to rapidly transform, and so remains a dynamic and contested subject in academia 
that requires clarification. Steger and Nederveen-Pieterse provide broad surveys of major 
theorists of globalizing processes, which are reviewed here in order to contextualize my own 
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thesis’s interpretation and application of GS to my focus on university-driven counter-
hegemonic social movements, and university student-driven protests. The primary units of 
analysis in my thesis and its case studies are systems, particularly education systems, which 
are in turn founded upon political, social-cultural and economic (poli-socio-economic) 
systems. Within these systems, as explained later in terms of hegemony, power, legitimacy, 
and authority, I focus on national-level counter-hegemonic social movements, and their 
subsidiary protests, which have sub-national, super-national, regional, and/or global 
influences.  
Before I present my specific case studies, in order to contextualize these units of 
analysis as a true GS thesis, I review the possibly contentious theories of a macro, global 
context. This review is necessary in order to clarify and justify my own particular lens I use 
to “zoom in” and “zoom out.” I do this in a particular way because of my own interpretation 
that GS has the potential to be transgressive, radical, and counter-hegemonic, but remains 
constrained by the academic privilege of historically colonial, Global North and West 
institutions. This privilege must be constantly critiqued, lest colonial “savior” practices are 
reified and perpetuated.  
Meta and Macro Post-National Analyses  
Steger (2010) provides examples ranging from quantitative, pro-capitalist, economic 
theories of Levit (1983) and Stiglitz (2003) to qualitative, conceptual theories by Appadurai 
(1996), Giddens (1991), and Hardt and Negri (2000), highlighting the consistent theme of 
temporally and spatially accelerating change on a larger, possibly planetary scale. This theme 
of macro-scale transformation persists, even if few specifics of that change are agreed-upon 
by a cacophony of theories and theorists. Within my own department at UC, Santa Barbara, 
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GS began to to be academically formalized in the early 1990s, by the academic procedure of 
establishing one of the first graduate-level programs in the field of what was then titled 
Global and International Studies. The recent adjustment of our department’s name to remove 
“and International” and leave only Global Studies speaks to the shifting focuses of different 
universities, departments, disciplines, professors, pedagogies, methodologies, and ideologies 
- some of which seek to transgress existing epistemological boundaries of post-(inter-
)nationalism.  
Multiple different theorists reviewed below have framed GS as a field that 
transgresses conventional academic boundaries by being both multi-/inter-/trans-disciplinary, 
as well as centering research on justice and human suffering more than conventional, stand-
alone academic disciplines and departments. Despite some common themes, after over 30 
years of formal academic discussion, “What is Global Studies?” is still widely asked, and still 
lacks an academically agreed-upon answer.  Juergensmeyer answers this titular question by 
pointing out that the Global Studies Consortium, consisting of over 40 GS formal academic 
graduate programs worldwide, and was "originally proposed at a workshop in Santa Barbara 
in 2007," has agreed that Global Studies have the following 5 "key defining characteristics":  
● "transnational";  
● "interdisciplinary";  
● "contemporary and historical";  
● "postcolonial and critical";  
● "aim[ing] at global citizenship".  
(Juergensmeyer, 2011: 1-3)  
 
Two years later, in their Mainstream GS textbook Thinking Globally, which 
explicates how GS represents a way of thinking as well as a perspective or a unit of analysis, 
Juergensmeyer offers another answer that prompts further questions: 
[GS] can mean a lot of different things, both the hard and the squishy. It is usually 
defined as the analysis of events, activities, ideas, processes, and flows that are 
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transnational or that can affect all areas of the world. These global activities can be 
studied as one part of the established disciplines of sociology, economics, political 
science, history, religious studies, and the like. Or global studies can be a separate 
course or part of a whole new program or department. 
As an academic field, global studies is fairly new. It blossomed largely after the turn 
of the twenty-first century. But the intellectual roots of the field lie in the pioneering 
work of the many different scholars who have thought globally over many decades. 
These thinkers have attempted to understand how things are related and have 
explored the connections among societies, polities, economies, and cultural systems 
throughout the world. (Juergensmeyer, 2013: 1)  
 
Juergensmeyer outlines Global Studies as a still-emerging field that is inter-
disciplinary and largely dependent upon the perspective of the social scientists executing a 
particular study from their own particular perspective or discipline. This variety of 
interpretations of GS makes it both very flexible and dynamic, as well as vaguely-defined. 
Despite vague boundaries, some themes tend to permeate all GS theories. A post-boundary, 
non-conventional way of thinking is embedded in much Global Studies scholarship, as 
Juergensmeyer suggests in closing, with the notion that GS is defined by "one of the most 
hopeful trends in modern history—the reconnection of societies, economies, and minds that 
political borders have kept apart for far too long." (Juergensmeyer, 2013: 27) This notion of 
“reconnection,” as opposed to simply “connection,” implies a political act of remedying 
previously-disconnected “societies, economies, and minds,” with emphasis on how “political 
borders” functioned in disconnection.  
Nederveen-Pieterse “examines global studies and whether and how it differs from the 
earlier wave of globalization studies” because “studies of globalization are anchored in social 
science and humanities disciplines while global studies are, in principle, conceived on a 
different footing.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2013: 799) At this more meta level of dissecting 
what “different footing” constitutes studying globalities versus processes of globalization, 
transnationalization, or localization, Nederveen-Pieterse usefully “distinguishes two accounts 
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of global studies: an empirical account, i.e. a description of actual existing global studies, and 
an analytical or programmatic account, which refers to what global studies can or should be 
for theoretical or other reasons.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2013: 799) This thesis strives to be the 
latter, with acknowledgment of the former. Nederveen-Pieterse then goes on to outline 
different approaches to studies of globality and globalization, with a great many disparities 
existing between different, and sometimes politically- or historically-opposed groups. They 
conclude by touching on the “cognitive problems of global thinking, in particular the 
challenges of multicentric and multilevel thinking.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2013: 799) Writing 
directly in response to Nederveen-Pieterse, Steger critiques such a broad approach to 
defining GS, and insists that “globalization” is “the master concept at the heart of GS.” 
(Steger, 2013: 771) From this contention, and the broad array of contradictory and 
contentious sources briefly reviewed below, it is clear that GS remains unclearly bounded. 
This lack of clear boundaries may empower or frustrate theorists, depending on their biases, 
and demands clarification of said biases for any emergent Critical GS theory.  
Formalized, Mainstreamed Academic Methodologies, Pedagogies, and Ideologies  
With my thesis's focus on post-Cold War Contemporary Globalization beginning 
around the late 1980s, it’s prudent to highlight Harvey’s Marxist The Condition of 
Postmodernity and contrasting mainstream academic global and globalization studies 
methodologies. (Harvey, 1989) Harvey helped keep in academic discourse Marxist 
dialectical materialism and its critiques of capitalism and Eurocentric modernity, during a 
time of increasing marginalization of Marxism, including mainstream academia’s 
abandonment of it. Harvey even helped highlight and popularize the academically marginal 
Gramscian notions of hegemony and resistance under (post-)Fordism regimes. Harvey helped 
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establish in academia theories of global-scale post-Fordism, centering analysis on 
financialization and the concomitant 1987 capital crisis as global inequality and insecurity 
increased. (Harvey, 1989: 357) However, the collapse of the USSR and simultaneous rise of 
pro-capitalist policies and theories, both within and beyond academia, further marginalized 
Marxist and Gramscian theory, as detailed below.  
As “the end of history” became a common-sense assumption about poli-socio-
economic systems, uncritical academic discourse reified the system of capitalism, for which 
there was no longer any viable alternative. (Fukuyama, 1989, 1993) Analyses became 
centered on the role, power, and sovereignty of nation-states that were assumed to be liberal 
democracies. Critiques of capitalism became considered largely in econometric theories and 
capitalist language, thus reifying the notion that “there is no alternative” to capitalism. (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002; Bond, 2014: 121) Even Hobsbawm wrote that the experiments of Soviet-
style state socialism were fundamentally flawed in the contemporary global system, and 
shifted to a more general analysis of “globalization,” rather than their earlier, more 
politicized, and more accurate, terms. (Hobsbawm, 1998)  
Around this time period in the late 1980s through 1990s, common concepts and 
discussions in powerful academic institutions began to center theories around the notion of 
“globalization” as a totalizing process. In 1992, Barber’s approach partly satirically and 
partly seriously conceptualized globalization as a contest between “McWorld, or the 
globalization of politics,” which is problematic in its own way, and which is opposed by the 
Islamophobic concept of “Jihad, or the Lebanonization of the world.” (Barber, 1992: 30) 
Barber noted that in 1991 “there were more than thirty [hot] wars in progress, most of them 
ethnic, racial, tribal, or religious in character.” (Barber, 1992: 32) Barber sadly concludes 
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their analysis with a “darkening future of democracy” and notes “McWorld does manage to 
look pretty seductive in a world obsessed with Jihad.” (Barber, 1992: 33)  Barber fails to 
consider how capitalist McWorld is in fact a driver of Jihad and nationalist violence, despite 
noting that “the free market flourished in junta-run Chile, in military-governed Taiwan and 
Korea…” and so apparently possessed the capacity to recognize capitalism’s relationship 
with militarism. (Barber, 1992: 31)   
Much like Barber, other widely-influential, mainstream academic critiques and 
theories failed to critique accepted notions of what constitutes “liberal democracy.” 
Ultimately, c. 1990s GS tended to reinforce Eurocentric notions of the supremacy of their 
own nationalism, with uncritical perspectives of the formerly colonized world’s “tribalism.” 
Such focuses on capitalist realism and economic imperatives, without necessary engagement 
with deep histories of racism, sexism, capitalism, and colonialism, are reflected in pieces like 
The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Strange, 1996) and 
in “Power Shift: The Rise of Global Civil Society” published by the highly influential right-
wing Council on Foreign Relations, and embracing the Washington Consensus. (Matthews, 
1997)   
No article better represents the Global North and West biases of mid-1990s emergent 
GS academic theory than the highly politically influential, Harvard-based, mainstream GS 
academic Huntington. Their “Clash of Civilizations” thesis was the master concept behind 
their theory of a post-Cold War, post-1988 “New Era in World Politics.” Notions of a “Clash 
of Civilizations” uncritically supported and perpetuated the near-arbitrary colonial 
disconnection of the global map into racist Others. Huntington’s widespread influence 
exemplifies mainstream academia’s and policy- makers’ persistent ignorance and 
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marginalization of critical race and gender theories, from Feminist to Queer to Black to 
Chicanx Studies, and beyond. Such totalizing “civilization”-based global studies remained 
fixed in nationalism, focusing on how many wars might burden so-called liberal and 
democratic, and superior, Western nation-states. Over time, post-9/11 academia and Critical 
GS was increasingly able to dismiss such ignorant theories. Many theorists on the leftist 
margins and in the mainstream now acknowledge Huntington’s work as a “clash of 
ignorance” more than anything. (Said, 2001)  Unfortunately, many Mainstream GS theories 
produced at Ivy League institutions went on to significantly influence global policy beyond 
the circles of those with the academic privilege to know better, and with lasting ramifications 
for global epistemology pedagogy, methodology, and governance.  
While Harvey produced critical, anti-capitalist theories, work such as Dicken’s 
Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy, now in it’s 7th edition, 
became mainstream academic texts, and their theories also became influential on governance 
policies. Dicken’s and others’ similar theories became and remain essential tools to 
understand globalization and GS. Dicken’s analyses provided an easy-to-understand model 
of a “globalizing… transnationalizing… [and] regionalizing” economy comprised of 
“multiple dimensions” of “vertical...transnational production networks” and 
“horizontal...territorial systems at different geographical scales” resulting in a complex 
global system of “markets and peoples” that “have to operate within multi-scalar regulatory 
systems.” (Dicken, 2003a: 7-8)  This argument is strikingly similar to Nederveen-Pieterse’s 
multi-dimensional analyses, but Dicken uses only standard capitalist-realist econometrics. 
Dicken exemplifies econometric analyses that dissect in limited but conventionally useful 
ways the simultaneous “new geo-economy” and the ongoing persistence of the capitalist-
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realist economic map due to the “territorial embeddedness” of production networks post-
Cold War. (Dicken, 2003b) While Dicken makes global complexity relatively accessible to 
mainstream academics and students located in the Global North and the West, their pedagogy 
and approach to GS is not centered on critiques of hegemonic poli-socio-economic systems. 
Instead, Dicken et. al.’s largely econometric, quantitative, nation-state-based, zoomed-out 
methodology relies on International Relations (IR)-derived ideal types, what I term 
“capitalist-realist”. Combined with a pedagogy of British colonial-style reliance on the 
authority of prestigious universities, this ideology of Mainstream GS perpetuated 
Eurocentrism, and only shallowly critiques without self-reflexivity.  
There are many other examples of similarly-aligned and -influential Mainstream GS 
that center nation-states and capitalist markets as the primary actors and units of analysis 
within globalization. I argue these theories covertly support the ongoing power of established 
authorities, at least through the constant centering of their narratives and theories on existing 
authorities, especially states and capitalist-realist epistemology. One of the best examples 
would be Keohane and Nye’s theory of “complex interdependence.” Complex 
interdependence is ostensibly “the opposite of realism” insofar as it assumes that post-Cold 
War there is a “minor role of military force,” and that a nation-state’s use or threat of force 
will vary depending on the issue and the nation-state at hand, versus realist theories that 
military force is always the most important option. (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 2001: 
71) They argue this is because in a highly inter-/trans- nationalized, regionalized, or 
globalized economy, “employing force on one issue against an independent state with which 
one has a variety of relationships is likely to rupture mutually profitable relations on other 
issues...the use of force often has costly effects on non security goals.” (Keohane and Nye, 
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2001: 71, 74, 76)  Thus we see that through nation-states and their sub-state capitalist firms’ 
desire to maintain predictable profitability, there is decreased incentive to use force, but still 
centers on the concern for “security” of the nation-state. Perhaps the most critical part of their 
theory is admission that over-reliance on an “ideal type” is too reductive - much like ideal 
types of free-markets are too reductive to understand global capitalism - so a more complex, 
pluralistic, and multi-centered theory is necessary. (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 71)  Perhaps 
most egregiously, though, complex interdependence grossly neglects sub-state conflict, 
massively overgeneralizing that “fears of attack in general have declined” with a perspective 
explicitly noted as limited to “industrialized, pluralist countries,” thus excluding the majority 
of the world population - especially residents of historically colonized regions. (Keohane and 
Nye, 2001: 75)   
While at first glance such theories about complexity appear to transgress against 
notions of capitalist-realist ideologies by ostensibly centering on peace or security, they 
covertly further the interests of nation-states that are already powerful enough to be 
perceived as legitimate, global-scale authorities. Such analyses fail to recognize that unequal 
economic power and other advantages are securitized through military force and other types 
of violence. They fail to realize that sanctions, embargoes, or currency (de)valuation, are 
weapons that are the privilege of nation-states with economic power. They fail to realize this 
economic power constitutes another type of force: financial violence that may be used or 
threatened against others. They also fail to recognize how the production and legitimization 
of knowledge, such as theories produced in influential Global North and West academic 
institutions, represent an epistemological and ideological soft power over Global South 
theories. That this is largely unconsidered by complex interdependence theorists and other 
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capitalist-realist-confined Mainstream GS academics demonstrates how apparently peace-
centered, apparently left-wing methodologies and pedagogies are in fact covertly right-wing 
in their underlying and often invisible ideology.  
It should be noted that by the time of the Obama Regime, Clinton State Department, 
and 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis, influential academics such as Professor Ikenberry at 
Princeton University were promoting revised “complex interdependence” theories. These 
revisions prioritized ostensibly peaceful “predictability” between nation-states, in order to 
overtly justify ongoing USA global hegemony and authority as a so-called Liberal Leviathan 
that decides what behavior should be predicted. (Ikenberry, 2011)  What was predictable for 
a great many humans residing in non-USA-aligned nation-states was wretchedness and 
violence, something not considered by Ikenberry. The closest Ikenberry comes to criticality 
of the current international order in their analyses is an assumption that “liberal democracy” 
and capitalist development would incrementally lessen said wretchedness and violence - in a 
way palatable to established authorities in the Global North and West.   
There have also been overtly right-wing theorists that, throughout the establishment 
of the formal academic GS field in the 1990s, overtly, uncritically, and polemically 
reinforced the rhetoric, methodology, and ideology of both the first and second Bush 
Regimes. In line with the preachings of the first Bush Regime’s “new world order,” theorists 
in powerfully-connected institutions, like Princeton University’s Professor Slaughter, 
furthered the abandonment of Marxist / development / dependency theory in favor of a statist 
and capitalist analysis that largely ignores the people of diverse races, genders, abilities, and 
historical backgrounds bearing the brunt of “crises” threatening state power. (Slaughter, 
2004: 1-4) Again, Huntington’s racist, Islamophobic, and xenophobic “clash of civilizations” 
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is exemplary, given its ongoing ideological influence today with the USA-driven Global War 
on Terror, initiated during the neoconservative second Bush Regime, but expanded under the 
neoliberal Obama regime.  
An exemplar of overtly right-wing GS theorizing, Micklethwait and Woolridge 
present a disturbingly upbeat overview of “globalization” that stands in starkest contrast to 
more critical and contentious theories offered below. By juxtaposing Marx’s Communist 
Mannifesto and early critiques of capitalism’s inherent globalizing tendencies as “intercourse 
in every direction, universal interdependence of nations.” (Marx and Engels, 1848, 1906 
trans.)  Micklethwait and Woolridge contemporarily reiterate Smith’s reductive “rising 
boats” analogy by arguing: “globalization makes us richer - or makes enough of us richer to 
make the whole process worthwhile.” (Smith, 1776; Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2000: 11) 
They assert that “power lies increasingly in the hands of individuals rather than 
governments...the world is nevertheless a lot freer today than it was just a few decades ago, 
before globalization got into high gear,” without any serious consideration that correlation 
may not equal causation, or that there exists widespread repression within and by ostensibly 
free, liberal, democratic, capitalist nation-states. (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2000: 12)  
Micklethwait and Woolridge, and other similar theorists, argue reductively and 
uncritically that capitalism equals democracy and individual liberty. Similar so-called 
theories are more accurately categorized as politically right-wing polemics. Such arguments 
are academically unsound due to a lack of critical engagement with the ideology they are 
promoting, as well as failing to imagine ecological, social, cultural, or other issues due to an 
embarrassingly limited understanding of what constitutes liberty: “the freedom to define our 
own identities...[through consuming] books, movies, even potato chips that reflect their own 
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identities.” (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2000: 14, 13) Despite this lack of imagination and 
academic rigor, these overtly right-wing theories are neither isolated nor unpopular, within 
and beyond academia. Fourteen years after such absurdly ignorant assertions, the same 
theorists proselytize the same reductive theories about unrestrained capitalism equaling 
democracy, while serving as editors-in-chief of the highly-influential media products The 
Economist and Bloomberg Businessweek. (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2014)  
Unfortunately, as addressed throughout this thesis, reductive and (c)overtly right-wing 
methodologies, pedagogies, and ideologies have become common-sense on a global scale, 
and this reification and mainstreaming was led by powerful and privileged academics 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
Transgressive Theories and Critical Academic Projects 
Within global and international studies, academics’ aspirations to influence 
descriptions of the contemporary globality are a point of contention, as earlier examples 
evidence. Older and newer variations of a theory of a global-scale “world order” or “world 
system” have been offered in some form by both mainstream theorists, as well as 
marginalized academics. Many of these various descriptions transgressed existing formal 
boundaries and informal common-sense assumptions about Eurocentric worldviews. Even 
early, policy-oriented, IR- and economics- based assertions about global-scale changes and 
transformations of state power (Strange, 1996; Matthews, 1997; Held, 1999) threatened 
established knowledge, despite not significantly critiquing notions of “liberal democracy,” 
nation-states, and capitalism, like Harvey. (1989)  More transgressive GS theories challenge 
common-sense assumptions of what constitutes “globalization,” and argue that use of such an 
absolute and all-encompassing term is dangerous by disregarding risks of convergent, path-
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dependent logic. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2014)  A more explicitly politicized approach to GS 
highlights both the implicit ideologies and biases of purportedly objective, neutral, or 
apolitical approaches to GS. Such critical academic endeavors, oftentimes labelled a Project 
of some sort, tend to try and answer in creative, interdisciplinary, divergent, and non-path 
dependent ways the question “What is globalization?” in addition to “What is global 
studies?” McNeill has long theorized that what most call globalization, and what I term 
“Contemporary Globalization”, is simply one more era in human history marked by many 
long-term processes of disruptive convergences between the local and super-local, since the 
beginning of human consciousness. (McNeill and Kindleberger, 1989; McNeill, 2008; 
McNeill and Christian, 2011) Wallerstein theorizes that globalization "has been happening 
for 500 years" and that specific “transitions” should be referenced instead of a totalizing, 
term like "globalization" generally. (Wallerstein, 2000: 249)   
Globalization is a misleading concept, since what is described as globalization has 
been happening for 500 years. Rather what is new is that we are entering an 'age of 
transition'. We can usefully analyze the current world situation using two time 
frames: 1945 to the present and circa 1450 to the present.  
The period since 1945 has been one long Kondratieff cycle...The economic and 
political developments of the last 50 years are easy to place within this framework. 
The period from 1450 to the present is the long history of the capitalist world-
economy.  
(Wallerstein, 2000: 249)   
 
For a critical, zoomed-out, meta-analysis, Nederveen-Pieterse suggests that global 
histories and histories of globalization can range from notions of pre-historic to Classical 
Western to c. 1450-present capitalist world-systems histories, like those of Wallerstein. 
The article outlines the analytics and criteria that inform periodizing globalization. It 
criticizes presentist and Eurocentric views on globalization, the contemporary view, 
the modernity view (1800 plus) or the capitalism view (1500 plus). It discusses 
approaches to world history and how globalization fits in. Understandings of 
globalization, such as multicentric and centrist perspectives, and units of analysis 
affect how timelines of globalization are established. Taking into account global 
history going back to the Bronze Age and oriental globalization, these require 
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inserting the Greco-Roman world as part of globalization history. It concludes by 
outlining phases of globalization in the (very) longue durée.  
(Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012b: 1)  
 
McNeill, Nederveen-Pieterse, and Wallerstein all offer critiques that interrogate their 
own Eurocentric biases and situations within capitalism, but maintain such a zoomed-out 
perspective that they consider multiple disciplines. Even by claiming overt apoliticism, they 
continue to be academically transgressive by highlighting the shortcomings of each discipline 
and approach to “globalization,” including their own issues of “Eurocentrism” and 
“presentism.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012: 2) Unfortunately, even with self-reflexivity and 
ideological transgression, when producing GS knowledge within Global North and West 
academia, academia’s systemic self-service and the issue of inevitably creating a “Northern 
Theory of Globalization” arises.  In this way, the limitations of academic theories alone for 
highly-influential transgression emerge.  
Producing theories and knowledge of globalization that favor the Global North and 
West depends in part upon theorists and texts that are “almost totally embedded in 
metropolitan academic routines of citation and affiliation” that ignore non-metropolitan or 
non-university produced and legitimized knowledge, therefore excluding hums of the Global 
South. (Connell, 2007: 379)  With an emphasis on how non-Global South, and especially 
African, knowledge is excluded from legitimate sites of knowledge production, like Global 
North and West academia, Professor Kamola argues the following:  
Today, the heated globalization debates of the 1990s and early 2000s have quieted to 
a murmur. A growing number of scholars even voice skepticism about whether 
globalization theory has any lasting relevance, some declaring it “by and large 
defunct” (Leander 2009:110) and in need of a “postmortem” (Rosenberg 2000; see 
also Rosenberg 2005; Kamola 2012).  
Some evidence even suggests that the volume of academic work on globalization is 
declining, down from its high-water mark in the late 1990s (Guillen 2001:241). 
However, as the globalization debate quiets, it becomes possible to observe its lasting 
legacy. This legacy lies less with particular conclusions about whether globalization 
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is new or old, good or bad, whether it undermines the nation-state, or differs 
substantially from modernity or postmodernity.  
Rather, in the nearly two decades spent debating these and other questions, scholars 
repeatedly made assertions about what does (and does not) count as “global.” Even as 
globalization theory wanes, “the global” this literature produced continues to pervade 
the social sciences, providing the foundation for numerous offshoot literatures 
currently shaping academic and public debates... 
 
Many scholars in Africa now find themselves disconnected from the centers of 
knowledge production and dependent upon international agencies for funding. Much 
of the research conducted in African universities is commissioned by “foreign 
institutions, agencies, or individuals” who “determine and control its content and gain 
credit for it,” a practice that creates serious hierarchies among African academics and 
materially constrains the kind of intellectual work that can be produced (Federici 
2000:19–21).  
This “intellectual recolonization” (Federici 2000:19) follows a general pattern in 
which “non-metropolitan thought” remains almost “totally unreferenced” within a 
globalization literature “almost totally embedded in metropolitan academic routines 
of citation and affiliation” (Connell 2007:379). In this context, academic “picture[s] 
of global society” are often created by merely “projecting traits already recognized in 
metropolitan society” (Connell 2007:379).  
Because the largest and most productive academic processing zones exist in the West, 
Africa and other non-Western locations often become sites of “unprocessed data” and 
“reservoirs of raw facts” rather than “sources of refined knowledge” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2012:1). This tendency results in a lack of “epistemic diversity” within the 
globalization literature resulting in a “monoculture” of social scientific knowledge 
(Santos, Arriscado Nunes and Paula Meneses 2008; see also Cooper 2005, 2010; 
Ferguson 2006).  
(Kamola, 2013: 53, 52)  
 
Throughout their career, Kamola uses influential Global North and West academics 
such as Professor Ferguson’s Global Shadows (2006) to support critical and academically- 
marginalized critiques of how mainstream and influential GS academics such as Fukuyama 
(1992), Huntington (1996), Held et. al. (1999), Sassen (1996), and Stiglitz (2003) “each 
produces a concept of globalization in relation to the absence of Africa…[so] Africa’s 
invisibility within the globalization literature is actually symptomatic of a structure of 
academic knowledge production that marginalizes African scholars.” (Kamola, 2008: 184) 
Kamola specifies influential and prestigious USA and UK universities as central to how a 
“global imaginary is socially produced...within deeply embedded material practices, such as 
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those taking place within the university.” (Kamola, 2012: 2)  What material practices are 
taking place within USA and UK universities, that influence how the global and globalization 
is imagined?  
Kamola asserts, and I agree, that Global North and West academic claims to 
legitimate knowledge production, which is usually produced through empirically measurable, 
quantifiable measurements of objective reality as a key methodology, “effectively disables 
potentially emancipatory projects that might arise from imagining the world differently.” 
(Kamola, 2012: 2)  So, on the one hand, GS is situated within academia as an 
interdisciplinary field combined of IR, economics, and cultural studies. Its relatively 
emergent epistemology transgresses some boundaries, such as academic disciplines and 
obedience to the authority of capitalist-realist epistemologies. On the other hand, northern 
theories of globalization still abound in GS, especially amongst Mainstream, not 
marginalized or Critical, GS. Despite being academically, or departmentally, or disciplinarily 
transgressive, Mainstream GS  reifies Global North and West hegemonic epistemologies, 
methodologies, and pedagogies.  
University of Manchester Professor of Economics Dicken best exemplifies 
Mainstream GS theory. Their approach is relatively new, and relatively divergent from 
established IR and economics, but ultimately offers only an incremental change from 
mainstream USA- and UK-derived capitalist-realist theories that invisibilize much of the 
world through reducing all analyses to econometrics. Dicken exemplifies attempts to 
apolitically offer a uni-disciplinary approach to critiquing assumptions and definitions of 
“globalization,” which they consider “one of the most used...most misused...confused 
words...In the last 25 years it has entered the popular imagination in a big way, although it is 
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a concept whose roots go back at least to the nineteenth century, notably in the ideas of Karl 
Marx.” (Dicken, 2007: 1)  Dicken emphasizes that their “primary focus is the global 
economy,” also noting that such a global economy “is deeply embedded in social, cultural, 
and political processes and institutions [that] are themselves often substantially imbued with 
economic values...in the kind of capitalist market economy that now prevails throughout 
most of the world.” (Dicken, 2007: 5)  In other words, Dicken’s subjective perspective on 
what is central to a uni-disciplinary GS practice is, in fact, the capitalist-realist economy, 
though they insist they are not subjective.  
Dicken contrasts their approach to that of “‘hyper-globalists’ to the right and to the 
left” who, they argue, both have unrealistic theories of globalization equating de-
nationalizing global neoliberalism. Dicken starkly denies global neoliberalism through the 
following: “This hyper-globalist view of the world is a myth. It does not - and is unlikely to - 
exist.” (Dicken, 2007: 6)  In this way, through their assertion of methodological and 
epistemological superiority through quantitatively-derived objectivity, which academia 
mandates as a matter of its individualist competition, Dicken, self-identifies as moderate, 
apolitical, and neither on the left nor on the right - and yet, superior to other forms of 
knowledge.  
They do concede that the global economy is at the center of their theories, that 
capitalism is the de facto poli-socio-economic system now, and even that qualitative analysis 
is a necessary complement to quantitative analysis - but without any overt political 
engagement on the matter. In the next revised edition of their major text Global Shift, their 
“Introduction: Questioning Globalization” only mentions the “many casualties in the 
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financial system in 2008.” (Dicken, 2010: 1)  However, Dicken does use stronger language in 
categorizing the type of globalization leading up to the 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis.  
Neo-liberal, free market ideology (sometimes known as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’)...dominated the global economy for the past half century. 
Question: does the economic turmoil that began in 2008 herald ‘the end of 
globalization’? Well, it all depends on what we mean by ‘globalization’. It helps if we 
distinguish between two broad meanings of globalization.  
One refers to the actual structural changes that are occurring in the way the global 
economy is organized and integrated. The other meaning refers to the neo-liberal, 
free-market ideology of the ‘globalization project’. Of course, the two are not 
separate. As a result, confusion reigns. It is too early to say whether the free-market 
ideology has been irrevocably changed by the global financial crisis. Many think it 
has. Others believe that, once the dust settles, it will be business as usual.  
(Dicken, 2010: 1)  
 
But how does such an econometric approach to GS “move beyond the rhetoric, to 
seek the reality?” What if, as I argue, as South Africa’s students have argued, “the reality” 
for the majority of the world is wretched, inhumane violence, which econometrics 
invisibilizes, and of which qualitative descriptions are dismissed as “a myth” or just “hyper-
globalist” rhetoric? Such assumptions of one’s apolitical and unbiased, objective view of 
reality at best reflect the academic privilege of the theorist and their position within both 
academia and the world. At worst, they perpetuate dangerous assumptions and ignorance of a 
great deal of information and theories available to - and ignored by - those with academic 
privilege and power.  
GS as an emerging field is purportedly inclined towards political activism and justice, 
and derives from multiple disciplines in both the humanities and the social “sciences.” 
Unfortunately, all disciplines have varied histories of existing within, resisting against, and 
contributing to oppression. Academia has a long history of contributions to oppression, from 
psuedoscience like phrenology, to pervasive abuses of medical sciences on historically 
colonized peoples. Academic self-reflexivity and recognition of the biases of one’s own 
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department, discipline, and academic systems is essential to critically “zoom out” to a global 
perspective without forgetting local perspectives. Such critical global studies must seek, as 
Sachsenmaier argues, to incorporate and re-integrate into emergent global theory the 
historically excluded local majority.  
This book is centered on the idea that the debates about the possibilities and dangers 
of global history cannot just be conceptual in a narrow, methodological sense. They 
also need to address factors such as the international academic settings underlying the 
field, for these doubtlessly influence the ideas of historians. As scholars 
experimenting with hitherto unusual spatial paradigms, historians involve 
institutional, local, and global spaces within which they operate... 
 
If global historians fail to consider their own sociologies of knowledge, as well as the 
multivarious social, political, and cultural contexts framing their activities, the 
conceptual debates in the field will only be a pale reflection of what they potentially 
could be. In other words, the skills of global historians need to include an 
exceptionally high degree of professional self-reflexivity... 
 
Paying due attention to local peculiarities in the project of global history, however, 
requires some caution not to exoticize scholarship in different parts of the world.  
(Sachsenmaier, 2011: 3-4)  
 
I contend that Mainstream GS, particularly that established during the early phases of 
Contemporary Globalization c. 1988-2001, effectively failed to consider its “own sociologies 
of knowledge,” has failed “to pay attention to local peculiarities,” has demonstrated a low 
“degree of professional self-reflexivity,” and as such became, and mainly remain, “only a 
pale reflection of what they potentially could be.” (Sachsenmaier, 2011: 3-4)  Fortunately, 
counter-examples to mainstream academia exist within Critical GS.   
Darian-Smith consistently and sharply self-reflexively critiques the field they and 
their department at UCSB has helped to pioneer, by insisting that GS must not become “the 
handmaiden of neoliberalism.” (Darian-Smith, 2014) Darian-Smith argues that many 
purportedly neutral academic disciplines have thus been co-opted by their very nature of 
being constrained by Global North and West academia. (Darian-Smith, 2015: 2-3)  Darian-
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Smith additionally argues "that [development] indicators are producing and privileging 
certain kinds of knowledge over other kinds of knowledge that may not be so easily 
“captured” by nationally structured numerical reductionism," reiterating the need for units of 
analysis that go beyond capitalist-realist econometrics and nation-states as the be-all, end-all 
unit of analysis. They clarify that “Rather than summarily rejecting the quantitative 
approach...we use indicators more judiciously and critically, and counter-balance them with 
other forms of qualitative and local knowledge” as opposed to the current “veneration of 
numerical indicators offers a seductive illusion of control...a cult of quantification." (Darian-
Smith, 2015: 2-3)  This challenges the ostensibly apoliticism, neutrality, and consequent 
superiority of many quantitative IR, Economics, Political Science, and Mainstream GS 
theorists, a la Dicken.  
I am not uncritically, “summarily rejecting” absolutely quantitative epistemologies, 
and arguing that the binary opposite - absolutely qualitative epistemologies - are the only 
viable analytical lenses. I am necessarily, critically reviewing the structural power 
imbalances of academically-produced knowledge that, under Contemporary Globalization, is 
now rarely perceived as legitimate unless predicated on ostensibly objective quantitative 
analysis. I recognize that the rise of post-modern scholarship, qualitative analyses, and “the 
subjective turn” of academia helped transgressively birth new critical fields such as Feminist, 
Black, Chicanx, and Queer Studies. (Boghassian, 2006: 713)  Similarly situated within the 
margins of academia, I argue argue it is necessary for GS generally, Critical GS, and my 
thesis specifically to reaffirm why qualitative and subjective components must critique the 
“illusion of control,” neutrality, and objectivity - in order to avoid succumbing to a 
hegemonic “cult of quantification” and convergence with neoliberal epistemologies.   
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Older critiques of globalization, global processes, emergent globalities, and 
mainstream capitalist-realist academia can be found in the avowed leftist’s Hobsbawm’s 
Cold-War era, pre-Contemporary Globalization theories. Their definitions of global “ages” 
represent one form of an overtly political academic project - albeit one that has been 
extensively marginalized within and beyond academia due to its explicit Marxist and socialist 
perspective. (Hobsbawm, 1994; 1989; 1975; 1962)  New critiques abound as well. Foran, 
combining critical sociology with Critical GS, has issued an urgent “manifesto” (2010) and 
calls to action (2011) while supporting counter-hegemonic student groups (2015), organizing 
within academia for a rapid shift to “global crisis studies” centered on “global justice work.” 
(2010)  Foran rather effectively within their own constraints of academia facilitates 
"merg[ing] our efforts here [in academia] with the scientists, the parties, the movements of 
every color who are saying – or better, screaming – NO!" to impending global crises.” (2010: 
3) The Critical GS theorist Steger, too, offers a sharply different take than Dicken on the 
centrality of capitalist economics. One of their highly-accessible introductory texts centers 
globalization on politicized inequality and conflict, not an ostensibly neutral “business as 
usual” perspective. (Steger, 2003)  Steger’s scholarship beyond introductory texts is both 
highly accessible and sharply critical of what my thesis focuses on: the militarism and 
violence inherent in neoliberal capitalism, and the role the USA plays in perpetuating that 
violence. (Steger, 2005)  However, even with their relative accessibility, Hobsbawm’s, 
Steger’s, Foran’s, and Darian-Smith’s visibility and influence beyond academia on policy-
making remains marginalized.  
Recently-published “possible histories of the Global South” that focus explicitly on 
the “Third World Project” and its violent submission by “the Atlantic Project,” both of which 
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are tied to knowledge production by opposing political groups, is overtly aligned with leftist 
projects across the Global South. (Prashad, 2014; 2008)  The most useful Critical GS theories 
to this thesis, in addition to later-reviewed critical pedagogy and radical social movement 
theories, will be that of Nederveen-Pieterse (2004) and Robinson (1996). They focus on 
“neoliberal globalization” and “low-intensity democracy” called “polyarchy...in which a 
small group actually rules, on behalf of capital...in tightly controlled electoral processes,” 
respectively. Unfortunately, as I critically review and analyze academia’s approaches to 
globalization(s), the majority of highly Critical GS remains marginalized both within 
academia, and within society. As I review throughout this thesis, academia’s relevancy to 
contemporary radical democracy is questionable.   
Complex, Intersectional, and Practical Tools?  
Discussing the spread of GS to different groups inside and outside of academia, my 
thesis embraces the critiques McCarty levies against absolutely academic, perspectival, or 
philosophical GS meta-theories, whose outcomes tend to be “extreme levels of abstraction...a 
kind of analytical paralysis.” (McCarty, 2014a: 28)  McCarty insists that “The question 
‘What is Global Studies?’ is more than a purely academic question because formal, academic 
GS ‘programs are not developing in a vacuum’ but rather in a context of inequality, 
unfairness, and competition, from which academia is not exempt.” (McCarty, 2014a: 29)  
This argument that academia is not a zone of exception from society is central to my thesis 
and its case studies.  
Global Studies programs must earn a place within existing institutions, established 
fields of inquiry and faculties that are already under pressure from shrinking budgets 
and increasing student demand. 
As with any new interdisciplinary field, our programs must be able to hold their own 
against traditional disciplines such as economics, history, political science and 
sociology that offer their students coherent analytical frameworks, clear issues that 
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are framed in ways that can be understood, questions that can be answered, and 
powerful methodological tools with which to answer them. This is not to say that 
Global Studies should ask simplistic questions or offer simplistic explanations for the 
complex issues we deal with. However, if Global Studies programs are to establish 
legitimacy and compete for resources, they do need to offer some clarity... 
[GS] scholars need to convey the power that global perspectives have to address 
pressing global issues. We need to demonstrate that we can provide practical real-
world solutions. We need to communicate this potential not only to our students and 
to each other, but to scholars in other disciplines that are rapidly adopting global 
perspectives. 
(McCarty, 2014a: 28-30) 
 
McCarty’s critique of GS’s ongoing, comparative lack of “coherent analytical 
frameworks,” need to “earn a place within existing institutions,” and need to “establish 
legitimacy and compete for resources,” we see the ongoing need for critical epistemologies to 
practically address inequality, if only for their own self-preservation. Critical GS has 
struggled to be perceived as legitimate within academic institutions thus far, unless they align 
themselves with capitalist-realist epistemologies. A core focus of GS is "dealing in 
complexity" at a "global scale," offering the potential of "powerful analytical tools" and "new 
solutions to old problems" that existing epistemologies have also failed to provide. What I 
see as Critical GS’s most important concept, highlighted by McCarty and other theorists in 
GS and academia focused on recognition and engagement, is the following idea of 
“recovering critical perspectives”: 
Global perspectives are important because they have the potential to recover critical 
voices that are too often pushed out of the discourse of globalization. A focus on the 
economic processes of globalization can overemphasize the dominant processes of 
capitalism, global markets, international trade, development and regional trade 
agreements. A macroeconomic analysis displaces the local and further marginalizes 
voices from the periphery of the global economy. 
Global perspectives that encompass the entire local/global continuum necessarily 
encompass the voices of women, minorities, the unemployed, postcolonial subjects, 
people in the global south, people living in poverty, immigrants, refugees and other 
displaced persons, among others. 
By definition then, global perspectives include multiple intersectional dimensions... 
Any global analysis must include marginalized voices, many which bear witness to 
unfairness in the global system... 
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It is only by deliberately making room for these critical voices that Global Studies 
gains the potential to recognize and engage with the many facets of the most serious 
global issues facing the world today." (my own emphasis added)  
(McCarty, 2014a: 31)  
 
McCarty’s closing critique is in line with my premises on institutions and pedagogies 
that support radical activist-scholars within and beyond academia. If Critical GS is a tool, 
what is its purpose? My thesis, as Critical GS theory, demands academia realize its “potential 
to recognize and engage” in problem-solving that moves beyond “rather small academic 
circles.” I later outline how this demands more politicized and less formally academic 
approaches, given historical and contemporary constraints upon academia. The next question 
arising from this transgressive definition of GS is: how can “complexity” theories that are not 
just about abstract “globalization” be practically applied, in a global poli-socio-economic 
system centered on over-simplifying complex issues, and governed by reductive logics 
rooted capitalist-realism? This notion of recognition and reconnection is paralleled in 
theories like those of Wolf, introduced as far back as the early 1980s, in work like Europe 
and the People Without History, where they question a dis-integrated academic and 
conceptual approach to the world rooted in Eurocentric practices that “persist in turning 
dynamic, interconnected phenomena into static, disconnected things” and therefore 
necessitating reconnection. (Wolf, 1982: 25)   
I close this review of GS theories much like how I close my critical premises and, 
ultimately, my entire thesis: with a question connected to my query above, but one that may 
be even more pessimistic. Wolf’s theories on the necessity of re-connection have existed for 
almost forty years, alongside similar theories from other marginalized fields, such as 
intersectionality and Black Feminist Thought, or Black Feminism. (Crenshaw, 1991; Collins, 
1986, 1990, 1998, 2000)  Hobsbawm’s and Wallerstein’s ideas fermented in the margins of 
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society, within academia, for even longer. How can transgressive and radically democratic 
theories practically move beyond academia to influence political action?  
Recounting the convoluted history of the field of Global Studies and the complexity 
of multifaceted global problems is intellectually satisfying, but it often doesn’t help 
us communicate beyond our own rather small academic circles.  
(McCarty, 2014: 33)  
 
It is fitting that the end of a thesis’s theory review self-reflexively critiques itself as 
almost entirely an “intellectually satisfying” act. Such strictly intellectually satisfying 
performances are required of an overwhelming majority of students within academia, prior to 
their engaging in political activism beyond “the rather small academic circles” that 
marginalize most Critical GS theorists - especially those in the Global South, who lack the 
privilege, power, and influence of Global North and West academics.  
Definitive Theme: Post-Colonial, Post-Modern, Global-Scale Transformation 
Both many of the more conservative, capitalist-realist, “right” wing academics, and 
many of the more progressive, Marxist / development / dependency, “left” wing academics 
now accept as factual a global history wherein the mid-1400s through the mid-1900s 
constituted modernity, defined by global Western European dominance and the authority, or 
legitimate power, of nation-states. Most academics agree this European dominance was 
complemented by c. 1850s-1950s ascent of the USA as a regional power in Latin America, 
and then as a global superpower, which I and other Critical GS theorists define as a global 
hegemon or empire.  
The beneficial and detrimental causes and effects of the modern international system 
remain hotly debated by the right and left within and beyond academia, with an ongoing 
marginalization of Marxist academics, politicians, and policy-makers. Within both 
mainstream and marginalized GS, all argue that global-scale changes of some sort are 
 
 
37 
occurring. GS theory consistently argues that this change is from an established, colonialism-
based, Europe-driven, inter-nation-state system that was the world order from roughly 1450-
1950, to an emergent and different world order. As Juergensmeyer noted, “postcolonial” 
tends to be one of the foundations of GS theories. Below I outline distinct theories critical to 
my case study: post-colonialism and decolonization.  
Stuchtey outlines the overarching themes of colonialism and imperialism, and how 
various European powers, monarchies, firms, industries, and states “decisively shaped world 
history,” arguing that “globalisation has a critical background in the world historical 
involvement of the non-European sphere from the Early Modern Period up and into the 
period of decolonisation" for 500 years. (Stuchtey, 2011) Stuchtey continues:  
The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494)...the independence of India in 1947...mark the start 
and decline of a key problem in the history of Europe, perhaps even its most 
momentous, that the always precarious colonial rule caused complex competitions 
among Europeans just as much as among the indigenous population in the colonies, 
that it was able to simultaneously create cooperation and close webs of relationships 
between conquerors and the conquered, and that it was never at any time free of 
violence… 
(Stuchtey, 2011: 3)  
 
Stuchtey charts global processes of Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, British, and 
Russian colonizations, as well as "the independence of the North American colonies in 1776 
[marking] one of the most important turning points - from the Atlantic to the Asian aspect of 
the British empire." Stuchtey further outlines foundational events in "informal imperialism," 
Scramble for Africa, and post-WWII decolonization across Africa and Asia. Through these 
dates and other major declarations and actions of multiple European powers, Stuchtey 
provides a broad understanding of empire-building and imperialism, and the territorial 
conquest and colonialism required by such terrible acts at a global scale. Stuchtey also 
highlights how over time, colonialism became not only a project by and for elites, but a 
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totalizing process with positive and negative economic and political participation by 
effectively all sectors of society.  
There are various definitions of colonialism and processes of colonization, which I 
distinguish from imperialism, like how how I distinguish critical-conceptual theories from 
historical examples. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is less on imperialism as a 
general concept of extending authority. Instead, I focus more on colonialism as a specific 
ideology of how to extend authority, and on colonization as a set of specific resource-
controlling processes derived from that ideology.  A 2011 “typological reappraisal” that 
reinterprets for the 21st century Finley’s “Colonies: An Attempt at a Typology” highlights 
how 4 decades of academic research and discussion of colonialism “demonstrates how 
complex and manifold seemingly straightforward ideal types” remain.  Sommer provides an 
accessible and basic overview of what a colony is and is not: “Essentially...a collectivity of 
people...[taking] into account a vast array of variables: resources, the labour force, 
demography and the socio-political framework in which colonisation occurs.” (Sommer, 
2011: 183-184)  Sommer maintains that such a broad ideal type is not useful without more 
specifics, arguing a “true typology needs to establish some sort of hierarchy.” (Sommer, 
2011: 185)  They then present a hierarchy that my thesis uses as a guideline: “a colony” is a 
fixed object; “colonisation” is a process of creating one or more colonies; and “colonialism” 
is an ideology driving multiple processes, including colonization.  
Colonies established by few or some migrants tend to be peripheries of strong 
political centres (‘empires’). Almost invariably, they are imperial colonies politically 
depending on the motherland (British India, Africa...Extinguished or shrinking local 
populations often require the importation of labour from third parties...Immigration in 
strong numbers usually results in the assimilation, marginalisation or extinction of the 
original population... 
 
Another factor, largely independent of the other variables, is the driving force behind 
the establishment of colonies. We need to distinguish between individual and 
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collective motivations. Individuals settle away from home because they seek 
adventure or freedom...Collectivities also use colonies to improve their wealth; but 
they serve political and strategic ends, as well. 
(Sommer, 2011: 186-187)  
 
This definition is then divided into 4 types of colonies, which are the following, with 
my own bold emphasis added for clarity:  
1. Pure imperial colonies (‘provinces’), established through conquest for the purpose of 
tributary exploitation; low influx of colonial immigrants…: British India….African 
colonies… 
2. Imperial settlement colonies, established through massive settlement colonisation 
flanked by military power with the purpose of exploiting local labour and/or exporting 
excess population. Colonisation may involve extinction or marginalisation (New 
England...Southern Rhodesia, South and South West Africa, French Algeria…) Colonies 
are dependent on imperial centres (‘motherland’) but ties tend to be looser than in the 
case of pure imperial colonies…. 
3. Pure settlement colonies, established through massive settlement colonisation, often 
flanked by violence, with the purpose of land seizure. This type of colonisation tends to 
result in local populations being marginalised (…the American West…) 
4. Outpost colonies, established through conquest or peaceful agreement...for the purpose 
of gaining (strategic or commercial) access to a hinterland… 
(Sommer, 2011: 187-188)  
 
Using Sommer’s typology, the hierarchy of colonies is clearly ordered in terms of 
what is overtly militarized and focused on conquest and power imposition, versus covertly 
militarized and ostensibly focused on immigrant land seizure for private commercial gains. I 
argue that South Africa and California both have fit the definition of “Type 1, Pure imperial” 
colony in the modern period, albeit with wide variability between both case studies in terms 
of time and space. California best fits the Type 3, “Pure settlement” colony definition for the 
majority of its post-Mexico history - but a colony within the “American West” region 
nonetheless. South Africa would be Type 1 in the 1600s-1700s,  a Type 2 “Imperial 
settlement,” in terms of the Anglo-British colonialism, as well as Type 3, in terms of the 
colonial Dutch-Afrikaaner colonialism. Sommer summarizes processes of colonization as:   
The most general definition of colonisation could be ‘invasion’ or ‘seizure of land’. 
There is colonisation without colonies (frontier colonisation like in the Russian East 
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and the American West or ‘internal’ colonisation...)... and there are colonies without 
colonisation (the case of pure imperial colonies above). The common theme is 
expansion: societies exporting people to distant places, creating networks of outposts 
or pushing forward their boundaries into ‘barbarian’ peripheries... 
(Sommer, 2011: 185-190)  
 
With the notion of expansion and penetration of others seen as inferior or alien to the 
superior colonizer, Sommer closes with a specific re-iteration of colonialism as an ideology 
that builds upon Osterhammel’s theories. They contrast Iron Age European and 
Mediterranean colonialism to modern, European nation-state-driven colonialism. The bolded 
emphasis has been added for this thesis.  
[colonialism] has been defined as ‘domination of people from another culture’. But 
this definition is too inclusive to be of analytical value; it embraces all forms of 
imperial rule, colonial or not, which by definition include cultural difference between 
the rulers and the ruled. To sharpen the ideal type, J. Osterhammel has added three 
attributes: colonialism implies 
(1) that one society completely deprives a second one of its potential for 
autonomous development; that an entire society is ‘remote controlled’ and 
reconfigured in accordance to the colonial rulers;  
(2) that the ruling and the ruled are permanently divided by a cultural gap;  
(3) the intellectual ‘yoke’ of an ideology whose purpose it is to legitimise colonial 
expansion.  
 
According to Osterhammel, colonialism is the rule of one collectivity over another, 
with the life of the ruled being determined, for the sake of external interests, by a 
minority of colonial masters, which is culturally ‘foreign’ and unwilling to assimilate; 
this rule is underpinned by missionary doctrines based on the colonial masters’ 
conviction of their being culturally superior. 
 
[Iron Age] Greek ethnocentrism and its discourses of barbarian ‘otherness’ do not fit 
into this category. The ‘spirit of colonialism’ (Osterhammel) requires more:  
Namely the translation of such discourses into a consistent ideology serving the 
colonisers’ practical needs. It further requires the persistent unwillingness on the part 
of the colonisers to accommodate...the culture of the colonised... 1 
(Osterhammel, 2005: 21)  
                                                   
1 Osterhammel, J. (1997) p. 21: "[...] eine Herrschaftsbeziehung zwischen Kollektiven, bei welcher die 
fundamentalen Entscheidungen über die Lebensführung der Kolonisierten durch eine kulturell anders artige und 
kaum apassungswillige Minderheit von Kolonialherren unter vorrangiger Berücksichtigung externer Interessen 
getroffen und tatsächlich durchgesetzt werden. Damit verbinden sich in der Neuzeit in der Regel 
sendungsideologische Rechtfertigungsdoktrinen, die auf der Überzeugung der Kolonialherren von ihrer eigenen 
kulturellen Höherwertigkeit beruhen." 
Osterhammel’s 1997 texts have been updated, revised, and translated into English in 2005 and 2015 versions. 
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Osterhammel’s other theories further exemplifies what I term Eurocentric, academic 
analyses of colonialism. They aggressively critique the brutality of colonialism, while 
simultaneously crediting European global conquest as the primary driver of “the 
transformation of the world” for hundreds of years, using Global North and West academic 
languages, and speaking mostly to other academics - largely because academia forces them to 
do so.  Along with Stuchtey, Sommer, and many Global North-situated Marxist-
development-dependency theorists, these theories and critiques of colonialism remain 
incredibly zoomed-out, macro analyses, that often lack first-person testimony of non-
academic products of colonized peoples themselves. Additionally, their practical application 
beyond “small academic circles” is debatable.  
Frantz Fanon, one of the most widely-recognized and seminal Black African 
academics, who wrote and worked in France-occupied northern Africa, is still widely 
regarded as exemplary of decolonization theory, not Eurocentric (post-)colonial theory. Even 
in 2016, Fanon is central to understanding colonialism, to my own thesis, and to university 
student protesters across South Africa. That said, Fanon’s appeal to blunt descriptions of 
colonial violence, such as the title of their magnum opus, The Wretched of the Earth (1963), 
is dismissable by much of academia and the Global North and West, in Dicken’s terms, as 
“misused...confused...a myth.“  Fanon’s work is and was highly problematic and 
marginalized by contemporary academia and when it was published in the 1950s and 1960s. 
On the one hand, Fanon fails many contemporary measures of intersectional inclusivity, 
particularly the mainstream academic insistence on any form of violence being illegitimate, 
unless it is undertaken by the state.  
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Black Skin, White Masks (1952) internalized highly sexist Freudian analyses, and 
Wretched of the Earth embraced highly masculist, binary gender roles. A Dying Colonialism 
(1965) was a proudly subjective narrative of Algeria’s War of Independence.  Much like 
Marx, Fanon provides a useful critique and method to deconstruct a system, rather than to re-
construct an entirely new system. On another hand, Fanon overtly rejects Eurocentric 
academia. As such, the Global North and West’s for-profit use of Fanon may be cultural 
appropriation. Whatever the interpretation of Fanon, the fact remains that they invited Sartre 
to write the preface to their groundbreaking text, including the direct, mocking challenge:  
Europeans, you must open this book and enter into it. After a few steps in the 
darkness you will see strangers gathered around a fire; come close, and listen, for they 
are talking of the destiny they will mete out to your trading centers and to the hired 
soldiers who defend them. They will see you, perhaps, but they will go on talking… 
(Fanon, 1963: 13)  
 
The magnum opus of another central figure in decolonization, Steve Biko, contains in 
its very title a defiance of the Eurocentric prescription of capitalist-realist insistence that 
Black South Africans and other colonized people conform to the ideologies of White 
liberalism: “I write what I like.” (Biko and Stubbs, 1978; 2002) Whatever the interpretation 
by contemporary academics, Biko and Fanon clearly articulated their highly unpopular and 
marginalized views, despite the fact that their social positionality ultimately led to the logical 
end of the extreme marginalization of their already-colonized bodies: premature death. Fanon 
wrote while serving the Front Liberacion Nacionale (FLN) during the Algeria’s War of 
Independence, and struggling within France-occupied Algeria and Tunis between 1955-1960:  
National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, 
commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, 
decolonization is always a violent phenomenon...is quite simply the replacement of a 
certain ‘species’ of men by another ‘species’ of men...[is] a social structure being 
changed from the bottom up...decolonization, which sets out to change the order of 
the world is, obviously, a program of complete disorder...The naked truth of 
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decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which 
emanate from it...  
 
The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by 
barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who 
are the official...the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate and their frequent 
and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle 
butts and napalm not to budge… 
The violence with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and the 
aggressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life 
and of thought of the native mean that, in revenge, the native laughs in mockery when 
Western values are mentioned in front of him. In the colonial context, the settler only 
ends his work of breaking in the native when the latter admits loudly and intelligibly 
the supremacy of the white man’s values. In the period of decolonization, the 
colonized masses mock at these very values, insult them, and vomit them up. 
(Fanon, 1963: 35-36, 38, 43) 
On the one hand, Fanon’s focus on “complete disorder...a world cut in two...searing 
bullets and bloodstained knives...rifles butts and napalm…” may be categorizable by Dicken 
et. al. as hyperbole or myth. On the other hand, 300,000 - 2,000,000 northern Africans died 
directly as a result of Algeria-France combat. Those numbers equalled at least 2%, and up to 
around 15%, of Algeria’s total recorded population c. 1960. (Horne, 2012) That one in fifty 
to one in eight residents of a state could be killed by combat direct seems like it would be 
enough to evidence the nearly totalitarian scope of colonialism and decolonization, given the 
fact that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), indirect deaths, wounded civilians, and the 
residual effects of PTSD were not included in c. 1960 data. And yet, causes and effects of 
colonialism as a totalizing, absolutely violent concept remain debated, or diluted if they are 
recognized.  
Further evidence of how real, and not hyperbolic or mythical, the totalitarian impact 
of colonization and European conquest-driven globalization, is evidenced by the death tolls 
in  Belgian King Leopold’s - later the Belgium nation-state’s - colony of the Congo. There, 
the best-researched casualty estimates from colonization range from 10% to as high as 50% 
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of the pre-colonization residents. The non-proportional, absolute value of up to 10 million 
dead by colonization in one state alone denotes a genocide that far surpasses the most 
infamous Global North and West example: Hitler’s Nazi regime and the Jewish holocaust. 
However, unlike the genocides of Europe, King Leopold’s Ghost remains one of the only 
influential or widely-read texts on Congo’s colonial genocide - a term its title still avoided. 
(Hochschild, 1998)  As of 2016, academia, civil society, and governmental institutions 
increasingly make decisions based on data derived from quantitative methodologies. 
Inadequate or nonexistent data, both past and present, testifies to just how low a priority 
colonies were, given failures to implement even basic state services, such as census-taking, 
birth, and death records.  
Fortunately for my thesis at least, within the UC, Santa Barbara, Critical GS project, 
Professor Lezra focuses significantly on colonialism. They focus in particular on the totality 
and severity of colonization as simultaneous political, social, economic, and cultural 
ideologies and processes - and their connection to pedagogies. Their text The Colonial Art of 
Demonizing Others: A Global Perspective specifically analyzes modern colonialism and 
imperial consolidation on a global scale, c. 1750-1850. (Lezra, 2014)  Lezra argues that 
during this time, Eurocentric interpretations of colonized peoples’ emancipatory struggles 
were dehumanized through literal demonization - or representation as monstrous and 
demonic figures - in visual and textual media. In this way, even articulate expressions of 
resistance by the colonized were ultimately distorted by the colonizers, within a larger 
context of ongoing, constant, global-scale dehumanization of people of color by European, 
and American, colonial powers. Throughout this time period, the teaching of freedom dreams 
became itself another form of colonization, whereby privileged citizens of empire were 
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largely taught to identify the colonized and their struggles as sub-human, disgusting, and 
deserving of punishment. For this reason, the transgressive power of even the most radical 
work, like Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, remain debatable, if they lack impact beyond 
academia, where they have historically been misrepresented by large swaths of mainstream, 
Global North and South academics.  
In their article A Pedagogy of Empathy for a World of Atrocity, Lezra concisely 
theorizes a Critical GS update to Fanon’s notion of global-scale wretchedness, with the term 
“a world of atrocity.” (Lezra, 2014)  Lezra contextualizes contemporary notions of atrocity 
with recognition of both an initial act of violence, as well as its later representation and ideas.  
In times of escalating acts of global violence and chaos, visual and narrative 
representations of discrete acts of violence interlock in a deeply interdisciplinary 
social text of multiple media and modes of transmission. Representations of atrocity 
— photographs and documentary accounts as well as creations of imaginative culture, 
such as songs, art, and story-telling — record and transmit a social text that Frederic 
Jameson once eloquently termed the hurts of history... 
 
An act of atrocity is an act of violence that is perceived to exceed the boundaries of 
what a legitimate punitive measure — either against an individual or a collective 
group of people — would be for retribution for the unjust infliction of an injury. 
Atrocities never stay in the past. They are enacted, experienced, witnessed, and 
translated. They take multiple forms.  
What makes an act of violence an act of atrocity (rather than a pain-ridden event such 
as a death by accident, sudden disease or other uncontrollable natural events) is not 
only the element of deliberation behind it, but also the affective horror and the poetics 
of disavowal that the act generates in its documentation and dissemination. Such acts 
do not disappear with mourning or grief, but exceed any sort of narrative of closure or 
containment. 
(Lezra, 2014a: 1, 4) 
 
Lezra provides two visual representations of atrocity that evidence how little has 
changed over hundreds of years of colonialism. “Figure 1, Lynndie England and Iraqi man in 
Abu Ghraib prison” (Lezra 2014b: 2) is juxtaposed against “Figure 2, John Stedman, 
Surinam, late eighteenth century. Frontispiece of Narrative of a Five Years Expedition 
Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam.” (Lezra 2014b: 3) Both figures represent a 
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military-uniformed White person who appears relaxed and bemused, while pointing at and 
standing in a position of dominance over a defeated and humiliated person of color. Lezra’s 
lens is especially relevant given my social positionality as a White man operating within the 
constraints of Global North and West academia, who frequently confronts the paradoxes of 
studying and teaching the terrors of colonialism and neoliberalism. Many students, especially 
those within Global Studies, Chicanx Studies, Black Studies, and other critical Social 
Sciences, Humanities, and Fine Arts (SS HFA) learn about centuries of previously-denied 
genocide and ongoing atrocity in a formal colonial institution: the university. Many of these 
students are themselves survivors of intergenerational and/or interpersonal trauma. Within 
academia, and exemplified by the contrasting tactics of Californian and South African 
university-driven social movements, the question of confronting and recognizing violence 
without perpetuating violence remains omnipresent - and as yet unresolved by Global North 
and West academia, or Global South.  
Lezra’s proposed method of navigating a world of atrocity is neither explicitly non-
violence / non-violent resistance, nor explicitly violent revolution / decolonization. Instead, 
they theorize that because teaching is potentially transgressive and radical, and violence is 
omnipresent in our poli-socio-economic systems and social movements, education offers a 
way to engage violence without denying or perpetuating violence. They focus on 
understanding and deconstructing violence through conscious, decolonizing pedagogies that 
are empathetic and emotional, not only interdisciplinary.  
How do we create a pedagogical narrative around the social text of hurt that doesn’t 
dwell so much in grief or blame that we cause violence to our students?  
How much discourse and disciplinary packaging can we responsibly use to keep our 
students at a safe distance from the very real hurt of the social text they inhabit? 
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The continued recurrence of human atrocity, and the proliferation of the spectacle of 
unbounded organized power (both today and in the past; state and non- or counter-
state) require a new kind of pedagogy... 
 
Times of acute and escalating global atrocity require highly creative forms of 
thought… 
 
To address the self-critical paralysis and disengagement from acts of violence that are 
themselves so harmful to our students, a comparative cultural study of the notion of 
complicity is necessary.  
(Lezra, 2014b: 1, 2, 3, 7)  
 
It is with this critical lens which my thesis seeks to align itself, demonstrated in my 
analysis of the performance art and protests in my case study. Empathy and decolonization 
are two critical components of what my thesis identifies in Rhodes Must Fall, which both 
embraces Fanon’s rhetoric of necessarily violent resistance, while intentionally “dwell[ing] 
so much in grief or blame” to elicit emotional responses from other populations. Therefore, 
these qualities are what my thesis embraces to distinguish itself as Critical GS:  
● focusing on self-reflexive analyses of academic complicity in violence;  
● referencing the work of colonized peoples in a non-appropriative manner; 
● understanding the limitations of academic products;  
● extensively drawing upon non-academic work and non-rational, emotional texts that are 
marginalized by academics in the Global North and West  
● aligning with and supporting the perspectives of the historically colonized subjects, rather 
purporting to be neutral. 
 
As noted above, my thesis relies on an epistemological notion of global-scale events 
and changes contextualized by non-presentist, non-Eurocentric deep histories of colonialism 
and violence. Generalizations inevitably occur as a result of the privilege of a zoomed-out 
global  perspective. Having acknowledged those limitations, though, the detailed analysis and 
“thick description” of the South Africa case study should provide an appropriately zoomed-
in, micro perspective to counterbalance broad spatial and temporal generalizations implied by 
any global perspective. Below, the temporal constraints and time periods used in my thesis 
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are outlined, with an emphasis on my thesis's definition of “Contemporary Globalization” c.  
1988-present.  
Definitive Time Period: Contemporary Globalization c. 1988-2016 
The primary deep historical time periods utilized by GS and relied upon throughout 
my thesis are the following, presented in chronological order, which is also the order that 
analysis occurs throughout this thesis. First, the period of Europe’s global hegemony, 
articulated primarily through colonialism c. the late 1400s to the late 1900s. Second, and 
more specifically, a Long 19th Century, as first conceptualized by Hobsbawm, c. the late 
1700s through the early 1900s, and ending with the collapse of several empires upon the 
conclusion of World War I. (Hobsbawm, 1962, 1975, 1987) Third, a Short 20th Century, c. 
WWI through the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the global Cold War. (Hobsbawm, 
1994; Westad, 2007)  
I argue that “Contemporary Globalization” is the most useful specific term to denote 
the post-Cold War time period, running from the late 1980s - early 1990s collapse of the 
USSR, through at least 2016, during which time “a new [development] era” where “pluralism 
is here to stay” has broken more than just temporally with “the globalizations of the twentieth 
century”. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012a: 1)  This is due to the massive shifts in global nation-
state and non-state power that occurred from 1988 onward, and during which the USA 
became firmly established as the global hegemon that drove or led most political, social, 
economic, and cultural thought around the world.  
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It is this period of Contemporary Globalization, which is connected to deep histories 
of earlier globalization, especially colonialism, which my thesis focuses on. my thesis 
conceptualizes Contemporary Globalization as best summarized through the following:  
1. post-Cold War global-scale changes in politics, economics, societies, and cultures, with 
consistent trends emerging in each local example of globalization;  
2. driven by ideologies originating or refined in the USA, and therefore establishing the 
USA’s global hegemony; and,  
3. establishing neoliberal capitalist poli-socio-economics on a global scale.  
Within Contemporary Globalization, my thesis conceptualizes three specific 
contemporary historical time periods to analyze ongoing global and local processes. The first 
part of Contemporary Globalization is the long decade of the 1990s. This spans from the 
1988-92 collapse of the USSR through 2001, which is the beginning of the next historical 
period of Contemporary Globalization: the Post-9/11 USA-driven Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). The Post-9/11 GWOT spans from 2001 through 2007, which is the beginning of 
the next contemporary historical period: the 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis. Third, the 
2007-Present Global Capital Crisis, which runs from 2007 through 2016, during the writing 
of this thesis.  
While this approach potentially reifies and perpetuates a hegemonic concept of time 
periods, it uses these temporal and spatial logics because of the ongoing hegemony of 
Eurocentrism and over-determination of the world by the Global North and West. Again, this 
thesis, like all Critical GS theories, both exists both within, and in resistance to, global over-
determination under Contemporary Globalization. By acknowledging and critiquing the 
Eurocentric, Global North and West authority which so over-determines human society, it 
does not reify these logics, but rather resists and critiques them.  
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2007-present Global Capital Crisis 
The year 2007 delineates the ongoing time period within Contemporary Globalization 
as of 2016. This is due to the persistence of the unstable and precarious global poli-socio-
economic order of neoliberalism, which was made undeniably visible due to the financial- 
and housing-induced global crisis of capitalism that began in 2007-2008. It is difficult to 
overstate the importance of what I refer to as the Global Capital Crisis, which is colloquially 
referred to as the Global Financial Crisis or The Great Recession. These events and 
processes, which are both causes and effects of ongoing Contemporary Globalization, 
marked several global-scale shifts in the poli-socio- economic systems of the planet, on a 
scale comparable to the USA- and Europe-driven Great Depression of the 1920s-1930s, 
almost a century earlier.  
The global financial systems leading up to 2007 were predicated on advanced 
capitalism, extensive financialization, and high-risk, high-profit stock market behavior, 
ultimately inflating most nation-states’ GDPs and industries’ values into precarious bubbles. 
Despite some technological innovation and labor productivity advances, mostly driven by 
information technology, the global economy under Contemporary Globalization remained 
dominated by Global North and West firms and nation-states. As it had for centuries prior, 
this dominance relied on military securitization of access to inexpensive raw materials, 
especially hydrocarbon energy sources. The post-Cold War USA dominance also depended 
upon inexpensive consumer goods, largely provided by China and East Asia, in order to 
continuously grow a consumer-oriented, advanced capitalist system. This dominance also 
relied upon the USA-driven Post-9/11 GWOT, invasions, occupations, and neo-colonizations 
of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other still-exploitable regions colonized by Europe and the USA.  
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Beginning in 2007 and continuing through 2009, driven by the USA’s housing and 
concomitant stock market collapses, the global economy that was almost entirely dependent 
upon the USA’s ever-increasing consumption began to collapse, too. At the same time, the 
neoconservative and neoliberal policies of the Second Bush Regime were electorally 
exchanged for the Obama Regime. Barring radical or revolutionary change before 2017, the 
Obama Regime will have only incrementally reformed policies begun by the Bush Regime. 
There has been a re-implementation of an official ban on torture, and reduction in overt 
military occupations.  Despite this, little systemic poli-socio-economic change occurred since 
the Global Capital Crisis. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act adjusted financial practices, but the 
USA’s continuous GDP, and by proxy the world’s financial stability, growth remains largely 
dependent on high-risk, high-profit financialization. The effectiveness of trickle- down 
Reaganism is still considered common sense. USA courts incrementally reduced violence 
against some communities, like LGBTQ people, while further legitimizing violence against 
others. Single- payer healthcare failed; a mandate for private, for-profit insurance company-
driven insurance plans was implemented. Privatized and covert drone warfare somewhat 
replaced overt “boots on the ground” warfare. Combat gamified. The most common injuries 
on USA soldiers and non-USA civilians shifted from shrapnel and gunfire to PTSD and 
smart bombs, respectively.  
Unfortunately, the Great Recession did not significantly or rapidly abate. There were 
few significant structural changes to the USA’s, or the world’s, poli-socio-economics. 
Instead, during the Global Capital Crisis, existing institutions more or less resumed “business 
as usual” (Dicken, 2007) albeit with reduced profits and increased levels of violence. In the 
USA and around the globe, from 2007 onward, established economic indicators such as 
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unemployment, GDP growth, FDI, overall market stability, and inequality remained at 
dangerous levels. Conservative econometrics indicated at least low predictability of profits, 
and at the worst impending revolutions. Additionally, other sub-state indicators embraced by 
most of civil society, such as under- and mal-employment, election turnout and transparency, 
and Inequality-Adjusted metrics like the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index 
(HDI), all remained unincorporated into the USA’s or into the most powerful multilateral 
institution’s development indicators. (Darian-Smith, 2015)  
The regime change of elected officials in the USA c. 2008-2010, Bush to Obama in the 
USA’s executive branch, and Democrats to Republicans in its legislature, were not incidents 
isolated from the Global Capital Crisis. After the frustration of a “business as usual” electoral 
system, and fueled by the never-resolved racial and other tensions in the USA, 2010 midterm 
elections saw the far right-wing Tea Party faction rise to power within the Republican Party. 
A growing polarization also grew within the Progressive and Moderate factions within the 
Democratic Party, the other half of the USA two-party duopoly, as this 2-party electoral 
system failed to significantly protect society from the fallout of Contemporary Globalization. 
Despite this, in 2012 the incumbent Obama Regime was re-elected, the sluggish economic 
growth persisted, and consumer and national debt continued to increase. Only in China and 
select other parts of the world did widespread national economic growth occur - and 
alongside state repression and tension with competing nation-states.  
Elsewhere in the world, where elected change was less permissible, business as usual 
did prompt attempts at revolution, such as the Arab Spring c. 2011-present. With the 
persistence of existing authorities’ hegemony and influence, despite the Global Capital 
Crisis, regime change ultimately stagnated nearly everywhere. In Libya, protests escalated 
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into social movements that became armed revolution, which the UK, France, Italy, and the 
USA supported through UN-approved intervention. For Libya, the Global North and West 
bombed Gaddhafi under the auspices of human rights, while Europe- and USA-based energy 
companies secured profitable oil contracts after the Gaddhafi regime was overthrown. As 
disarmament and reconciliation of post-Gaddafi powers went unresolved, Libya accelerated 
towards state state collapse, while the oil firms continued their usual profitability. In Syria, 
protests escalated into social movements that yielded mass slaughter by the Assad Regime, in 
some of the most visible suppression of the 21st century. In Egypt, the elected and so-called 
Islamist Morsi Regime was deposed and replaced by the USA-friendly, military-supported 
Sisi Regime. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, the theocracy persisted, thanks in part to massive 
financial support from the USA that allowed bribing protest leaders. with the blessing of the 
USA, in those states, business as usual continued. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the 
USA-driven occupation and planned handover to a USA-friendly regime continues to 
collapse, as the rise of Daesh threatens calamity by justifying increased state militarization 
alongside its own crimes against humanity.  
In Europe, austerity regimes and financial collapses destabilized ostensibly sustainable 
social democracy models of capitalism. Tensions between the Russian Federation and the 
USA escalated, with protests in Ukraine becoming militant social movements, and then near 
civil war by mid 2014. Ultimately, armed conflict in Ukraine became a new proxy war 
between NATO and Russia. The downing of a commercial airliner, killing over 200 
passengers in the first such shoot-down in Europe since the 2001 Siberia Airlines incident, 
was the deadliest such incident since the 1982 Pan Am Flight 103 bombings. USA- and EU-
Russia tensions reached unprecedented post-Cold War levels. Questions of the EU’s and 
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Euro stability, democracy, and potential future dissolution were and continue to be raised. As 
of 2016, there were more per-capita IDPs and refugees than ever before. Almost a decade 
after the Global Capital Crisis began, almost all of Northern Africa, the Middle East, and 
Europe continues to struggle with political, social, economic, and cultural instability, as well 
as crises of identity and conscience, exacerbated by xenophobia and racism.  
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the 2007-present Global Capital Crisis. Its 
multivarious collapses and shifts of power are too vast a topic for several research institutes 
to publish in a multi-series volume, let alone my thesis to summarize. Suffice it to say, this 
period is an escapable part of any global or local analysis of a poli-socio-economic system, 
and is the primary temporal backdrop for my case study of South Africa’s counter-
hegemonic, university-driven social movements and university student protests.  
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Contemporary Globalization, De-democratization, and Covert Authoritarianism 
 
My thesis's first major premise is that, despite the Global Capital Crisis, as of 2016 
the contemporary globality remains USA-driven, global, neoliberal capitalism, and this is 
because neoliberalism is fundamentally a “new” form of covert authoritarianism. Though 
thoroughly defined and theoretically conceptualized throughout this first critical premise, in 
simplest terms, I argue the following. Neoliberalism is fundamentally a covert form of 
governance by capital, which was, under Contemporary Globalization, imposed on a global 
scale by the USA through violence. I agree with the majority of Mainstream and Critical GS 
theorists that after the collapse of the USSR, the USA’s variety of advanced capitalism 
became the foundation for a unipolar, USA-driven, post-Cold War global order. I argue that 
this variety of advanced capitalism was neoliberal capitalism, or “neoliberalism,” for short. 
This neoliberalism was imposed at a global scale through neoliberal globalization, which 
necessitates violence, militarization, and securitization; this neoliberal globalization was the 
definitive process of Contemporary Globalization from after the collapse of the USSR and 
the Cold War through the present.  
Defining Hegemony, Regional and Global  
Modern hegemony (Greek; English: leader) theories originate with northern Italian 
theorist Gramsci and their anti-capitalism work in a counter-Fascist, early 1900s context. 
(Hoare and Smith, Gramsci, 1999; Forgacs, Gramsci; 2000)  Much of Gramsci’s theories on 
hegemony, collusion, control, history, materialism, and capitalist-realism are filtered through 
translations and academic theorization about Gramsci’s own theories. Their work was in their 
own time a translation and filtering of Marxist and Leninist theories about the bourgeoise and 
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proletariat. (Cox, 1983; Gill, 1993) Much of Gramsci’s most influential writing and theories, 
like that later cited by Fanon and Biko occurred while he was detained by the state. As such, 
hegemony is often nebulously defined, given that it is a translation of a translation, which has 
survived within the margins of the margins of society - in marginalized academia.  
Gramsci’s theories provided groundbreaking lenses for assessing interregna between 
dominant powers, the assumed objectivity of intellectuals, the relationship between urban 
and rural power dynamics, as well as local and national authorities. Perhaps most useful was 
Gramsci’s problematization of an overly-reductive ideal type approach to state power, which 
they achieved by emphasizing how cultural and social non-state agents influenced the state, 
laws, and legality. Gramsci theorized that “basic changes in international power 
relations….can be traced to fundamental changes in social relations,” insisting that culture or 
society within a state exerts significant influence, or cultural power, over both that state and, 
potentially, other states. (Cox, 1983: 168-169) In fewer words, “to be meaningful, the notion 
of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil 
society,” (Cox, 1983: 164) which today remains an assertion that transgresses against 
common sense ideas held by many: most find meaning in ostensibly apolitical social acts. 
Although focused on inter-nation-state exchanges and IR, Gramsci’s ideas about 
international relations asserted that politics, sociology, and economics all intersected. This is 
most relevant to my later analysis of neoliberalism’s global hegemony, which originated 
within The South culture, economics, and history within the USA.  
The complexity and multivarious applicability of hegemony is part of its appeal, 
much like Critical GS as “complexity” studies is very appealing. Much like GS, hegemony is 
more flexible than reductive capitalist-realist notions of the state, and may be interpreted and 
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applied to multivarious case studies, thus allowing broader understanding than previous 
theories did, as well as increasing possibly wider adoption by critical theorists. In Gramsci’s 
time, this was especially useful in discriminating between various ideas of revolution, such as 
a “war of movement” or “war of position” regarding entrenched, state and non-state forces 
that could oppose or facilitate radical change. (Cox, 1983: 164-165) It was also especially 
useful to recognize “a dialectic of revolution-restoration which tended to become blocked as 
neither the new forces nor the old could triumph,” problematizing simple revolutionary ideals 
into a complex plurality of victories and losses, advances and retreats, over a longer period of 
time history previously suggested. (Cox, 1983: 165-166) Gramsci’s most relevant idea 
regarding hegemony for my thesis’s first and second critical premises is how:  
Gramsci’s variant of philosophical realism...identifies the intellectual process as a 
creative, practical, yet open-ended and continuous engagement to explain an 
apparently intractable social reality. This process is, like the processes of change 
within a given necessity, a dialectical one, and is thus a part of the historical process; 
it does not stand outside it. Indeed, Gramsci developed the unique concept of the 
'organic intellectual' to show how the processes of intellectual production were 
themselves in dialectical relation to the process of historical change… 
(Gill, 1993: 23) 
 
Gramsci, imprisoned in Fascist Italy in the early 1900s, argued much how Freire and 
other critical pedagogists imprisoned by absolute poverty under the Cold War would later 
argue: the individual subject is always a part of, and potentially complicit in, a historical 
process that cannot be objectively separated from the subject. Additionally, Gramsci’s 
concepts of hegemony, and later Marxist and Gramscian academics’ radical theorizing, 
provide excellent foils to Global North and West methodologies, epistemologies, and 
ideologies.  
This Gramscian viewpoint can be contrasted with the technocratic assumptions which 
inform the outlook of most professional economists in the West… 
The Gramscian approach provides a general critique of methodological individualism, 
and methodological reductionism...for Gramsci, it is the ensemble of social relations 
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configured by social structures ('the situation') which is the basic unit of analysis, 
rather than individual agents, be they consumers, firms, states or interest groups... 
the approach insists upon an ethical dimension to analysis, so that the questions of 
justice, legitimacy, and moral credibility are integrated sociologically into the whole 
and into many of its key concepts. This is reflected in Gramsci's dual conception of 
politics and the state...as a class-based apparatus of rule...[and also as] something akin 
to the Aristotelian view of politics as the search to establish the conditions for the 
good society, where the state is able at least potentially to be transformed from an 
apparatus based upon social inequality into an ethical public sphere.  
In contrast to the tendency in much of the (American) literature to prioritise systemic 
order and management, from a vantage point associated with the ruling elements in 
the wealthy core of the global political economy, the historical materialist perspective 
looks at the system from the bottom upwards, as well as the top downwards, in a 
dialectical appraisal of a given historical situation: a concern with movement, rather 
than management. This highlights the limits of a narrow political economy approach 
to the analysis of IR. 
(Gill, 1993: 24-25)  
 
In my thesis, I attempt to build on these notions of a dialectic approach that is both 
globally zoomed out and formally academic, as well as locally zoomed in and transgressive 
against academia’s ostensible neutrality. I additionally draw on the theories of Laclau and 
Mouffe regarding how to translate concepts of hegemony into actual politics and policies 
that, hopefully, can yield a sort of ethical public sphere - rather than an amoral private 
marketplace. In my case study of South Africa’s university students’ radical rhetoric, I aim to 
be “grounded in privileging the moment of political articulation….for [my] analysis, a notion 
of the social conceived as a discursive space...becomes of paramount importance.” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001: x)  Most useful from the theories of Laclau and Mouffe are their 
recognition of the inherently antagonistic nature of both hegemony and radical leftist 
resistance to right wing domination, and radicals’ antagonistic propensity towards fracture. 
(Carroll and Ratner, 1994; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001)  
My simplest summary of hegemony is that it is a more complex notion of power, 
legitimacy, and authority - or governance - that is based not exclusively on overt state power 
and direct, physical violence. Instead, hegemonic governance is collusion between state and 
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non-state powers, to create not only a legal, but also a cultural “normalcy” or set of common 
sense assumptions that are expected to be followed - or else. The “or else” may or may not 
include direct, physical, state violence. It may or may not include social, cultural, and/or 
economic exclusion - a soft power form of violence, or softer violence. Through hegemony, 
society is ordered not exclusively on what is legal and enforced by state authorities, but 
rather additionally on what is cultural and enforced by powerful non-state agents, who also 
possess significant authority. Their authority, or legitimate power, is maintained through a 
dialectic between the state, civil society, agents of capital, and even the proletariat. With this 
nuance, Gramscian notions of hegemony provide a more complex way of understanding 
violence and governance beyond “legal” and “illegal,” beyond the state as the sole source of 
control, and beyond a binary bourgeoisie versus proletariat lens. With this nuance, 
governance systems that appear to have “small government” may be understood to actually 
impose stricter forms of control - as I argue is the case with neoliberalism. With this nuance, 
it is easier to understand how conformity to certain norms is not overtly conforming to an 
authority and enforcing the laws of the state, because the state’s dialectic with not-state 
agents makes its enforcement covert.  
A hegemonic lens focuses analyses on more informal, culturally-created norms that 
are effectively non-state, de facto, socially-constructed rules that govern human behavior in a 
dialectic with state, de jure, legally-constructed laws, which are perceived as formal 
legitimization mechanisms. In a hegemonic system, when actors conform to or follow the 
lead of whatever the non-state authority legitimizes as “normal,” they are not apparently 
succumbing to the authority of the state. In their widely-cited text on the "propaganda model" 
of a hegemonic but non-totalitarian state, like the USA, Chomsky outlines how direct 
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physical violence is replaced by collusion with corporate media to encourage obedience as 
normal, common sense. For-profit media replicates nation-state interests, which are 
themselves subservient to logics of profitability, in order to create "necessary illusions," like 
the concept that advanced, neoliberal capitalism is common sense.  
The point is that in a ... totalitarian state, it doesn't much matter what people think 
because ... you can control what they do… 
But when the state loses the bludgeon, when you can't control people by force and 
when the voice of the people can be heard...you have to control what people think… 
And the standard way to do this is to resort to what in more honest days used to be 
called propaganda. Manufacture of consent. Creation of necessary illusions.  
(Chomsky, 1992: 51-53; Chomsky, 1999)  
An example of this would be a society where the majority of humans assume that it is 
“common sense” for an ideal type, such as an ostensibly “free market,” to absolutely explain 
politics, society, and economics. The exemplar of this is the post-Cold War, widespread 
acceptance, to the point of it being common-sense, that an “invisible hand” guides “free 
markets” to ensure “all boats rise.” Within this common-sense, “free markets” are collections 
of equally-informed, equally-powerful, and rational individuals, who almost all behave of 
their own free will to pursue their own self-interest. This logic is perceived as common-sense 
without significant critical thought about how legal and/or social laws structure and constrain 
a capitalist “free market” and vice versa. Such a logic also dismisses critiques that many 
assumptions about actors within that society, such as their inherent objectivity, or rationality, 
may be false.  
In simpler terms, if oppressed people can believe that conforming to oppression is in 
fact common sense, normal, and not oppressive, then that may be a more pervasive, more 
subtle, and less overt way to maintain control. Of course, under colonialism, when overt 
racism was both cultural common sense, and legal state policy, “the policeman and the 
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soldier...maintain[ed] contact with the native and advise[d] him by means of rifle butts and 
napalm…” (Fanon, 1963) To exemplify this idea of hegemony specific to this thesis, Biko is 
most concise: “The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the 
oppressed.” (Biko and Stubbs, 1978; 2002: 68)  
Hegemony at the National and Regional Level 
Of course, this concept of subtle state-and-non-state collusion is a less useful analytic 
lens when the state is very visibly exercising authority through outright dictatorship and 
dominance, and applied at a national scale. Unlike a conventional IR capitalist-realist lens, 
using hegemony to analyze oppression rapidly grows more complex and problematic when 
zooming out from a strictle nation-state unit of analysis to a regional or global perspective. 
However, this complexity and problematization is an essential quality of a post-/inter-
disciplinary analysis which transgresses beyond reductive nation-state units of analysis 
maintained by IR, Political Science, and/or Economics. So, hegemony tends to be more 
useful in critiquing post-inter-/trans- capitalist politics, societies, and economies, compared 
to a society with a more visibly authoritative state.  
During the Cold War, the visible, overt, direct violence of Soviet states lent 
significant weight to pro-capitalist arguments that critiquing capitalism’s covert, and less 
visible, authoritarianism was not a priority, compared to the USSR’s overt authoritarianism. 
In the post-Cold War time period, however, advanced capitalism is now commonly conflated 
with democracy by nation-states, agents of capital, and civil society. Discourse about how 
“there is no alternative” to capitalist-realism is now the norm, de facto and de jure, if not by 
all academics, then by the majority of politicians and other policy-makers, who impose this 
mindset onto each subsequent generation. (Fisher, 2009; Rheingans and Hollands, 2013)  
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Because of the invisibilization of the authoritarianism of the advanced capitalism of the USA, 
as well as the way in which transgressive anti-oppression both resists and replicates 
oppression, my thesis relies largely upon notions of hegemony. Below, I justify focusing on 
“hegemony” to describe complex power dynamics on regional and global scales under 
Contemporary Globalization.  
In Gramsci’s time, focus would have been on the Italian bourgeoisie’s management 
of the proletariat, and movement of state versus non-state forces, or the bourgeoisie actions in 
an inter-national, multiple nation-state way. Under Contemporary Globalization, my focus is 
global and regional hegemony. As regional integration increases under Contemporary 
Globalization, hegemony may be also understood through the way that a single nation-state 
or authority leads other nation-states or authorities within a region towards policies that 
benefit the regional hegemon, with the technically legal, but actually manufactured, consent 
of others in the region.  
In this thesis, a region is a contiguous geographical territory and space, usually with 
the sharing of political borders of the collection of nation-states within that space. Common 
interest associations of nation-states do not necessarily constitute a region, although they may 
be a trading bloc, free-trade area, or otherwise aligned or allied around common concerns. 
(Söderbaum, 2009; Paasi, 2009; Makgatlaneng, 2013)  There has been significant attention in 
recent years to the BRIC(S), or the 4-5 nation-states with the largest economies after the G7: 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and sometimes South Africa, depending on the theorist. 
(Armijo, 2007; Robinson, 2015; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2015b; Bond, 2016)  While collectively 
the BRIC(S) may someday constitute a regional hegemon or a even global hegemon, 
currently they would not be what my thesis considers a “region,” despite how BRIC(S) 
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policies may impact their constituent nation-states and, in turn, other nation-states that follow 
their lead. My thesis considers Southern Africa a critical region for counter-hegemony. I 
alternately use the term “South(ern) Africa,” denoting how South Africa as a concept and 
political actor is at times synonymous with an entire region, given its significant power in the 
region.  
It includes, but is not limited to, the political boundaries of the nation-states which 
comprise the regional trading bloc the Southern African Development Community (SADC).2 
Southern African region could alternately be everything on the continent south of the equator 
- which SADC almost now includes. The African region itself could be tied to the continental 
land mass, and the African Union (AU) could be a continentally-scaled region in and of itself 
- as well as a common interest association of nation-states. In the case of Southern Africa or 
the African region, South Africa could easily fit the definition of a regional hegemon 
exercising regional hegemony, as it leads or drives neighboring and nearby states and 
peoples, influencing state policies and laws, as well as social and cultural norms. 
(Makgatlaneng, 2013)  
The result of this regional exercise of authority and contest for legitimacy about what 
is “normal” is sometimes seen as a blend of complex interdependence and hegemony, or 
“interdependent hegemony,” when regional powers challenge and rely on one another, but 
also on the global hegemon. (Xing and Augustin, 2016)  Alternatively, the notion of “sub-
imperialism,” or a regional hegemon acting as a regional imperial power, while it is also 
subordinated to a global hegemon, is a recent concept. However, I reject it in this thesis, as it 
centers the narrative on a regional hegemon as imperial, rather than on the fact that the 
                                                   
2 See Figures 3.2.A,3.2.B in Chapter 03: South Africa’s Global, Colonial History.  
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regional hegemon is internalizing the oppression imposed upon it by the global hegemon. 
(Taylor, 2011; Bond, 2016)  
Western Africa would also be a region, which includes but is not limited to the 
nation-state collection known as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), wherein Nigeria would be considered the regional hegemon.(Babatunde, 2006; 
Iwilade and Agbo, 2012) However, South Africa may or may not have more influence than 
Nigeria in the region of western Africa, depending upon the specific issue at hand. Because 
of South Africa’s significant influence over the region of Africa and the region of southern 
Africa, but not necessarily the region of western Africa or the globe, South Africa is herein 
referred as a regional hegemon, but not a global hegemon. An example of what would likely 
not be able to be considered regionally hegemonic would be Botswana, a relatively wealthy 
and respected nation-state in the southern Africa region, but a nation-state which ultimately 
has a much lower measure of economic, cultural, and military state power, or the ability to 
influence norms, compared to South Africa.  
Another example relevant to my thesis is Germany. (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013; 
Bulmer, 2014) Within the continental territory of Europe, and within the nation-state 
association of the EU, Germany’s economic, cultural, and military power may significantly 
influence policies, behaviors, and norms across the region. An example of what would likely 
not be able to be considered a regional hegemon is Italy, which ultimately has significant 
cultural power and influence across the region of Europe, but lacks economic and military 
power, is less influential than Germany or other nation-states or authorities within the region 
of Europe and/or the EU, and ultimately follows the lead of other authorities. A final 
example relevant to my thesis would be the USA’s sub-national state of California as a 
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regional hegemon, within both the USA and North America as regions. This premise lacks 
extensive academic and theoretical support. California’s only recognized hegemony is its 
influence on racializing immigration, language, and education policies. (Lowenthal, 2006; 
Cobas, Duany, and Fagin, 2015) However, I assert that the economic, cultural, and even 
military power of California leads other sub-national states within the USA. California 
significantly influences other nation-states in North America and the Pacific Rim, especially 
Mexico, through immigration, drug, incarceration, and financial policies. The California 
Democratic Party also drives policies within the USA’s Democratic Party, thereby impacting 
other states governed by it.  
An example of what would likely not be able to be considered a regional hegemon in 
the context of North America or USA as a region region would be the USA state of Oregon, 
or the nation-state of Canada. Both Oregon and Canada, while possessing some influence 
over politics and cultural norms, ultimately are much less influential than California. I feel 
compelled to clarify that one of the USA’s sub-national states is not the same as a nation-
state within a region, insofar as the national authority of the USA would legally override the 
authority of a sub-national state. Similarly, in a global context, the global hegemon overrides 
the influence of the regional hegemon in most areas most of the time. As such, it is important 
to remember that the changing context for a regional hegemon may reduce its hegemony, and 
this is almost always true when a regional hegemon encounters a global hegemon. (Taylor, 
2011; Bond, 2016)  To return to the context and region most relevant to this thesis, Southern 
Africa, it must be noted that the policies and behaviors pursued by the regional hegemons of 
Germany or California or even South Africa will generally not have as much influence or 
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power as those pursued by the global hegemon of the USA as a nation-state and assemblage 
of capitalist agents.  
Defining Global Hegemony, Past to Present 
Global hegemony is, in the simplest terms, hegemony operating at a global scale, and 
impacting less powerful regions, nation-states, and sub-state forces.(Gill, 1993)  A global 
hegemon is an actor that possesses significant authority on a global, super-international scale, 
and which exerts influence in almost every region and nation-state in terms of simultaneous 
economic, cultural, and military power. (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Modelski, 1987; Gill, 
1993; Robinson, 1996; Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004) A global 
hegemon exerts its authority in an ostensibly consensual exchange, perceived as legally and 
socially legitimate or normal, and in which multiple different actors around the globe, within 
a region, and at the local level of the nation-state or below, all collude with the global 
hegemon in way that  legitimizes its leadership and dominance. (Gill, 1993; Nederveen-
Pieterse, 2004, 2011)   
Most theorists agree that throughout the modern era, select European nation-states 
were globally hegemonic, empowered through empires of colonies and wielding significant 
capitalism-derived economic, cultural, and military state power. It is generally understood 
that in discussing global hegemons, during the early modern period, Portugal, the Dutch 
United Provinces, Spain, and then Britain were the primary global hegemons. (Gilpin, 1981; 
Modelski, 1987; Wallerstein, 1979, 2000; Osterhammel, 2005, 2015; Stuchtey 2011)  
Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish influence around the globe was expansive c. 1500s-1800s, 
with the Portuguese colonizing and controlling vast parts of South America. This control was 
dependent upon a powerful navy and an intercontinental plantation economy based on 
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slavery, raw resource extraction, agricultural production, navy-facilitated global distribution 
of commodities, and financialization of early modern capitalist systems. (Hartz, 1969; Flynn, 
2002; Coniff and Davis, 2002; 2003; Peterson, 2011; Baptist, 2014)  The Dutch United 
Provinces maintained arguably one of the most powerful and expansive global economies, 
driving the expansion of for-profit firms and modern capitalism’s dependence on 
colonization. As reviewed in the following chapter, the impact on South Africa remains, to 
this day, devastatingly violent.  
Beginning in the 1500s, Spain arguably became the first truly global hegemon. 
Following the late 1400s Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula, Spain controlled significant 
territory and resources, and wielded ideological power over darker-skinned races and 
Islamic, animist, or otherwise non-Catholic cultures. Consequently, with massive growth in 
naval and military power, and colonization of much of the Americas and parts of 
southeastern Asia, Spain succeeded other European powers. Spain colonized expansive 
portions of the Americas and established a Pan-Atlantic, Pan-Latin America, Pan-Pacific 
economic empire based on slavery and extractivism, expanding on existing Dutch and 
Portuguese practices. It additionally created the strongest naval force up to that point in 
human history. Spain’s control of the Philippines and silver trade from the Americas to China 
drove major monetary changes across both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and into Europe. 
(Peterson, 2011)   
Spain globally spread European economic practices, especially slavery, plantation 
economics, and gold- and silver-based currencies. Spanish cultural practices, from religion to 
food to architecture and shipbuilding, became known across Europe, South America, North 
America, and eastern Asia.  Within this culture of violence, colonialism, enslavement, and 
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domination, so too did culture of resistance by both the colonized and within the colonizers 
emerge. The common exemplar of this would be the Catholic priest Bartolome de las Casas, 
who was anti-indigenous slavery, but pro-African slavery. (Castro, 2007) Within Catholicism 
and Spanish imperial circles, de las Casas was marginalized and his political action was 
attacked by the mainstream authorities - but at the same time, their politics, transgressive as 
they were at the time, ultimately led to “ecclesiastical imperialism” rather than 
decolonization.  
Although the power and reach of Spain’s global hegemony did not operate with the 
same speed and intensity of later global hegemons, it was for most intents and purposes one 
of the lead drivers of the Eurocentricization of the planet c. the 1500s to the 1800s. 
Regionally, in Latin America following the USA’s decolonization from the British Empire, 
and through the 1800s indigenous Americans’ decolonization struggles against Spain and 
Portugal, the USA succeeded Spain as the regional hegemon. (Robinson, 1996; Grandin, 
2007; Guardiola-Rivera, 2010; Gonzalez, 2011)  Globally, as the Spanish Empire collapsed, 
the British Empire succeeded Spain as the global hegemon. In both cases, the ascending 
power reiterated the historical violence of colonization, maintaining violence against, and 
profitable exploitation of, colonized peoples.  
The British Empire expanded upon the Eurocentric global order established by 
Spain’s global hegemony, which Wallerstein termed the “modern world-system,” and which 
Hobsbawm termed as signalling “an age of revolution,” an “age of capital,” leading to an 
“age of empire”. (Hobsbawm, 1962, 1974, 1989) This Eurocentrism was predicated on 
notions of a European identity of lighter-skin, the Protestant Work Ethic, technological 
innovation, and dominance of both natural environments and less-powerful peoples. During 
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the 1900s, as the British Empire, and slightly less powerful empires, warred and collapsed, 
“the age of extremes” unfolded, with the emergence of all-consuming, industrialized, total 
war that killed the highest absolute and relative, per-capita numbers of combatants and non-
combatants. (Hobsbawm, 1994) World Wars I and II were driven by Eurocentric politics and 
European imperial aggression, and as such relied upon colonial human and material 
resources to be fought and to be justified.  
It is generally accepted that World War I marked the massive curtailment of the 
German empire, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and the end of the Russian Tsarist 
empire, once the Russian Revolution implemented the Soviet system. By the end of World 
War II, the British and French Empires were unravelling, and the rise of the USSR and the 
USA established a “bipolar” post-Europe global order, contested globally throughout global 
Cold War. (Westad, 2007)  Seen in this global, hegemonic lens, most of the 1900s were 
defined by wars of hegemonic succession, where first fascist Nazi Germany and imperial 
Japan, and then Soviet-socialist USSR and capitalist USA, waged global-scale wars to 
succeed the British Empire as the global hegemon. (Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1987; 
Wallerstein, 1979, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Ferguson, 2005; 
Westad, 2007)  By the end of 1992, the USSR had collapsed, and the USA eventually 
emerged the victor as the collapse of the USSR heralded the official end of the Cold War.  
The significantly different, and unequally-distributed, but average higher-per-capita 
development indicators, of the USA resulted in the widespread conclusion that the USA and 
its poli-socio-economic ideologies “won” the Cold War. This perspective is neatly 
summarized by UK Prime Minister Thatcher’s assertion “There is no alternative” (TINA) 
perspective, which was adopted widely by UK, USA, and other Global North and West 
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politicians, policy-makers, and corporate media. (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Bond, 2014: 121) 
TINA, however, and its Cold War-era anti-communist, pro-capitalist Cartesian dualism, was 
conformed to by mainstream academics. Fukuyama’s sweeping generalization of “the end of 
history” (Fukuyama, 1989; 1992) exemplifies academia’s abandonment of Marxist / 
development / dependency critiques even better than the popularity of Huntington’s 
Islamophobic “Clash of Civilizations.” (Huntington, 1996)  As a review of (c)overtly right-
wing Mainstream GS theory reveals, it is path dependent, reductive, uncritical, and 
unimaginative to take as factual the teleology of the Global North and West’s version of 
“liberal democracy” and capitalist-realism. The post-USSR ascent of the USA should be 
described: in terms of neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and violence.  
Defining Global Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism 
Neoliberalism is a term long-used by marginalized academics. It has recently become 
a mainstream academic buzzword used by both the right and the left within academia, to 
support and to challenge its ongoing use, respectively. As detailed below, neoliberal 
capitalism, or neoliberalism for short, is generally agreed-upon by academics and many 
policy-makers as a problematic or controversial variety of advanced capitalism that varies 
significantly from varieties with more visible market regulations. (Jackson and Deeg, 2006; 
Robinson, 2015)  
Under neoliberalism, many governmental regulations on capitalist firms are reduced, 
ranging from those intended to mitigate environmental impacts, to maintain fair labor 
practices, and to maintain national sovereignty and a skilled national labor force. This 
decrease in nation-state ability to regulate firms, which spreads across regions and the globe 
as states attempt to out-compete one another, creates a shift towards a “globalized economy”, 
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wherein capital, commodities, information, and, to an extent, labor moves more quickly 
across territorial boundaries, space, and time. (Levitt, 1983)  Poorer people are generally 
denied the same increased legal freedom of movement afforded to capital, unless it is for the 
purposes of becoming laborers in a new context. (Held, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Steger, 2003)  
One result of this globalized economy is an increase in transactions and competitiveness 
amongst firms, producers, consumers, and laborers, as well as an increase in the amounts of 
and the powers of multi- and trans-national corporations (MNCs and TNCs).  
MNCs and TNCs are for-profit capitalist firms that maintain operations and taxable 
headquarters in more and more diverse geographies around the globe, rather than staying 
within a single national market or tax system. (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Hirst, Thompson, 
and Bromley, 2015)  Under Contemporary Globalization, few Global South MNCs or TNCs 
emerged to rival the existing power or market capitalization of Global North and South firms, 
which maintained absolutely and relatively higher profitability and stock valuation year-to-
year, decade-to-decade, from the 1980s to the present. (Dunning, 2007) As the space and 
time required for firms, producers, and consumers to engage in transactions compress, spatial 
and temporal marketization occurs, too, as formerly non-transactional human social and 
physical infrastructure must prioritize transactions to maximize efficiency. (Peck and Tickell, 
2002; Harvey, 2005)  What this yields is both a massive increase in the complexity of the 
world and a shift in the type of complexity, alongside a decrease in the ability to understand 
the world - except in terms of individual marketplace transactions.  
Under neoliberalism, what is perceived as a legitimate source of power and authority 
shifts away from notions of states that ostensibly represent the will of the majority with 
beneficial intervention in markets. Instead, legitimacy depends on notions of markets that 
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will better serve consumers with less state interference. A result of this is the rise of the 
power of non-state actors, both for-profit firms and ostensibly not-for-profit NGOs and civil 
society. Neoliberal civil society is comprised of multivarious actors, but the institutions, and 
networks of institutions and individuals, are a fundamental part of neoliberal civil society. As 
corporations became multi- and trans-national and centered on notions of marketplace 
transactions, so too does civil society. Transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Castells, 2008) of NGOs, which are often legally categorized as “non-profit” oriented, 
become significant sources of influence on state policies (Evans, 2000a, 2000b). Neoliberal 
civil society attempts to fill in “the democracy deficit” created by neoliberalism, defined by 
Weiler et al. as the “gap between formal legitimation and material democratic deficiency”. 
(1995: 11)  The policies that NGOs largely over-determine, without electorally-determined 
public support (Bond, 2000) cover all topics, from religion (Yates, 2002) to trade (Carroll 
and Carson, 2003) to environmental protections (Wapner, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998) to 
security. (Oudraat and Haufler, 2008)  On the one hand, decreasing state authority somewhat 
provides an increased ability of humans to collectivize through transnational networks and 
rally around “counter-hegemonic globalization,” or “globalization from below,” due to better 
information flow across historical boundaries of space and time. (Evans, 2000a; 2000b) This 
is the optimistic, marketization-as-democratization view of neoliberal civil society.  
On the other hand, all NGOs benefit from this increased ability to collectivize, 
including those dedicated to promoting capitalist-realism, and yet legally classified and 
overtly-identified as non-profit NGOs.  As marketization of space, time, and the state occurs, 
pro-capitalist institutions and networks increase their influence on the state, relative both to 
historic levels of capitalist influence, and relative to contemporary levels of influence by anti-
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capitalist institutions that possess less power, authority, and legitimacy within neoliberalism. 
(Carroll and Carson, 2003)  Because neoliberal poli-socio-economics prioritize profit and 
efficiency above all, transnational networks of businessmen, corporate executives, and pro-
capitalist NGOs are better able to establish revolving doors between their executives. This is 
because new neoliberal common sense, as well as good old fashioned corruption, encourages 
closer integration between pro-capitalist, for-profit agents and markets and states.  
Whereas many mainstream GS theorists within academia and beyond argue that 
decreasing state power relative to market power ultimately yields more freedom, I align 
myself with marginalized and critical theorists that argue the opposite. Under neoliberalism, 
most of society remains excluded from controlling capital or the state, and the result is less 
freedom, decreased power, and an increasingly precarious survival. (Wacquant, 2009; 2010)  
The marketization processes that neoliberalism imposes upon society, and that spread across 
state boundaries, yields what I detail later as “governance by capital.” This is similar to 
conventional Marxist-development-dependency theories of “oligarchy,” or rule by a small 
group, or what Robinson terms “polyarchy,” which means rule by many, but not the majority. 
Robinson’s term specifically refers to the control of the state by a select population that 
controls significant capital, and it is closer to my theory. (1996, 2000)  
In line with similar theories of oligarchy and polyarchy, I argue that as state power 
decreases relative to market power, select parts of the state, those which secure for-profit 
transactions, increase their power. Additionally, select parts of society, such as pro-capitalist 
NGOs and for-profit firms, become more powerful because of their ever-increasing control 
of capital, and its consequent ever-increasing ability to influence state laws legitimizing the 
rule of capital, perpetuating an endless circle, or a revolving door, of a state that serves 
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capital, and a capital that serves the parts of the state that serve capital. This “cycle of 
neoliberalism” is roughly visualized in Figure 1.1 below. While it is based upon 
“enforcement” of securitization of surplus labor, I argue that “enforcement” can refer to any 
process of the state applying force, under the auspices of securing profitability, and 
legitimized by the common sense of a society unable to imagine alternatives to capitalism. 
(Golash-Boza, 2012; 2015)  
FIGURE 2.1: The Neoliberal Cycle: “Privatization” Yields Increasing State Enforcement 
 
Text Description(s):  
Graphic visualizing “The Neoliberal Cycle,” with five main phases: (1) Privatization yields (2) Global 
inequality and outsourcing, yields (3) Low wage work, yields (4) Cutbacks in social services, yields (5) 
Enhanced enforcement arm [of the state.]  
 
Source(s):  
Golash-Boza, T. (2015) Deportees caught in a neoliberal cycle. Al Jazeera America (December 20, 2015) Qatar: 
Al Jazeera.   
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Given these theories and processes, my thesis defines neoliberalism as:  
● An ostensibly economic model that overtly identifies itself as a re-interpretation of 
Europe’s modern liberalism and classical economics models for the post-modern world ;  
● An actually political, social, economic, and cultural (poli-socio-economic) ideology, 
or way of imagining the world, with covert qualities in addition to its overt qualities;  
● Founded on notions of Eurocentric hyper-individualism: a masculine individualism 
that fails to consider super-individual social structures, except the classical idea of the 
nation-state, and that posits all human individuals are equally powerful, rational actors, 
who behave in their own self-interest and, consequently, benefit all of society;  
● Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”: 
the transition away from “public” provisions of goods and services to private, individual 
capital transactions that are more “efficient” and therefore superior;  
● An ostensibly smaller-government model overtly identified as “de-regulation” of 
nation-state governance; and,  
● An actually bigger-government model covertly re-regulating society through 
increased selective policing, militarism, and securitization of society to ensure select 
capital transactions are more likely to occur than others  
 
Throughout Contemporary Globalization, and especially since the Global Capital 
Crisis, some neoliberal policies have been proven by even conservative economic indicators 
to be abject failures in their respective areas, such as privatizing healthcare (Fisk, 2000) or 
urban water. (Spronk, 2007)   Other policies have proven to be at best highly precarious and 
unstable in a globalized economy, such as energy or financial booms and busts, which a 
majority of academics will now term “crises”. (McNally, 2009; Bruff, 2014)  Despite its 
academically- identified problems and the immensity of the Global Capital Crisis, neoliberal 
capitalism continues to govern the existence of most nation-states, state associations, regions, 
and sub- / non-state agents, including individuals.  
This “strange non-death of neoliberalism,” (Crouch, 2011) and the fact it simply will 
not “die” has earned it the moniker of a “zombie” ideology which persists despite the near-
consensus of academics and theorists denouncing its instability, inhumanity, and violence. 
(Harvey, 2009; Peck, 2010; Springer, 2015)  Despite this majority of academics’ consensus 
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on neoliberalism, including mainstream academics and even some previously conservative 
theorists, after almost ten years of the Global Capital Crisis, neoliberalism persists as the de 
facto world order. My thesis argues that, if such an inhumane and violent governance logic 
endures in an international community of ostensibly free, humane, just, legal, liberal, 
democratic nation-states, one of the following must be true:  
A. The near-consensus of extensive, rigorous, often self-reflexive and -critical, democratic 
academic research that condemns neoliberalism is factually incorrect, and as such it is 
understandably ignored by receptive, democratic nation-states that incorporate legitimate 
knowledge produced by universities; or,  
B. The contemporary, nation-state-based global order is in fact not free, humane, just, legal, 
liberal, and democratic, and the knowledge produced in academia is only considered 
legitimate and incorporated into state policies when it benefits the state and/or capitalism.  
 
My research suggests B., given the greater democracy, systems of checks and 
balance, prevalent self-reflexivity, and encouragement of critical thought within academia, 
relative to the lack of democracy, checks and balances, self-reflexivity, or critical thought in 
Contemporary Globalization’s poli-socio-economics. Below, I outline how we arrived at 
neoliberalism on a global scale, and then address how the legitimacy and authority of 
knowledge, historically produced by universities, intersects with the violence of 
neoliberalism’s covert authoritarianism: governance by capital.  
Contemporary, Neoliberal Globalization Yielded Global Neoliberalism 
Neoliberal globalization has impacted almost every facet of everything on planet 
earth. Non-human animal species and environments across the globe; non-living chemistry of 
the planet’s atmosphere; effectively all human economic interaction; nearly all human 
cultural norms and practices; the economic and legal structures underpinning those practices 
-  since Contemporary Globalization, neoliberalism has at least impacted, if not decided, all 
of these. My thesis understands “global neoliberalism” largely in terms of the global theories 
of Nederveen-Pieterse, Robinson, and Bond. It later uses the critical pedagogy work of 
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Giroux and the political science work of Brown to specify its authoritarian qualities. With 
that in mind, to reiterate, I use Contemporary Globalization to denote:  
● Post-Cold War, 1988-present, global-scale changes in politics, societies, economics, and 
cultures, with consistent trends emerging in each local example of globalization;  
● driven by ideologies originating in or refined by the USA, and therefore establishing the 
USA’s global hegemony; and,  
● establishing neoliberal capitalist poli-socio-economics on a global scale 
 
Again, to re-iterate and clarify, neoliberalism is:  
● Ostensibly an economic model overtly tied to Eurocentrism;  
● Actually a poli-socio-economic logic with additional covert qualities;  
● Hyper-individualistic;  
● Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”;  
● Ostensibly smaller-government overtly identified as de-regulation;  
● Actually bigger-government that covertly re-regulates society through increased selective 
policing, militarism, and securitization 
 
Because I understand the world in terms of hegemony, or collusion and coerced 
consent, not outright domination, I recognize that processes of globalization, and local 
encounters with and articulations of globally hegemonic ideas, exist and are maintained as a 
dialectic between the local and the global. I also recognize that there may be something of a 
plurality or variety of neoliberalisms globally, much as there is a plurality or variety of 
capitalisms. Neoliberalism in the USA differs from neoliberalism in Chile, in Congo, in 
China, in the UK, and in South Africa. However, I maintain that global hegemonic authority 
has an overwhelming power advantage over local actors, in terms of economy, culture, and 
military. As such, a global plurality of multivarious local neoliberalisms around the globe 
means that while there are varieties of assimilation and resistance that remain dynamic and 
unique, as of 2016, nearly all local poli-socio-economic systems are still effectively 
constrained by the fundamental logics of neoliberalism more than they are defined by a 
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successful alternative. In the words of Robinson, "‘varieties of capitalism’ produce varieties 
of integration into global capitalism" and consequently varieties of exploitation. (2015: 16)  
As the Cold War ended and the USSR collapsed, the USA-UK variety of advanced 
capitalism that had incubated during the Cold War was able to be imposed on a global level.  
Nederveen-Pieterse historicizes neo-liberalism as occurring in “waves” throughout the short 
20th century, beginning in the USA with “proto” neoliberalism in the 1940s-1960s, “roll-
back” neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, and “roll-out” neo-liberalism from the 1990s to 
the present. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004) An example of the USA’s proto phase of 
neoliberalism is the Cold War era development of “the infrastructure of 
neoliberalism...ideology (free market), think tanks...and economic policy (the “Chicago 
boys” in Chile and Indonesia)” which became increasingly legitimate within the political and 
economic elites of the USA, and then imposed upon the lower classes as common sense. 
(Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004: 3)   
An example of the USA’s roll back phase of neoliberalism is the c. 1970s-80s shift in 
monetary and fiscal policies, such as floating currency exchange rates, and the integration of 
the most conservative smaller-government ideas of Hayek and Friedman into the Republican 
Party’s “Reagonomics,” into the UK’s “New Labour”, and into the USA’s “Third Way” 
Democrats. Their question of “could we consider neoliberalism as the sequel to the Cold 
War?” would appear to be answered economically and ideologically through understanding 
that: “if modernization theory was state-centered and part of the postwar governmental 
Keynesian [and Fordist] consensus...the Washington consensus turns another leaf, to 
government rollback and deregulation.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004: 10)  “Roll-out” 
neoliberalism, the primary focus of this thesis due to its fundamental role in Contemporary 
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Globalization, is the Washington Consensus “elevated from domestic policy to international 
program...implemented through IMF stabilization lending and World Bank structural 
adjustment programs...the combination of Dixie capitalism and Wall Street financial 
engineering has been extrapolated on a global scale.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004: 10-11)  
Specific examples of this concept of the “role out” neoliberalism and its necessary violence 
and collusion with knowledge systems are detailed later.  
Nederveen-Pieterse’s early 2004 theory was not just that post-USSR globalization 
was a USA-driven project to establish neoliberalism at a global scale. Rather, their sub-state 
scale of analysis argued that neoliberalism derives from the poli-socio-economics of The 
South, within the USA. What they term “Dixie capitalism,” Beckford terms “plantation 
economics” (1999), which I consider now to be “global plantation economics.” I term it as 
such to emphasize its abuse of labor and propensity towards slavery. Contemporary, global 
plantation economics’ history lies with Anglo-British and USA colonialism and enslavement 
of Africans and indigenous peoples. Nederveen-Pieterse highlights how Dixie capitalism / 
plantation economics on any scale depends on racialized state violence, and a racist culture 
which supports it, to control inexpensive labor for capitalist exploitation. How this 
inexpensive labor is maintained has varied throughout history, from chattel slavery to Jim 
Crow to prison industrial complexes. (Wood, 2003; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004; Baptist, 2007)   
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As such, while neoliberalism’s overt logic is that of “privatization,” which ostensibly 
yields smaller-government and market deregulation, it is in fact covert re-regulation of 
society as a whole, with the following priorities:  
● Decreasing real wages and rights for labor;  
● Decreasing real taxes and other costs, such as labor costs, for capitalists and firms;  
● Decreasing state or “public” spending and delivery of most social services; and,  
● Increasing state violence in the form of selective incarceration and policing.  
(Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004)  
Today, as the state legitimizes these priorities through laws influenced by agents of 
capital, governing human behavior is executed in in a subtler form of hegemony compared to 
Fanon’s “rifle butts and napalm” of explicit state authoritarianism, but neoliberalism’s end 
goal of free labor, enforced through incarceration and policing, remains. Like most 
knowledge of neoliberalism, this theory is not widespread beyond academia, but it is 
supported by multivarious other theories recognizing the USA’s foundation as an efficiency- 
and profit-oriented society that relied first on chattel slavery, then on Jim Crow, then on mass 
incarceration, and now on the post-9/11 security-surveillance state. (Hall et. al., 1978; Wood, 
2003; Baptist, 2007; Alexander, 2012; Amar, 2013; Gill, 1995, 2015; Gunn, 2013) With each 
social movement-induced legal transformation of the state, select populations continued to be 
racialized and governed through decreasingly visible state application of different types of 
legitimate violence, but at an increasingly complex global scale. Understanding the origins of 
Contemporary Globalization, neoliberal globalization, and the establishment of global 
neoliberalism based upon the USA’s South helps clarify the global order’s colonial origins 
and history of racialized authority. Later, this helps to understand the brutality of its 
manifestation in South(ern) Africa.  
This supports my thesis's focus on historical colonialism and ongoing decolonization 
against contemporary colonialism in South Africa and elsewhere around the world. Despite 
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hundreds of years of violence, the end of the Cold war, and multivarious power shifts, there 
has been little change in the fundamental logics governing human behavior, or in the lived 
experiences of most human beings. When using this deep historical-colonial lens to analyze 
the contemporary world system, it is unsurprising that global neoliberalism, both 
theoretically and actually, perpetuates highly racialized forms of global imbalance between 
the North and West and the South.  Under neoliberalism, aggressive governance of human 
behavior actually increases, just not overtly by the state, in order to maintain the authority of 
profitable non-state capitalist authorities, who in turn influence ostensibly legitimate state 
authorities, who in turn legitimate and legalize pro-capitalist policies.  
As agents of capital require collusion with the state, so too does the state require 
collusion with academia and media to legitimize production and consumption of the 
necessary illusion that it is common sense that there is no alternative to neoliberalism. 
Although media plays a key role, much has already been written on corporate media’s 
collusion with the state to maintain profitable neoliberal capitalist hegemony, and the focus 
in my thesis is education. Academia colluded in this oppression through legitimizing such 
logics, given their status as epistemological authority figures.  
Global Neoliberalism’s Covert Authoritarianism: Hegemonic Governance by Capital  
As noted above, the hegemony, collusion, covert increase of state violence in the 
name of individual freedom, and other qualities of neoliberalism increase the likelihood of 
violence. I argue that neoliberalism is fundamentally an ideology of authoritarianism, here 
titled “governance by capital.” As outlined below, this governance by capital in the ideology 
of neoliberalism is authoritarian at its core, in that it gives more authority to those that 
already possess it, and delegitimizes attempts by other actors to increase their own authority, 
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unless they conform to the logic of for-profit, private, capital transactions. But, in an 
ostensibly free and democratic system, with routine elections, how can so severe an ideology 
as authoritarianism persist? The simple answer is that the system is neither free nor 
democratic, despite formal electoral institutions. The security of select groups’ profitability 
necessitates selective application of state violence to regulate markets in a way that maintains 
those groups power.  
This is executed by an anti-democratic and bureaucratically insulated “deep state” 
that is largely unresponsive to elections. The last portion of my thesis’s first critical premise 
focuses on specifics of militarization, securitization, and violence. Before that, I review the 
critical theories of how de jure electoral systems only ostensibly provide citizens the ability 
to freely choose their governments. The de facto policies governing behavior, however, tend 
to be determined outside of state elections - ultimately resulting in a system that is 
fundamentally authoritarian.  
The influence of agents of capital upon the state is a familiar critique of Marxist / 
development / dependency theory. Though marginalized within academia under 
Contemporary Globalization, these anti-capitalist critique remain increasingly relevant due to 
the Global Capital Crisis. (McNally, 2009; Bruff, 2014) Several Marxist theorists’ consistent 
use of the term “authoritarian” to describe neoliberalism have been consistently-ignored 
beyond academia for decades. This is yet one more example of how, under Contemporary 
Globalization, transgressive arguments against the common sense of the superiority of 
“privatization” and capitalist-realism are seen as illegitimate, even when articulated by civil 
society actors that were once powerful, such as universities. Bruff revisits Gramsci, 
Poulantzas, and Hall to understand state and market authority in Contemporary 
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Globalization. Their analysis asserts that, like universities, the formerly robust democracy of 
the European style “social democracy” variety of capitalism has been de-democratized by 
global neoliberalism. (Bruff, 2014)  As such, by the time of the Global Capital Crisis, nearly 
all poli-socio-economic models worldwide, even relatively stable and therefore preferential 
varieties of capitalism, or models proposed by academics, have been rendered illegitimate by 
states that deem them impossible to implement, amongst a populace unable to articulate 
alternatives.  
“De-Democratization” and “Governance by Capital”  
“Governance by capital” is slightly different than “oligarchy,” or what Robinson 
terms “polyarchy,” which specifically refers to the control of the state by a select population 
that controls significant capital. (1996, 2000) Governance by capital refers to not only state 
governance mechanisms, but rather to all political, social, cultural, and economic governance 
logics. Governance by capital refers to the fact that at every level of human existence, the 
market dominates the narrative. States remain relevant, though they increasingly seem to 
only exist because of, and in service to, markets and profitability. States continue to 
legitimize markets and agents of capital under the auspices of “democracy.”  However, under 
neoliberalism, governance is no longer only about the state being controlled by the market. 
Instead, everything, everywhere, at every time, is about the market - a totalizing notion of 
everything as transaction. The market is life, everything, everywhere. Morality, emotion, 
connection, and nearly every decision made under neoliberalism is about efficiency and 
maximizing resource consumption in search of profit. Humans are no longer humans, or 
citizens, or residents - they are renters, reduced to purely transactional entities, nothing more 
than consumers of commodities, produced in another place that, like home, can only be 
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capitalist. (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Brown, 2003; 2006) They have gone from being homo 
sapiens to homo economicus. (Brown, 2015)  In more concrete terms, neoliberalism’s 
governance by capital simply means that agents - be they state, non-state, for-profit, or non-
profit - with more capital have more power. Powerful agents then influence state legal 
structures to further profit themselves or their capital interests by increasing their 
profitability, thus maintaining or expand their authority. Essentially, there is the degradation 
of both de jure legal democratic checks and balances - an elected government - or de facto 
social democratic checks and balances - a community valuing people above profit.  
This expansion of the authority of capitalists occurs simultaneously as, and as a result 
of, denying anti-capitalist actors the ability to legitimately, through elections or institutions, 
increase their already-limited authority. Their lack of authority is constantly legitimized by 
the overriding, totalizing ideology of capitalism, transactions, and profits being the most or 
the only important behavior for humans. This authority system is legitimized by hyper-
individualism as the cultural norm. The ability to consider the complexity of a state system, 
such as its electoral process, is not present in a discourse that is entirely focused on 
individuals as free agents. Neoliberalism is the manifestation of it being “common sense” 
that poor people are poor. and rich people are rich, because each individual poor or rich 
person has earned that status free of super-individual forces.  
A neoliberal society ridicules whoever would vote for a person who likes poor 
people, like a socialist. The French voted for Hollande, but France’s Eurocentric, pro-
capitalist deep state, unaffected by elections, precluded this ever having any real impact. The 
USA showed some  support for Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist, who 
ultimately lost before general elections began. A neoliberal society also lacks the ability to 
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analyze this social system, due to over-emphasis of individuals, under-emphasis of systems 
or structures, and the degradation of any education system to institutionalize understanding 
of these issues. Collusion, critiques of capitalism, and hegemony are all critical theories and 
concepts not taught even in much formal education, and especially not in secondary 
education - which is the highest level of compulsory formal education in the USA, and in 
most industrialized nation-states. Furthermore, neoliberal society’s anti-systemic discourse 
furthers covert governance by  capital emphasizing the idea that non-state authorities cannot 
be oppressive, because only the state, and never markets, can oppress humans. Markets equal 
democracy, after all.  
As such, if elections are held, and neoliberal common sense dictates the reductive 
conclusion that if there are elections, then there is democracy, and anti-capitalist candidates 
will always lose, then agents of capital simply need to covertly manipulate lawmakers within 
the state, and/or manipulate elections in order to yield compliant lawmakers. This hegemony 
of neoliberalism effectively invisibilizes an actual lack of choice or access in electoral 
systems, invisibilizes elected officials’ responsiveness to citizens, and/or invisibilizes the 
many un-elected positions which significantly influence policy, but remain subject to 
influence by agents of capital.  This hegemony of neoliberalism also effectively invisibilizes 
the oppression of a massive state apparatus that colludes with non-state capitalist authorities 
to sustain a “free market,” which is in fact a system of global plantation economics, whereby 
powerful actors use force to secure access to less costly raw materials and other capital, 
including human labor.  
Giroux and Brown both summarize neoliberalism’s inevitable end process as “de-
democratization” through its reduction of legal protections for individual rights, except the 
 
 
87 
right to consume if one has capital. Giroux and Brown both highlight how individual 
freedom to participate in institutions or to engage in non-transactional or anti-capital cultural 
behavior is labelled as transgressive, dangerous, or terrorist. The “erosion of liberal 
democratic features,” according to Brown (2003), is predicated on merging the state with the 
market, so that they are one and the same. What Brown terms “the end of liberal democracy” 
(2003) and a “stealth revolution” that results in “undoing the demos” (2015) would of course 
be dismissable by Dicken as “hyperbole” or “myth”. Consider how Brown, a political 
scientist at the prestigious UC, Berkeley, has almost no influence on the actual policies of a 
system; her theories have not been, and are unlikely to ever be, incorporated into mainstream 
discourse, institutional practices, or state policies. However, John Yoo, another UC, Berkeley 
professor, was contracted by the Bush Regime to legitimize and legalize post-9/11 torture. 
This exemplifies how only select populations of universities may have any impacts beyond 
academia, and usually only when in service to the dominant ideology.  
Beyond Brown and UC, Berkeley, Giroux in Canada, along with many other critical 
theorists who are constrained by SS/HFA departments within academia, have for many years 
highlighted the dual imposition of labels of “terror” on populaces in order to legitimize state 
violence against them. (Giroux, 2008) Such a deep state is characterized through extensive, 
intersecting state apparatuses responsible for maintaining surveillance, intelligence, policing, 
incarceration, and overall fiscal/monetary financial stability for powerful capitalists - 
frequently summarized as “securitization,” expanded upon in the next section. Maintenance 
of these policies and processes are executed by various bureaus and agencies with no 
electoral oversight, and negligible legislative oversight. This has been theorized by 
O’Donnell as a form of “delegative democracy,” (1994) whereby “democratization” into an 
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ostensibly liberal democratic, but actually capitalist-realist, government requires 
consolidation and formalization of institutions, such as electoral systems, that fail to 
implement the will of the majority while respecting the rights of minorities. (O’Donnnell, 
1994, 1996)  This form of delegative democracy allows “informal institutions,” such as pro-
capitalist or otherwise anti-democratic networks between state and non-state authorities, to 
do the majority of governing, either in terms of legislating or implementing laws. (Soyler, 
2013)  Because of the presence of at least democratic procedures and some institutions, such 
as an elected legislature, ostensible separation of powers, routine elections, but a lack of 
governmental responsiveness to the will of the majority, or violation of the rights of 
minorities, or extensive collusion between the state and non-state agents of capital, the 
Robinson’s simple term “low intensity democracy” seems apt.  
“Governance by Capital” Is Covert Authoritarianism 
“Polyarchy” and “low intensity democracy” themselves lack the malicious underlying 
ideology that I believe USA-driven neoliberalism possesses. For that reason, I prefer 
Giroux’s and Brown’s “new” “authoritarianism.” Levitsky and Way’s technical theories on 
authoritarianism, which, like Robinson, rely on Dahl to deconstruct the misused term 
“democracy,” articulate how exactly systems with elections may remain fundamentally 
authoritarian. Per Dahl’s 4 essential components of “procedural democracy,” all procedures 
must be present for a system to be democratic. Furthermore, even if all procedures are 
present, the system may only be considered procedurally democratic.  
  
 
 
89 
Dahl’s 4 “procedural minimum” components of democracy are:  
● Free, fair, and competitive elections  
● Full adult suffrage 
● Broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association 
● Absence of non-elected ‘tutelary’ authorities...that limit elected officials’ power to 
govern.  
(Dahl, 1974) 
 
To this, Levitsky and Way add the following requirement:  
“The existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and 
opposition.” 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010: 6, 7)  
 
Whereas “full authoritarianism [is] a regime in which no viable channels exist for 
opposition to contest legally for executive power,” Levitsky and Way theorize a middle 
ground of “competitive authoritarianism,” (2010) or, in simpler terms, “elections without 
democracy.” (2002)  A competitive authoritarian system maintains Dahl’s essential 
components of democracy on paper, but challengers to the authority have no real chance of 
winning elections in which they compete. Unfortunately, Professor Levitsky is a professor 
privileged by their position in a Global North and West institution of exceptional prestige: 
Harvard University’s Department of Political Science. As such, they conveniently failure to 
analyze any states in the Global North and West. Systemic violations of civil liberties, voter 
suppression, and other actions they use to identify authoritarianism in the Global South is not 
applied to the USA. I, however, do believe this analysis should occur. By their above-
mentioned qualifiers, if the USA is not “fully authoritarian,” than it is definitely a 
“competitive authoritarian regime” where the status quo is one where “Competition is thus 
real, but unfair.” (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 5, 12)   
My thesis considers the USA’s electoral system and poli-socio-economic systems 
overall as “competitively authoritarian” at best, and invisibly, and therefore covertly, 
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authoritarian at worst. Given the overwhelming prevalence of governance by capital, 
histories of gross abuses of power, and increasing institutionalization of formal oligarchy and 
polyarchy, combined with a hyper-individualist, hyper-nationalist narrative post-9/11 that 
invisibilizes authoritarianism under the auspices of “counter-terrorism,” I prefer “new” or 
“covert authoritarianism” to describe the post-Cold poli-socio-economics the USA imposes. 
Understanding the USA’s imposition of its own authoritarian systems on a global scale, 
where colonialism entrenched definitive authoritarian power structures over hundreds of 
years, and the “roll out” of covert authoritarianism in a world with no viable alternative to the 
USA is particularly terrifying.  
One example of governance by capital on at least a local, national, and regional level 
is the sweeping regulatory power of the USA’s Federal Reserve bank and Department of the 
Treasury. This financial authority is almost entirely led by powerful capitalists tied to 
prestigious banking and finance complexes, and/or the executive boards of TNCs. Princeton, 
Harvard, and LSE- educated Paul Volcker’s 1970s-80s tenure exemplifies this. So too does 
NYU- and Columbia-educated Alan Greenspan’s tenure from the 1980s almost up to the 
Global Capital Crisis. Academia’s collusion in governance by capital, through powerful and 
ostensibly legitimate epistemological authorities, such as Ivy League or otherwise highly-
ranked and prestigious universities, is also later expanded.  
Another, more relevant example of governance by capital on global level is presented 
by Gibbs in their analysis of the USA’s manufacture of the necessity of interventions during 
the Cold War, based on a “business conflict model.” (1991)  Gibbs uses USA and 
Netherlands involvement in Congo c. 1950s-1960s as an exemplar of the USA using Latin 
America-style, CIA-driven interventions to depose a democratically elected anti-capitalist 
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prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. The USA, Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and various 
extractive firms based in these states colluded together to use the CIA to supplant Lumumba 
with Mobutu, a pro-capitalist strong man in sub-Saharan Africa who would maintain 
extractive firms’ access to raw materials. Throughout the Congo Crisis, Gibbs argues, a 
“business conflict model” provides a more complex view than, say, a reductive Marxist 
structuralist model would, of how competing USA, Dutch, and UK business interests 
influenced the USA’s CIA and Department of Defense, as well as Dutch and Belgian 
Ministries of Defense. (Gibbs, 199l; Turner, 2007)   
Using Gibbs’ business conflict model, competing interests, ranging from USA 
financial giant Rockefeller, to the Belgian extractive firm Union Minière du Haut Katanga 
(UMHK) and the holding company Société Générale de Belgique, to the ostensibly non-
profit NGO American Committee for Aid to KAtange Freedom Fighters, all contributed to a 
complex situation of multi-national, intra-competitive capitalists attempting to influence their 
access to an exploitable, Cold War-era Congo. This lens allows for a “thick description” of 
more than simply “agents of capital,” that are overwhelmingly structural, but rather a 
consideration of how competition amongst pro-capitalist agents allows for further 
consideration of the influence nationalism and other identities play in such military-
extractive-industrial complexes.  
The Congo Crisis is just one example of governance by capital on a global level - 
whereby even those with access to electoral systems locally or nationally have their will 
violated. Of course, this example is from before the USA’s global hegemony, when the 
USSR and the UN both unsuccessfully attempted to help the Lumumba Regime and prevent 
the USA’s and Belgium’s ongoing control of the Congo. Today, in South(ern) Africa, there is 
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no support for the marginalized anti-capitalist, anti-USA factions. Under neoliberalism, not 
only does the USA possess global power, but its power is perceived as legitimate. This is due 
both to the now global common sense that there is no alternative to capitalism, and so, 
economically at least, the USA’s way is always the right way. The USA’s increased 
legitimacy is also due to the degraded ability of state institutions to challenge the USA’s state 
power. One example is the UNSC’s rejection of SCR-1441, which technically made illegal, 
but actually did not prevent the USA-led invasion of Iraq. After all, the world’s largest 
conventional and nuclear military power, the USA, is the power which legitimizes (or de-
legitimizes) all other UN SC or General Assembly (GA) resolutions. Because of this, any 
alternatives to governance by capital proposed anywhere around the world have become 
transgressive, and labeled as radical, disrespectful, or not viable. 
In conclusion, if the majority of citizens and academics had their preferences 
formalized into law by democratic nation-states and international systems, then neoliberal 
economic policies would have been voted down in most regions, even if other individualist 
poli-socio-economics overall weren’t. The Global Capital Crisis, and the multivarious, 
simultaneous, consequential conflicts of it reveal the total unsustainability of such absolutist 
poli-socio-economic models. However, neoliberalism itself is predicated on a necessary 
illusion that capitalism and electoral proceduralism is freedom, and, as demonstrated above, 
inherently silences and suppresses the less powerful. As such, the roll out of neoliberalism is 
always violent, in that it violates the consent and will of the majority of those who must 
survive under it, and it either replaces an already-violent system, or replaces a less violent 
system that local residents elected to have, but were denied.  
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Global Neoliberalism’s “Securitization,” Militarization, and Violence 
Rolling out, or imposing, neoliberalism onto people outside the USA is almost 
identical to Osterhammel’s broadest definition of colonialism. “Domination of people from 
another culture,” certainly allows for interpreting as colonialism neoliberalism’s capitalist, 
non-state, or covert, domination of people. Even using Osterhammel’s more stringent 
guidelines for colonialism, neoliberalism’s global roll out meets all three of their criteria.  
1. “One society,” in this case, means Huntington’s civilization of advanced capitalism in the 
Global North and West, which “completely deprives a second one,” in this case, anti-
capitalist societies in the Global South, of “potential for autonomous development,” as 
global neoliberalism requires dependency upon the USA, IMF, WB, and powerful 
militaries to securitize capital; and as  
2. “the ruling and the ruled are permanently divided” by unequal distribution of wealth and 
unequal access to public goods and services; and as  
3. “The intellectual ‘yoke’ of an ideology;” here, neoliberalism as the only option, in turn 
delegitimizing public options, “legitimise[s] colonial expansion,” or in this case, further 
privatization and control of others’ territory by Global North and West firms.  
 
The many impositions of neoliberalism under Contemporary Globalization sometimes 
required overt and widely-known, or covert and lesser-known violence against select 
populations. Depending on if each imposition was acceptable to what the media and populace 
of the imperial power, usually the USA, considered “common sense,” the violence could 
become more and more visible and acceptable. Neoliberalism’s roll out varies from Cold-
War era military interventions to roll out capitalism in a number of ways. The advanced 
capitalism imposed now by the USA is in some ways more brutal than the advanced 
capitalism imposed during the 1950s-1970s. On the one hand, Development Theory’s racism 
was oppressive; on the other hand, they were not nearly as bad as structural adjustment, 
which remains covertly racist. However, I argue that the main difference is now there is less 
viable or visible opposition to neoliberalism than there was against capitalism during the 
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Cold War. This is true in terms of there being fewer visible alternative ideologies to 
neoliberalism that states and people perceive as legitimate, as well as there being less 
military capability for the colonized to resist the colonizers’, given almost all states’ 
dependency on the USA’s economy, as well as most states’ lack of robust, post- 
industrialized military technology able to challenge the USA’s overwhelming military power.  
Having made these arguments and reviewed critical concepts of neoliberalism, I now 
detail some specifics of militarization and securitization, in theory and practice, as essential 
parts of the new, covert authoritarian imposition of hegemonic governance by capital. 
“Securitization” is a process of a state maintaining the “free market” through deep state 
apparatuses’ selective application of violence, in order to maintain security; security, 
however, is a relative term, and in the case of neoliberalism, maintaining “security” means 
sustaining preferential capital flows and exchanges is a higher priority than ensuring bodily 
integrity. Much like neoliberalism is like capitalism, but different, so too is securitization and 
securitizing like securing, but different. The core of securitization as a process is composed 
of the answers to these main question of critical security theories:  
● Who and what defines “security” as opposed to “insecurity”?  
● How is the process of achieving “security,” or securitization, implementation?  
● Who is made secure, included, and/or excluded through complex security apparatuses?  
(Gledhill, 2010)  
 
In a simpler term, soldiers securing a site of significant national interest is an 
ostensibly straightforward concept. However critiquing the notion of security and its 
implementation, or focusing on the securitization of said site under neoliberalism, centers the 
narrative not on, say, the heroism of soldiers or the restoration of security, but on security 
and authority itself.  Critiques not only include why that site was valuable enough to require 
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securing, but rather how that building, national values, and state violence complexly intersect 
with not only one another, but also histories of state violence and values.  
Humans and institutions that cannot fully participate in private capitalist transactions 
tend to have already been historically colonized and marginalized. The historically colonized 
are, due to relatively less control of capital therefore less power, less able to participate in the 
transactions necessary to be relevant in a system that only values capital. As such, they are 
seen as increasingly expendable supernumeraries, and contributing to the insecurity of the 
system. Therefore, those populations are “secured” by the state, or non-state capitalists, 
through either being killed, ostracized, incarcerated, and/or enslaved if they refuse or are 
unable to assimilate into the neoliberal order.  
Increasingly Violent and Covertly Bigger Government 
As mentioned in the previous section, neoliberal securitization apparatuses generally 
include surveillance, incarceration, policing, the military, and monetary/fiscal/financial 
policies, executed by a deep state, without democratic oversight by elections, media, or 
human compassion. State enforcement keeps the poli-socio-economics of neoliberalism 
“secure” enough for private transactions to occur despite capitalist crises or threats to the 
security of that specific system. This state action, helped by media and academia collusion, 
also helps ensure enough humans in the system believe that it is “common sense” for this to 
be the only possible poli-socio-economic system. In the USA, this academic collusion 
manifests through formal education being either privatized and degraded, or neoconservative 
and nationalistic in teaching about Reagan’s triumph over the evil USSR.  
In South Africa, it manifests in various ways, but especially through formal 
Economics programs internalizing neoliberal curricula, which encourage students to go into 
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profitable extractive industries to increase firms’ profitability, while also increasing their 
country’s GDP and other economic indicators. These state security bodies intersect with 
centers of knowledge production, such as media and intelligence bodies, or centers of 
knowledge legitimization, such as prestigious universities or influential NGOs. State 
apparatuses of securitization also include monetary and fiscal policy mechanisms, which in 
turn require powerful stock markets to maintain globally dominant exchange rates, which in 
turn require powerful corporations maintaining profitability - encouraging closer integration 
between corporations and the state.  
This state action, though it often manifests through militarized, direct physical 
violence, also manifests as legal, financial, or environmental “slow violence.” (Nixon, 2011; 
Prashad, 2014) I argue that slow violence appropriately describes surveillance and long-term 
incarceration, racist court systems, gradual displacement, and environmental racism. As 
neoliberal society degrades the capacity to critically think about society beyond a discourse 
of individual freedom, so too does it degrade the ability to think critically about different 
forms of violence beyond direct physical violence. Even then, it is subject to narratives of 
personal responsibility. Nixon argues that “in an age when the media venerate the 
spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need,” 
discourses of violence often invisibilize the mundane, banal, and temporally drawn-out 
violence that disproportionately impacts “the poor...those people lacking resources who are 
the principal casualties of slow violence.” (Dixon, 2010: 3, 4) As noted earlier, the covert 
growth of violence and bigger government requires that its application be as invisible as 
possible. As such, neoliberal society often suppresses drawn-out or complex narratives of 
violence, like the indigenously dispossessed or IDPs, who are less eye-catching, and possibly 
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empathy-arousing, but suffering extreme levels of psychological, emotional, and often 
physical pain.  
The rise of debtors’ prisons and the incarceration of humans unable to afford bail, and 
who are often jailed due to inability to pay relatively low-cost fines, represents the carceral 
aspect of a poli-socio-economic system which does not tolerate humans too poor to 
participate in constant private transactions in a very specific way. (Giroux 2004, 2005; 
Alexander, 2012) The very high levels of restriction of movement through arrests, fines, 
indefinite detention, and simultaneously decreasing quality of prisoner treatment alongside 
increasing employment of prison guards, has also been termed a “carceral state.” (Zatz, 2014)  
In all cases, the covert growth of the carceral state, military-industrial / security / 
surveillance complexes, and overt denials about bigger government requires deeper 
integration between agents of capital and educational institutions, governmental agencies, 
and mass media. Producing and legitimizing pro-capitalist discourses helps ensure people 
continue to consider it normal for their “smaller government” to increasingly spend more on 
the military, police, security, and surveillance, while simultaneously applying violence to 
many people, as covertly and invisibly as possible. This state action actually increases the 
size of significant state bodies, due to the high amount of state investment, and publicly-
subsidized jobs, in militarized goods and services. Therefore, neoliberalism and 
securitization represents an increase in regulation of human behavior in many ways.  
As such, state securitization of capital profitability enforces a rigid social order of 
humans that are ordered in way that encourages the largest possible amounts of the highest-
possible profitable private transactions of capital, in order to indicate ever-increasing 
consumption and GDP growth, while degrading public spaces and service delivery. Surplus 
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labor in a variety of skills, such as both de facto enslaved assembly-line workers located at 
FoxConn plants in Shenzhen, China, as well as mineworkers in central and southern Africa, 
both exemplify the most violated victims of neoliberalism’s securitization processes.  
Additionally, citizens of empire, such as residents of the USA and Europe, are also 
targets and victims of securitization. Under neoliberalism’s securitization, since the post-9/11 
USA-driven rise of both an overt and covert surveillance-security state, the notion of security 
has constantly been used to refer to the predictability and stability of profitable flows of 
capital from exploitable sites, such as Chinese and African high-tech and low-tech sites, into 
USA-owned stock markets. Through a post-9/11 popular imaginary of constant fear of non-
state terrorism, this notion of statist and capitalist security has been conflated with 
Eurocentric development and civilization, while coinciding with the emergence of 
information technology and computing as omnipresent and omniscient.  
With post-industrialization, high-tech design or manufacture jobs remain a rare form 
of stable or profitable employment, while smartphones and computers have become 
omnipresent in the Global North and West. Simultaneously, these goods and services have 
become constantly fear-inducing due to the centrality they play in extra-judicial surveillance 
that supports an always-seeing, always-watching, always-listening, always-tracking security-
surveillance state - what has been called a “digital dystopia.” (George, 2015) Simultaneously, 
and contradictorily, these goods and services empower those who use them to access 
information produced by mainstream, always-playing, -showing, -telling, and -selling 
mainstream media that uncritically discuss the exportability of jobs to other, more 
competitive nation-states due to “globalization.”  
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Of course, oil has historically exemplified complex and violent flows of capital. Of 
course, oil is still extracted in regions governed by USA-supported authoritarians, before it is 
shipped to core consuming countries’ for refinement, distribution, and subsidized sale to 
Global North and West consumers. Profitable hydrocarbon industries still influence states to 
continue to subsidize extractive companies and sustain profitable capital flows to their 
executives’ bank accounts, partly through sustaining de facto control of exploitable sites. As 
such, extractive industries retain significance under neoliberalism, and given impending 
global climate catastrophe, oil and the military-industrial complex may still prove more key 
to destroying the planet for the majority so that the minority can profit.  
Endless Securitization of Endlessly Precarious Populations 
Of course, securitization may be considered a marginalized piece of jargon, and only 
an updated iteration of past academic theories on military-industrial complex models that 
never became mainstream common sense. However, it is a useful update for theories of 
violence under neoliberalism and post-/de-industrialism. Another, final, fundamental part of 
neoliberalism, which may also be simply academically updated jargon to many, is the quality 
of “precariousness” and new working class of “the precariat”, which have been mentioned 
above. (Wacquant, 2009; 2010; Zatz, 2015) In simple terms, due to the decay of public 
institutions and provision of welfare services, as well as the decreasing stability of long-term 
employment, rather than industrialized workers known as the proletariat being a major part 
of the working class, under neoliberalism, precariously-employed, post-industrialized 
workers may be referred to as the precariat. (Wacquant, 2009; 2010)  
This precariousness manifests in two ways. On the one hand, theoretically, 
precariousness denotes both ongoing uncertainty of employment, wages, and poverty, as well 
 
 
100 
as the general instability of neoliberalism, which requires violence to maintain its precarious 
position. On the other hand, actually, the precariat is manifested as contingent, at-will, sub-
contracted service workers, or those employed on only limited appointments - a population 
which now represents the majority of laborers in the USA. In simple terms, not only are the 
working class impoverished, they are now also chronically at risk of unfair dismissal, with 
fewer union and state protections should that dismissal occur, following a regression of labor 
laws in line with de-/post-industrialization.  
To summarize these theories of securitization, because capitalism is inherently 
precarious and prone to crises, a powerful state, acting on behalf of non-state, pro-capitalist 
agents, must exercise power to keep the system appearing stable, governable, and legitimate, 
thus hiding its precariousness, suppressing dissent, and securing reliably inexpensive labor 
for powerful firms. Furthermore, the state must exercise this power as invisibly as and 
covertly possible, maintaining the assumption that the market is “free” and there are fewer 
regulations governing human behavior than under, say, Keynesianism or Fordism.  
Having outlined some conceptual and theoretical themes to neoliberal securitization, 
below are specific instances of the violence of neoliberal globalization, expanded to almost 
all parts of the globe under Contemporary Globalization. Once imposed, neoliberalism 
increases inequality (as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer), displaces indigenous 
populations (by allowing firms to drive them off of exploitable land), and ultimately creates 
contemporary indentured servitude (by forced migration of expendable laborers away from 
military conflict and/or economic catastrophe). Of course, in an ostensibly colorblind world 
where such racialized practices have become technically illegal according to state laws - but 
not social laws and capitalist logics - it has become common sense to assume that pro-slavery 
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logics are extinct. However, as noted with its historical origins in plantation economics and 
“Dixie capitalism” in The South of the USA, the logical end result of neoliberalism is de 
facto and covert, if not de jure and overt, slavery - the cheapest form of human labor.  
The most useful academically-produced term I have found to describe this crisis is 
“precarity as capture.” (Barchiesi, 2012) Re-imagining neoliberalism’s precariousness and 
constant reduction of humans into increasingly expendable laborers with decreasing physical 
or financial security as de facto slavery problematizes established boundaries of the worker-
slave binary. Rather than using the less potent term “sweatshop,” I prefer the term 
“plantation,” due to its historical connection to plantations, and the rise of global plantation 
economics that necessitates new forms of slavery - not just “captive” or “highly exploited” 
labor. Below, I briefly survey some examples of de facto slavery increasing around the globe 
under neoliberalism, ending with Marikana and extractive-industrial complexes in South 
Africa. This focus on neoliberalism’s neo-slavery concludes my thesis’s first critical premise.  
Neoliberalism’s Precarity as Capture: The Global Rise of Neo-Slavery 
One of the most visible counter-hegemonic power dynamics during the Cold War, 
which continues to impact global poli-socio-economics under Contemporary Globalization, 
was the rise of regionally hegemonic powers that frustrated global hegemons. Arab states 
using OPEC and “petro dollars” c. 1970s capital financialization to resist both the USA and 
the USSR is a classic example. (Westad, 2007; Prashad, 2014) Post-Cold War, a great deal 
has been written about Dubai, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, focusing on the 
rapid accrual of financial, social, and political capital post-9/11. The opulence of “world class 
cities” or “worlding cities” assembled in amazingly short time periods has drawn significant 
criticism. (Roy and Ong, 2011) Much like other opulent assemblages under Contemporary 
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Globalization, amazing productivity and global images of power are made visible to extra-
national viewers through opulent technological erections, such as Olympic stadiums and 
skyscrapers built alongside slums that exemplify absolute poverty. The visibilization of 
power is actually dependent upon the invisibilization of the slum-dwellers the and laborers 
who have no choice but to exist as indentured servants for an elite class. (Alegi, 2007; 
Davidson, 2008; Hari, 2009; Cooper, 2013) This has led to significant focus on Dubai as a 
simultaneous “city of gold” and “city of slaves,” with men and women, often darker-skinned 
migrants or refugees, existing in perpetual, wretched, indentured servitude as construction 
workers and prostitutes, respectively. (Cooper, 2013)  
Under Contemporary Globalization and the post-9/11 globality, with its USA-driven 
xenophobia that manifests especially as Islamophobia and Sinophobia, it would be uncritical 
to limit critique to the Middle East or China without self-reflexive critical analysis of the 
USA’s complicity in increasing indentured servitude and de facto slavery around the world. 
USA consumer-driven high-tech plantations in China exemplify this. Spats of highly visible 
suicides at Apple’s sub-contracted high-tech plantations in China, especially the FoxConn 
plant, helped briefly visibilize the crisis of neoliberalism’s neo-slavery. Despite significant 
Sinophobia and mainstream media’s non-critical coverage of USA consumption financing 
high-tech plantations in China, the issue of indentured servants killing themselves to protest 
neo-slavery did temporarily disrupt the glossy imaginary of the USA’s, and California’s, 
high-tech idealism. (Chan and Ngai, 2010; 2012)  
As the USA has increasingly married its (deep) state to the “free market,” the USA’s 
driving of all states to do the same has partly driven China to shift towards an overtly pro-
“free market” (deep) state, away from its historical pro-command economy (deep) state. 
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(Chan and Ngai, 2012; Chan, Pun, and Selden, 2013)  As such, while the USA’s deep state 
has grown bigger while purporting to grow smaller, China, in contrast, overtly shifts towards 
a pro-“free market” model does not require assurances of smaller government. The result in 
China is a sort of extreme form of overt advanced capitalism and marriage of the state and 
market.  
Useful terms relevant to not only China but to all global capital flows, and revisited in 
my case study, include the extraction of raw materials for high-tech commodities as 
“iSlavery” (George, 2015) and “informational capitalism.” (Fuchs, 2014)  The rise of high-
tech, post-industrialized consumerism in the information age, and the concomitant global rise 
of neo-slavery, both represent securitization’s global, multivarious impacts on producers and 
consumers. Those consumers higher up on the global value chain survive slower forms of 
violence than the more direct, more physical violence inflicted on the producers lower down.  
In the ideas of iSlavery, digital dystopias, informational capitalism, and precarity as 
capture, we see that even USA consumers of high-tech commodities are subject to slow 
violence in the form of indebtedness and surveillance - as well as complicity in neo-slavery. 
(Barchiesi, 2012; George, 2015) USA consumers must face the moral violation of financing 
the violence of high-tech plantations and neo-slavery required to produce their high tech 
commodities, and which are ostensibly also necessary for a growing, globally competitive 
economy. In this way, both precariat and proletariat are captured by neoliberalism. A 
neoliberal subject is physically, financially, or otherwise unable to escape systemic violence, 
being doomed to participate in a global plantation economy as either a complicit consumer or 
as a de facto enslaved laborer.  
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I now focus on a region with relatively less critical or mainstream academic attention: 
Southern Africa under Contemporary Globalization. As noted earlier, Hochschild’s King 
Leopold’s Ghost (1998) is one of few influential texts on one of humanity’s most brutal 
colonial genocides in Central and Southern Africa. Their theory remains marginalized 
beyond small academic circles. With increases in critical security studies, more critical 
scholarship has emerged on extractive-industrial complexes that intersect with for-profit 
security-surveillance complexes specific to the African region. Much attention has 
understandably gone to Central Africa, Congo, “blood minerals,” and USA-supported 
interventions in a region often defined by genocide and civil wars. (Musah et. al. 2000; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Ferguson, 2006; Mullins and Rothe, 2008; Bachmann, 2010; 2014; 
Fuchs, 2014)  Stanford University’s Professor and Chair of Anthropology Ferguson, who 
received their PhD from Harvard, has received extensive credit for critiquing Africa in the 
neoliberal world order, especially self-reflecting on anthropology’s complicity in 
colonialism. (Ferguson, 2002, 2006, 2013)  
However, post-apartheid South Africa has received less critical security and anti-
capital analysis that is not marginalized by mainstream Global North and West academics 
and policy-makers. As such, a great deal of academically-produced knowledge on South(ern) 
Africa post-apartheid reified capitalist-realist epistemologies, without significant post-/-trans-
national, or explicitly anti-colonial, critiques after 1994. Many Global North and West pieces 
within and beyond academia have focused specifically on intersections of public health and 
HIV/AIDS, poverty and inequality, and human rights violations and trafficking - but often 
without critiques about how neoliberalism drives these atrocities. (Carter and May, 1999; 
Sikkema, et al, 2010)  In one forty page, USAID-supported report on South Africa’s post-
 
 
105 
apartheid “one kind of freedom,” dynamics of poverty, Carter and May (1999) do not once 
mention any of the following terms: capitalism, neoliberalism, globalization, international 
financial institutions, the WTO, the IMF, indentured servitude, or human rights.   
Alegi (2007) has focused on the political economy of “mega stadiums” and for-profit 
sport spectacles alongside “underdevelopment” in South Africa. They critique “South 
Africa's engagement with global capitalism” as “not mitigating apartheid's cruel legacies of 
racism, widespread material poverty, and extreme inequality,” and note global capitalism is 
increasing inequality under neoliberalism. (Alegi, 2007) A Guardian article covered the 
crisis of FIFA as analogous to global capitalist monopolies’ crises. (Mason, 2015) Mega 
stadiums do provide one highly visible exemplar of global neoliberalism, but my focus here, 
given South Africa’s student protesters’ focus on it, is Marikana, due to its invisibilization.  
My argument, and the final, specific, actual example of neoliberalism in this first 
premise, is in line with the arguments of South Africa’s university students’ transgressive and 
radical protests of extractive-industrial complexes. That is, despite hundreds of years 
between Rhodes’s 1888 and 1889 founding of De Beers and the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC), respectively, today’s overwhelmingly Black South African miners still 
endure de facto slavery. As noted in depth in the following chapter, “South Africa in a Global 
Colonial History,” the 2011 Marikana Massacre was a watershed moment in post-apartheid, 
neoliberal South(ern) Africa, with its consequences still unfolding. (Chinguno, 2013a; 2013b; 
Alexander, 2014)  Marikana exemplifies the extreme violence of global neoliberalism, 
including the perpetuation of de facto slavery as necessary for White-owned capital 
profitability. It also exemplifies both the potential of radicalizing resistance against such 
extreme violence, as well as how may visibilize violence.  
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Again, while the term “slavery” transgresses against common sense notions that this 
is a long-extinct practice, I intentionally invoke it to align myself with the transgressive 
narratives of South Africans, who in fact know better than the many Global North and West 
academics about the state of affairs in contemporary southern Africa. Again, in the current 
system which reduces humans and their qualitative experience into quantitative data and 
econometrics, it is actually preferential for state development indicators for firms to use 
indentured laborers, so long as on paper they are not listed as such.  
Under neoliberalism, as long as a firm’s profitability or stock price increases due to a 
stable labor supply of always-available, always-secured, low- or no-wage laborers, so too 
does national GDP increase, while affording middle-class jobs in the deep-state to loyal 
capitalists, and/those or unable to be employed otherwise. Once officially employed and 
securitized, refugees lose status as “migrants” or “unemployed,” further benefitting the state, 
further incentivizing private firms to increase legalizing, without officially admitting, de 
facto slavery. Barring analysis of sub-state or non-market issues, like human rights and 
quality of life, on paper this system actually reads as economically sound. Under 
neoliberalism, if several thousand humans die or are maimed in the process of this economic 
development, the invisibility of their inhumanity, and the powerlessness of groups that both 
care and have authority, ultimately decreases the likelihood of the state or firm facing any 
repercussions for causing such violence. In fact, with enormous labor surpluses, state-
subsidized labor control, and securitized automation and other technology, a firm may 
maintain future low- or no-cost labor expenses, due to an ever-decreasing need for many 
laborers, and ever-increasing level of contemporary peasantry needing employment, lest they 
be incarcerated. Under neoliberalism, given the overwhelming balance of power against 
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unarmed peasants, an armed uprising is unlikely to successfully occur. Such a severe 
imbalance of power means unarmed peasants stand little chance against an oppressive state 
armed with recently-purchased, high-tech, USA-manufactured weaponry.  
Summary and Clarifying Reiteration  
To clarify, here I provide a brief summary and clarifying reiteration of my above- 
detailed first critical premise: Contemporary Globalization, marked by the collapse of the 
USSR c. 1988-1992, and the consequent ascent of the USA to global hegemony, has yielded 
global neoliberalism. This is covert authoritarianism and de-democratization manifested 
through a totalizing ideology of political, social, cultural, and economic governance by 
capital.  
My premise first outlined the analytical lens of hegemony, or state and non-state 
collusion to govern human behavior, which is a more useful lens to analyze complex, non-
totalitarian power dynamics, such as global neoliberalism; conventional capitalist-realist IR 
focuses fail to imagine non-state oppression. I argued that hegemony may operate at different 
scales, with local or national agents overruled by the imposition of a regional hegemon, 
which may in turn be overruled by a global hegemon. This premise then defined neoliberal 
advanced capitalism, shortened to neoliberalism, and its inherent covert authoritarianism, as:  
● Ostensibly an economic model overtly tied to Eurocentrism;  
● Actually a poli-socio-economic logic with additional covert qualities;  
● Hyper-individualistic;  
● Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”;  
● Ostensibly smaller-government overtly identified as de-regulation;  
● Actually bigger-government that covertly re-regulates society through increased selective 
policing, militarism, and securitization 
 
Therefore, neoliberalism is not what it purports to be: a purely economic logic. 
Instead, neoliberalism is a totalizing poli-socio-economic ideology that covertly re-regulates 
society and governs human behavior by imagining humans as only transactional consumers. 
 
 
108 
As such, it becomes common sense to assume that there is no alternative to capitalism, which 
represents the hegemony of capitalist-realist epistemologies. Therefore, under neoliberalism, 
those with more capital have more power, and their power is perceived as legitimate, making 
them an authority. Simultaneously, those with less capital have less power, and are perceived 
as illegitimate. Therefore, capital becomes the only source of legitimate authority, eroding 
the legitimacy of democratic processes, like elections or academically-produced knowledge. 
If those processes transgress common sense and the laws of the (deep) state, which serve 
agents of capital, by promoting an alternative to capitalism, those processes therefore become 
illegitimate. This yields Brown’s and Giroux’s "de-democratization," “proto-fascism,” and 
"new authoritarianism," which I term "governance by capital," or “covert authoritarianism,” - 
similar to Robinson's "polyarchy" or Levitsky and Way's "competitive authoritarianism”. 
Therefore, I argue that neoliberalism is effectively covert authoritarianism and de-
democratization in favor of governance by capital - not governance by the will of the 
majority of voters, despite the presence of elections.  
Under neoliberalism, the hegemony of agents of capital is perpetuated through a 
“revolving door” dialectic between agents of capital and policy-makers, who legalize and 
legitimize governance by capital in state law. Alternatives to governance by capital are 
considered transgressive, and in need of securing. "Securitization" describes neoliberalism’s 
process of re-regulating human behavior through increasing state violence against select 
populations. This state violence is invisibilized and legitimized by the common sense 
acceptance that profitable capital flows must remain secure by any means necessary.  
Neoliberalism’s multivarious processes of covert authoritarianism are all violent in varying 
degrees, as either direct, physical violence, or indirect, slow violence.  
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My second and third critical premises, and my South Africa case study, analyze how 
sites of democratization, such as universities, respond to such authoritarianism and de-
democratization.  
 
Universities as Sites of Critical Democratization  
 
My thesis's second critical premise is that HEIs, and especially public universities, are 
idealized and sometimes actualized as sites of democratization. Universities that maintain 
public accessibility foster public participation through teaching democratic decision-making 
processes and critical thinking. If such democratizing processes are present in a university, 
then that university serves as a site of democratization, and this places a university in direct 
opposition to neoliberalism’s de-democratization and authoritarianism. This second critical 
premise in turn supports my thesis's third critical premise: that when sites of democratization, 
such as universities, encounter de-democratization and authoritarianism under neoliberalism, 
marginalized students may drive protests through radical and transgressive actions, which in 
turn may potentially drive social movements. Most of these critical concepts and theories of 
education fall under the lens of critical pedagogy, which I review below.  
Defining Tertiary Education Systems  
My thesis makes the following distinctions about educational systems, based on 
global trends and convergences in educational systems since the end of WWII, and 
continuing through the Cold War into Contemporary Globalization. My second critical 
premise’s terminology draws upon the following various perspectives on education and 
educational systems:  
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● Cold War-era critical pedagogy work (Freire, 1969; Hall, et al., 1978; Giroux, 1983; 
McNeil, 1986)  
● GS and development theories addressing education (Gore, 2000; Kwiek, 2000; 
Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012a; Escobar, 2015)  
● critical pedagogy theories written c. Contemporary Globalization (hooks, 1994; 
Readings, 1997; Clark, 2000; Freire, 2000; Olssen and Peters, 2007; Crow and Dabars, 
2015)  
● UN, state government, and NGO policies and reports (UNESCO, 2006; 2011; 2012a; 
2012b; 2014; 2016; CIGE and USAID 2012; Lohmar and Eckhardt, 2013; Goodchild et. 
al., 2014)  
● critical theorists on education and/or policy, relevant to my thesis and its specific case 
studies in South Africa, California, and Germany (Badat, 1999; Williams, 2003; Mettler, 
2006; Genicot, 2008; Giroux, 2004c, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015; Nikunen, 2012; 
Kamola, 2013; Reihlen and Wenzlaff, 2013; Uchem et. al. 2014; Newfield, 2008, 2011; 
Newfield and Lye, 2011; Lezra, 2014a; Foran, 2012, 2014) 
 
The intent here is to not reify a Global North and West perspective, but to recognize 
the wide disparity and variance in application of terms, and maintain consistent usage of 
terms throughout these sections. For that purpose, most, but not all, of these terms and how 
they are applied through my thesis do conform to the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) categorizations and classifications (UNESCO, 2011: 6-15)  
Defining Formal Education 
The first is the term “education” versus “school.” “Education” is a term that denotes a 
general process or system of instruction, either formal and institutionalized or informal but 
not at random, and learning between an instructor and a student. “School” sometimes denotes 
“education,” or “primary education,” or “basic education,” but sometimes denotes a physical 
campus location. In some contexts “school” denotes a discipline or approach to education, 
such as a “school of thought,” or in a name such as the “Chicago School,” abbreviated from 
“University of Chicago School of Economics.”  
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It is generally accepted that primary education, often called “primary school,” occurs 
early in a child’s life and includes the fundamentals of literacy, numeracy, and, to a lesser 
degree, interpersonal behavior. In the USA, primary education is known colloquially as 
“elementary school,” where each successive stage of learning is called a “grade”; in other 
locales, it is often colloquialized as a “Form.” Students in the USA in “First Grade” would 
not be at an equivalent level to students in the UK or South Africa in “Form 1,” however. As 
of 2016, the aims of primary education around the globe have generally been agreed to be, 
per the International Standard Classification of Education (UNESCO 2011) “designed...to 
give pupils a sound basic education in reading, writing, and mathematics, along with an 
understanding of other subjects.” For the purposes of this thesis, the terms “numeracy” and 
“literacy” will be used in place of “mathematics” and “reading...writing,” respectively, in 
order to coincide with standard institutional indicators.  
It is generally accepted that secondary education is that which: occurs after primary 
education; is targeted at young adults who may be instructed with slightly more focus studies 
than primary education instruction; is sometimes explicitly a preparation for tertiary 
education; and is founded on basic literacy and numeracy learned in primary education. Even 
at the secondary education phase, global uniformity in educational structure begins to 
fracture. Different nations have different year commitments and age requirements for 
secondary education, and different terminology for it. In the USA, “middle school” is a 2-
year period between primary and secondary education, but not necessarily utilized evenly in 
every state, and the quality of secondary education varies wildly, with even different 
programs in the same school serving the same population sometimes having wild variation. 
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In Germany, at the mid-point of secondary education, tracking of students into either more 
general, critical thinking education, or into more specific, vocational skills training.  
In the USA, sub-national states like California administer their own state departments 
of education with a high level of variability from one another, with students intended to, on 
average, graduate from secondary educational systems around ages 17-19. In South Africa, 
the Department of Basic Education (DBE) administers primary and secondary school, with 
students graduating around age 17-18. Beyond secondary education, there is even more 
divergence in pedagogy, terminology, and the bureaucracy of instructional systems. my 
thesis insists on the general term of “tertiary education” to refer to post-secondary education. 
“Higher education” is the colloquial alternative, but it reifies the notion of a hierarchy of 
“higher” and “lower” educational castes. “Tertiary” denotes only a continuation after a 
“secondary” and a “primary” schooling, and connotes slightly fewer moral and hierarchical 
ideas. Despite this, and despite many policy and theory documents conflating the two, 
“higher education” and “tertiary education” are often conflated, as are the specific 
components of tertiary education: “college,” “university,” “Higher Education Institution,” 
“academia,” “administration,” “instruction,” “training,” “department,” “discipline,” “skills,” 
“training,” “learning,” “practical,” “critical,” “lecturer,” “professor,” “financial aid,” “loans,” 
“private,” “public,” and so forth.  
Defining Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) 
For all intents and purposes, “tertiary education” refers to any education or formal 
learning occurring after secondary education. Institutions or other actors that offer formal 
tertiary education are herein referred to interchangeably as Higher Education Institutions 
(HEIs) and tertiary education systems, in order to coincide with quoted sources, as well as to 
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acknowledge their place in the three-tier global educational hierarchy. HEI denotes both 
online and for-profit or private institutions, as well as physical university campuses and 
public institutions. “Academia” refers to both the concept of a system of tertiary education 
composed of exclusive universities, as well as to the actual inter-university networks and 
bureaucracies of different university populations, which are overwhelmingly situated in the 
Global North and West. The term “university” specifically denotes an HEI that possesses a 
physical, built environment in which university students can personally interact, and which is 
not a singularly-focused HEI, such as a conservatory or a skills-based vocational training 
program. My thesis will not use the USA colloquial term “college” unless it is part of a name 
of an HEI, and generally “College of Engineering” or similarly will be interchangeable with 
“department of engineering.” My thesis will note when a HEI that uses the term “university” 
in its name, but it is primarily a vocational training program, such as South Africa’s Cape 
Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) which possesses a physical campus but has a 
limited vocational focus.  
In South Africa, the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) is 
responsible for tertiary education, including both skills-based training and more classic 
liberal arts- and science-focused universities. In South Africa, the Department of Basic 
Education (DBE) is responsible for primary and secondary formal education. In the USA, the 
Department of Education provides federal guidance for public universities nationwide, and 
administers significant portions of loan and financial aid schemes, but does not exercise as 
much control over individual universities, or over USA state-based school boards and school 
districts. In Germany, individual states retain broad control over administration of their 
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policies, but the Federal Ministry of Education and Research provides federal guidelines and 
administers significant portions of financial aid schemes.  
I conduct this review not merely to clarify my specific use of terminology. I do so 
also to highlight widespread disparities in what many assume to be accepted terminologies 
and processes, in a discourse rooted in Eurocentric histories and assumptions that the current 
3-tier system is the teleologically ideal for governing human behavior in terms of learning 
and teaching. That this 3-tier educational model of is ideal for governing human education 
remains to be seen. Analyzing such educational models is part of critical pedagogy, human 
development, social psychology, and other academic disciplines.  
Critical/Radical Thinking, Pedagogies, and Democratization 
Analyzing the poli-socio-economics of educational systems in the larger society in 
which an educational institution is situated is also the realm of critical pedagogy. Critical 
pedagogy address the role of educational institutions, universities and physical sites of 
education, teaching students how to think critically, and training students for specific 
vocations with specific job skills.  The roles of education, HEIs, and universities in society 
are debated as well by more quantitatively-inclined social scientists and economists. 
However, these sorts of debates tend to focus on top-down, capitalist-realist labor needs for 
skilled employees that support path dependent notions of development. (Mehta and Felipe, 
2014)  As such, critical analyses of the fundamental intents and outcomes of education tend 
to be less dependent upon existing econometrics, and more dependent upon qualitative 
narratives centered on the lived experiences of humans from a bottom-up, grassroots level. 
Critical pedagogy that interrogates the fundamentals of education, institutions, physical 
university campuses and built environments, and the difference between critical thinking 
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versus vocational skills training, are themselves transgressions against a neoliberalism that 
sees humans as only marketplace consumers in need of management, not engagement.  
The rise of post-modern, radical, transgressive, critical pedagogy is generally 
attributed to Freire, an educator who struggled alongside their deeply impoverished and 
colonized students in Brazil. (Freire, 1969) Freire’s work advocated for engagement with 
society similarly to Gramsci’s emphasis on movement and not management, on the covert 
subjectivity of overtly objective study, and on the ethical dimensions of the entire situation in 
which education occurs. (Gill, 1993) A great deal of consequent critical pedagogy became 
essentially a reiteration of Freire’s, and Gramsci’s, central call to action, summarized as:  
● Because epistemology is subjective;  
● because education is not excepted from poli-socio-economics; and,  
● because of the inhumane suffering of most students; therefore,  
● Education is a political act; and,  
● educators must not remain complicit in oppression.  
 
I expand here how the broad shift away from strictly objectivist, positivist, and 
Eurocentric pedagogies in the 1950s-1970s has been termed “the subjective turn” in 
academia. (Boghassian, 2006) This turn involved multivarious marginalized groups forcing 
their way into academia’s sites of knowledge production and legitimization by politically 
acting to affirm their epistemologies that had previously been disrespected and disregarded. 
Academia’s subjective turn witnessed the assimilation of marginalized epistemologies and 
methodologies, such as Black Studies, Queer Studies, Feminist Studies, and Chicanx and 
indigenous Studies. (Moraga, 1983; Anzaldua, 1986; Bernal, 1998; Armbruster-Sandoval, 
2016)  Central to this subjective turn were theories articulated by bell hooks, who embraced 
Freire’s notion of teaching as transgression, and highlighted how it was inherently 
transgressive for people of color and their epistemologies to exist within a historically White, 
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colonial university. (hooks, 1994; 2003) Much like Lezra (2014a), hooks emphasized the role 
of community and the importance of empathy as a part of politicized education, (2003) both 
of which transgress against technocratic notions of education as management of obedient, 
uncritical pupils.  
Harney and Moten’s radical text The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black 
Study (2013) carry on this tradition today by insisting that radical, transgressive, 
criminalized, and “fugitive,” Black studies have always driven change in the university, at 
great cost to “the subversive intellectual” - who is historically a colonized or marginalized 
student of color. Since the subjective turn, and increasing through Contemporary 
Globalization, there has been increasing convergence of anti-capitalist and counter-
hegemonic social movement theories with critical pedagogy theories. One such example, 
revisited in my final critical premise, highlights exploited graduate researchers as today’s 
subversive intellectual, with the notion of sweatshops and the Ivory Tower. (Williams, 2003) 
The subjective turn was also fundamentally a leftist turn, given its relative empowerment to 
silenced and invisibilized people. A recent book by retiring CSU Professor Lazer, Why 
Higher Education Should Have a Leftist Bias (2013) represents a logical conclusion to this 
notion. Lazere argues that because of the fundamentally right-wing nature of the USA, which 
significantly limits other sites of critical thinking beyond academia, HEIs offer students and 
society the rare opportunity to imagine alternatives to the current order. I return to this in my 
final, third premise, and conclusion.  
Giroux theorizes that education, and particularly critical thinking at universities, 
should be founded upon the human capacity for change, especially changing society to 
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become more just. Giroux’s argument about tertiary education can be summarized in the 
following quote:  
Education is not only about issues of work and economics, but also about 
questions of justice, social freedom, and the capacity for democratic agency, 
action, and change, as well as the related issues of power, exclusion, and 
citizenship. Education at its best is about enabling students to take seriously 
questions about how they ought to live their lives, uphold the ideals of a just 
society, and act upon the promises of a strong democracy.  
(Giroux, 2010: 195) 
 
Giroux consistently argues this throughout their career, insisting that formal, 
institutionalized tertiary education, while often co-opted by the state, remains the single most 
important site for learning about and teaching social justice, which requires political action 
by educators and students. (2010)  As early as the 1980s, witnessing the 
neoliberal/conservative backlash against radical anti-capitalist imaginaries in education, 
Giroux theorized about “a pedagogy for the opposition” that would empower marginalized 
people to coalesce and change society, using the university as a base. (Giroux, 1983)  Before 
the Global Capital Crisis, and even before the USA-led invasion of Iraq, Giroux identified 
the damage of neoliberalism and “corporate culture” on higher education (2002) and its 
intersection with “proto-fascism,” or neoliberalism’s fundamental de-democratization 
processes. (2004a)  Giroux was one of the first Global North theorists to identify 
“authoritarianism” as a fundamental part of neoliberalism (2004b); to identify the 
intersections of post-9/11 militarization and destruction of critical thinking, through the 
deliberate destruction of public HEIs (2004b; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2011a); and to focus on 
the expansion of the military-industrial-academic complex, concomitant with the expansion 
of the post-9/11 surveillance-security state. (2007)3 
                                                   
3 This term “military-industrial-academic complex” existed, but in a pre-9/11, Cold War era context. See:  
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Giroux theorizes that the proliferation of an engaged, justice-oriented, critically 
thinking citizenry is a necessary component of democracy, and that universities are the best-
equipped institution to maintain this fundamentally democratizing procedure. Giroux further 
argues that radical analysis necessarily exists alongside, and in a dialectic with, simultaneous 
processes of hegemonic normatization, colonization, and assimilation imposed upon 
universities, due to their non-exemption from poli-socio-economics beyond academia. In this 
way, Giroux optimistically sees universities as sites of transformation, where students 
empowered by critical thought and exposure to hegemony can better learn to resist it.   
Theories of educational systems’ centrality to democracy are not unique to Giroux or 
radical pedagogists after the subjective turn. They have existed in some form since at least 
Dewey (1916) and modernization theorists like Lipset (1959), who explicitly state that 
education has a causal relationship to, at least, procedural democracy and participation. In the 
first decades of the USA, even Thomas Jefferson cited important correlations between 
education levels and national economic and democratic capacities as justification for public 
HEIs. As noted below in my outline of the history of the institutionalization of tertiary 
education, modern nation-states readily acknowledge a causal relationship between robust 
tertiary education systems and national power, if not also acknowledging increased levels of 
participation and, consequently, greater levels of democracy.  
Universities are not exempt from the rest of society, though, and the subjective turn 
was a largely leftist movement against an overwhelmingly right-wing society. As such, the 
backlash against the leftist subjective turn was right-wing, and took the form of a neoliberal / 
conservative turn, epistemologically and pedagogically within academia, concurrent with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Leslie, S. W. (1993) The Cold War and American science: The military-industrial-academic complex at MIT 
and Stanford. USA: Columbia University Press. 
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neoliberal turn beyond academia across the USA. (Beverley, 2008)  The Chicago School and 
1973 Chile, mentioned above, and detailed just below this premise, best exemplifies the start 
of the convergence of neoliberal authoritarianism with tertiary education and public-serving 
HEIs.  But, before my section “Neoliberalism’s De-Democratization and Ruination of Public 
Universities,” I survey the history of functional tertiary education systems, to contextualize 
my subsequent theories of counter-hegemonic social movements specifically at public 
universities being destroyed by neoliberalism.  
The modern and contemporary concept of the university as we now know it derives 
from Europe’s imposition of their form of higher education on the rest of the world during 
colonialism. For this reason, Bologna, Venezia, Padua, Oxford, Cambridge, La Sorbonne, 
Frankfurt, and so forth are regarded as the oldest universities in the world (Kwiek, 2000) as 
opposed to the formal educational systems of the three mosques in Timbuktu; the Songyang 
academy in Dengfeng; Al-Azhar University in Cairo; or, the University of al-Qarawiyyin in 
Fes, which is the oldest known continuously- operating, degree-granting institution. (Verger, 
2003) Germany, the UK, and other European states of have long histories of public 
education. Germany’s Humboldtian model and concept of public HEIs serving as critical 
sites of cultural, political, and technological knowledge production, as well as collegial 
“academic communities,” has long driven other states’ policies. (Kwiek, 2000; Harley, 
Muller-Camen, and Collin, 2004; Reihlen and Wenzlaff, 2013)   
The university’s role in supporting at least national economic power, if not also 
political and cultural power, has been acknowledged by the USA and Europe since at least 
the 1800s. As noted above, founding father and slave owner Thomas Jefferson advocated for 
public primary and secondary education, as well as for tertiary education systems, citing their 
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alma mater, the College of William and Mary as inspiration, and later founding the 
University of Virginia. (Jefferson, 1781) Of course, the initial rise of universities in Europe 
and the USA, and likely throughout the Arab, African, central and eastern Asian regions, was 
predicated on exclusivity, and only including those deemed acceptable students. The Ivy 
Leagues in the USA maintain their contemporary prestige upon both a concept of heritage 
and respectability, as well as exclusivity, born in the colonial era. (Goldin and Katz, 1998; 
Mettler, 2011) In this light, the South actually led the USA in the creation of public HEIs that 
were open to the public beginning in the 1800s. Of course, at that time, only White men 
could attend, indicating the differences between contemporary and historical conceptions of 
"the public” as well as “the university.” (Goldin and Katz, 1998; Mettler, 2011: 114-116)  
Throughout modernity, during the long 19th and short 20th centuries, a modern 
Westphalian nation-state did need legitimate national centers of knowledge production. 
(Kwiek, 2000; Mettler, 2011; Mehta and Felipe, 2014) From approximately 1840 onward, the 
USA maintained relatively high secondary and tertiary graduation rates, with consistent 
growth year-over-year in accessibility to the general public. (Goldin and Katz, 1998; 
Newfield, 2011) Federal legislation in 1802 and 1862 helped sub-national states appropriate 
indigenous lands and earn grants for establishing public HEIs, specifically intended to 
support a professional industrialized class. (Mettler, 2011: 115) The 1868 establishment of 
the University of California, with its first university campus in Berkeley, CA represents the 
industrial-era roots of California’s UC system specifically, and a significant period of time of 
relatively accessible public tertiary education, as USA sub-national states often imagined 
ambitious education systems.  
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As the 1800s and industrialization advanced, enrollment in public and private HEIs 
grew in imperial cores as well as in colonial peripheries. Degrees granted and attendee 
demographics diversified gradually, with wide variability region to region, and the monastic 
and exclusive roots of most HEIs remained over the course of the long 19th century. The 
next most significant shifts in education policy would occur with the massive shifts in the 
global poli-socio-economic order, as a result of the collapse of de jure European colonialism 
and the end of the British Empire, largely caused by the ascendance of the USA and the 
USSR after WWII, during the short 20th century.  
Tertiary Education Globally: Post-WWII to Contemporary Globalization  
An economically thriving USA finalized its immediately post-WWII conventional 
and nuclear military dominance over former imperial powers through the destruction and 
occupation of Tokyo and Berlin, and the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
respectively. WWII into the the late 1900s was a time period of the USA’s pursuit of global 
hegemony, where the USA struggled to create an American-led world order and achieve 
simultaneous military, economic, and cultural power. Its principal opposition was the USSR, 
which tended to lack the economic and cultural power of the USA, but rivalled the USA in 
military strength. The USSR additionally, in multivarious contexts, rivalled the USA in terms 
of political and ideological power through support from anti-capitalist projects around the 
world. Both the Cold War’s ideological and technological contests necessitated significant 
production of knowledge that could claim to be, and could be perceived as legitimate, 
objective, unbiased, and therefore superior to the other ideologies’ knowledge.  
A post-WWII global legal framework was created that emphasized the importance of 
education on the basis of both rights, representative democracy, culture, and economics. This 
 
 
122 
was driven in part by USA policies and institutions, as well as by sweeping international 
documents and constitutions. The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC) all gave 
education a significant place in development and human rights narratives. While specifically 
how much and to whom education should be given, and at what cost, was contested by anti-
communist and anti-capitalist theorists, there arose general consensus in industrialized and 
industrializing states alike that education was a priority, generally.  
During the early global Cold War, states prioritized massive expansion of research 
spending and construction of public universities. Within and beyond the USA, much of this 
was driven by military investments in social and physical national infrastructure, including 
education and universities. Just before the end of WWII, the USA had established the GI Bill 
in 1944, signalling the first major USA federal policy significantly appropriating funds to 
tertiary education since the 1800s. This period was unique in terms of the scale of the 
expansion of research spending and construction of public universities. This expansion was 
driven by USA state appropriations, specifically from the Department of Defense (DoD), 
which occupied ~80% of all USA governmental research appropriations up to the mid-1960s. 
(Leslie, 1993)   
Between 1945 and 1980, enrollment in and graduation from institutions of tertiary 
education in the USA grew significantly, and participation in public tertiary education 
especially grew concurrently with construction of physical university campuses and 
increased funding. The GI Bill, post-WWII baby boom, initial Cold War dominance of the 
USA, the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA), and the 1965 Higher Education 
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Act (HEA) coincided with massive expansion of public HEIs, especially in Western states, 
yielding a Fordist Golden Age of of public universities. (Leslie, 1993; Evans, 1995; Jolly, 
2009; Mettler, 2011)  
This was wrapped up, however, in the military-industrial complex, which further 
necessitated large-scale, institutionalized education systems that would produce knowledge 
that served “the public,” meaning mostly pro-capitalist, anti-USSR nationalists. In addition to 
the pro-capitalist, pro-military culture of the USA within and beyond academia, so too did 
conservative rhetorics of talent, merit, nationalism, security, and competition exclude many 
poor or differently abled students from HEIs. (Urban, 2010) Funding schemes like the HEA 
somewhat resolved class exclusion, but notions of merit and competition still determined 
admissions to HEIs. In 1972, Title IX amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, attempting to 
remedy gendered and racial exclusion, but decades later, this tools remains a blunt instrument 
at best. (Valentin, 1997) All in all, tertiary education remained a privilege to be earned, and 
not a right to which all humans were entitled, despite massive increases in state spending. 
Contrarily, in the USSR, major constraints remained in place for attaining education, and 
these constraints and systems were imposed on Soviet-aligned states. In some ways, though, 
once educated, Soviet citizens increased social mobility due to improved employment 
prospects (Novozhilov, 1991; Titma, Tuma, and Roosma, 2003) and, radical imaginations, 
albeit in some places where dissent would be even more violently suppressed than in the 
USA. (Zajda, 1980)  
Ultimately, though, while not an intended outcome of a national government seeking 
to enrich itself in capitalist-realist terms, massive increases in tertiary public education in the 
USA, in addition to technological and social changes, resulted in an explosion of knowledge 
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production and consumption within and beyond academia. (Mettler, 2011; Newfield, 2008, 
2011; Longanecker, 2014) The resulting military-industrial-academic complex generally 
increased all public accessibility to tertiary education as a side effect of its intent to increase 
national economic and military power. (Leslie, 1993; Longanecker, 2014) The development 
of medical and information technology was largely driven by research conducted through 
joint DoD-university schemes. The infamous Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) arose in 1958 after the USSR deployed Sputnik, but from DARPA interaction with 
universities, especially MIT, inventions ranging from the internet to Google Maps and GPS 
to graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were developed, complicating the militaristic histories of 
such programs. The impact of global, internationalized, institutionalized expanded access to 
tertiary education around the world is visible in the proliferation of military-industrial-
academic complexes, and their concomitant general increase of access to tertiary education. 
The expanded medical, military, and financial capabilities of a robust tertiary education 
system based on public universities provided a model for other states around the world.  
Tertiary Education Regionally: North America and California 
Specifically in California, the 1955 establishment of the California Student Aid 
Commission, (CSAC) which oversees programs such as the Cal Grant, the CA equivalent to 
the USA Pell Grant, represents one component of increased public accessibility to tertiary 
education. The 1960 Donahoe Higher Education Act, also known as the California Master 
Plan for Higher Education, famously created a 3-tier tertiary public education system. 
(California Senate Bill No. 33, 1960; Graham, 1989) It was composed of a newer 
Community College (CC) and California State University (CSU) systems that would serve as 
the lower and middle tiers of the overall CA tertiary education system, respectively. The 
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upper tier of this system was the expanded University of California (UC) campuses that were 
able to accept, transfer, educate, and graduate all CA students meeting certain criteria. 
(Graham, 1989; Newfield, 2008)  
Between 1868 and 1919, only 3 UC campuses were built: Berkeley in 1868, San 
Francisco in 1873, and Los Angeles in 1919. Between 1944 and 2005, an additional 7 
campuses were built and/or officially expanded and incorporated into the UC system as full 
universities. For the CSU immediately post-WWII, 3  new campuses were established in two 
years: CSU Sacramento and Los Angeles in 1947, and Long Beach in 1949. At the UC alone, 
enrollment from 1940 to 2015 grew from approximately 23,000 Full-Time-Equivalent (FTE) 
students to approximately 238,000 FTES, an increase of over 1,000%. In 1940, using an 
approximate CA state population of 6.95 million, .331% of Californians were enrolled in the 
UC. By 2015, using an approximate CA state population of 39 million, .660% of Californians 
were enrolled in the UC. The establishment of CSAC, the Donahoe Higher Education Act, 
tripling of UC campus in 60 years, and the doubling of per-capita enrollment in the same 
time frame all represent a massive growth of public tertiary education in CA specifically.  
California, and other sub-national western USA states, disproportionately expanded 
not only tertiary education access in the USA, but especially public universities and others 
HEIs (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Newfield, 2008; Ryu, 2011; Longanecker, 2014) By 2020, 
Western states will possess a significant minority, over 30%, of university-aged residents. 
(Ryu, 2011)  Longanecker (2014) prefers to discuss the “federal/western research policy 
nexus” but I prefer Leslie’s (1993) and Giroux’s (2007) term the military- industrial- 
academic complex, as well as my own concept of California as a regional hegemon. These 
policies, contextualized by a long history of military and other technological development 
 
 
126 
being driven by federally-financed western HEIs, especially CA’s, made CA a regional and 
national driver of public education policy. For a brief period of time, which I expand on later, 
CA led the way in terms of diversifying curricula, students, instructors, and enrollment. Of 
course, California’s influence meant that whatever happened to its tertiary education systems 
would have ripple effects across the rest of the region, for better or for worse.  
Tertiary Education Regionally: South(ern) Africa 
In South(ern) Africa, education at all levels was overtly racist, Eurocentric, elitist, and 
exclusionary, from earliest colonialism through the post-WWII National Party apartheid 
regime that ruled South Africa from 1948 to 1994. Barring extraordinary exceptions, only the 
white elite of South Africa were allowed to achieve a formal tertiary education without undue 
individual or collective impediments. As examined in greater detail later, until the 1990s 
collapse of the apartheid regime, the vast majority of educational “development” in South 
Africa, which influenced the policies across Southern Africa, was aimed at reifying a 
racialized class system. Only in 1990 was there an actual increase of access to and education 
for non- Whites, and it was a largely symbolic gesture. (Badat, 1995; Jansen, 1997, 1999)  
Despite this deep history of exclusionary education, South Africa as a modern nation-
state, like in Europe, considered tertiary education an important component of the national 
economy. This is especially true in the role of educational institutions’ securing the 
profitability of the apartheid military-industrial complex. (Rogerson, 1990) Driven by the 
Cold War and the enforcement of apartheid within South Africa and across the southern 
African region, massive defense budgets and systems were similarly justified by the 
academic-military-industrial complex and supported through educated professionals. 
(Batchelor, Dunne, and Saal, 2000) Perhaps nowhere besides South Africa and the USA was 
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the military-industrial-academic complex so thoroughly established. White South Africans, 
despite comprising a small minority (around 10%) of the residents of the region, comprised 
the entirety of state military and police forces. All White South Africans faced compulsory 
conscription and military service. A great many also received formal tertiary education, in 
addition to their military vocational skills training. The overlap between Apartheid South 
Africa’s military and political elites with prestigious universities was significant.  
 Of course, the power shifts during the early phase of Contemporary Globalization 
included the collapse of the apartheid regime, which I detail later. Between 1989 and 1998 
“South Africa’s defense budget declined by more than 50% in real terms” as the USSR, the 
Cold War, and conventional USA policies of supporting anti-communist regime’s military-
industrial complexes also collapsed. (Batchelor, Dunne, and Lamb, 2002: 342)  Between the 
late 1980s and late 1990s, concomitant with imminent collapse of apartheid and 
Contemporary Globalization, White-owned capital flight instigated a major recession and 
restructuring of the economy away from manufacturing towards a service economy - 
including education as a service, and a decrease on arms manufacturing. (Batchelor, Dunne, 
and Saal, 2000)  The procurement budget alone, which in turn drove arms production in 
South Africa, as well as consumption Europe’s arms producers violating the UN-sanctioned 
arms embargo, “was cut by more than 80% in real terms.” (Batchelor, Dunne, and Saal, 
2000: 554)   
The 1994 abolition of de jure apartheid and political shift to a constitutional, 
procedural democracy included mass disarmament, restructuring, and even abolition of much 
of the South African Defense Force (SADF). By 1996, a new constitution had been ratified, 
and a new Ministry of Education created. The 1996 constitution explicated specific socio-
 
 
128 
economic rights, especially education and educational equity. (Republic of South Africa, 
1996; Berger, 2003) These entitlements, though commonplace in many post-WWII colonized 
states’ constitutions and the aforementioned UN resolutions, remain absent from the USA’s 
constitution. Such entitlements also remain absent from the USA’s contemporary neoliberal 
policies that de-fund education and consider it a privilege, not a right.  
Unfortunately, in line with conflating “democracy” with “free market,” South 
Africa’s accessibility of education in policy was couched in a rhetoric of competitiveness, 
and situated in a globalizing economy driven by the global hegemony of the USA’s 
neoliberal capitalism. The new Ministry of Education privileged “outcome-based education” 
(OBE) models that required competitive testing to quantify students’ development - a 
decision heavily dependent upon USA educational theories. (Spady, 1994; Jansen, 1997)  
The importation of Spady’s theories is just one example of USA-driven, competition-based 
policies being privileged and incorporated into a developing set of national policies, despite 
significant academic evidence that OBE isn’t the correct model for post-apartheid South 
Africa (Jansen, 1997; 1999a; 1999b). In this way, while South Africa resisted the global 
hegemon, at least in its constitutional approach to rights, as it created foundational policy 
documents in the beginning of Contemporary Globalization, it neoliberalized many policies, 
including education.  
Tertiary Education Under Contemporary Globalization 
This section briefly reviews tertiary education systems under Contemporary 
Globalization, which I argue are being experienced around the world. Academia has been 
systematically coerced into colluding with agents of capital and the state, while 
neoliberalism’s destruction of education continues to stratify, ghettoize, and potentially 
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radicalize universities. These issues complement Giroux and help me focus on how social 
movements, the production of knowledge, and democratic participation are all becoming 
radically restructured by neoliberalism in critical sites of democratization: tertiary education 
and HEIs, especially formerly public universities. Under Contemporary Globalization, public 
universities have encountered, and continue to encounter, at least all of the following 
processes:  
● reduced funding from the state, as measured by per-capita appropriations, relative shares 
of GDP and GNP, and in other proportional terms;  
● increased tuition and other fees charged to individual students’ private households;  
● a drive to conform to neoliberal capitalist priorities of privatization, prioritizing “free 
market” competition, entrepreneurialism, and profit-seeking; and,  
● increasing precariousness and exploitation of university labor.  
 
Because Contemporary Globalization has been defined as neoliberal globalization, 
which requires securitization, militarization, and violence, the collusion of once-liberal 
academia and neo-conservative thought must be reviewed. As mentioned, Chile in 1973 was 
a unique, watershed moment. The U of Chicago School of Economics’ collusion with state 
violence was when roll-back neoliberalism under the Cold War began to be refined into roll-
out neoliberalism for the USA’s post-Cold War global export. 1973, Chile, and U of Chicago 
represent several simultaneous, new processes of collusion between academia, the state, and 
economic theories:  
● increased visibility of the Pinochet Regime as an ideal manifestation of advanced, 
neoliberal capitalism, in a region historically colonized by the USA;  
● the integration of the most extreme thinking of capitalist markets and profitability into 
mainstream economics, resulting in formal articulations of neoliberal capitalist rhetoric;  
● the adoption of this neoliberal rhetoric by mainstream, right-wing politicians;  
● the consequent adoption of this rhetoric for use as anti-left talking points by the USA’s 
conservative Silent and/or Moral and/or Christian Majorities and Coalitions; and,  
● perhaps most importantly, the robust and highly-visible support of prestigious University 
of Chicago economists and other academics, who legitimized and popularized not only 
neoliberal economics rhetoric, but re-legitimized the necessity of intervention to establish 
“free markets,” conflated with “democracy,” in the post-Civil Rights era  
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(Silva, 1991; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004)  
 
Conservative USA academics’ highly visible and overt praise of the Pinochet Regime 
and its brutal form of advanced capitalism sharply diverged from the state’s covert tactics in 
executing yet another foreign intervention, as well as different from past academic 
denouncements of such militarism. Alongside corporatizing mass media, academia, led by 
the hegemonic U of Chicago, colluded with the state by legitimizing neoliberal poli-socio-
economics, given universities’ status as epistemological authority figures. The U of Chicago 
School of Economics, and especially Milton Friedman, had widespread influence within and 
beyond academia, and were perceived as powerful, legitimate, and authoritative. Their ideas’ 
adoption by Ford-, Reagan-, and Thatcher-era conservative parties, and their support for the 
neoliberal Pinochet Regime, all legitimized and mainstreamed neoliberalism.  
Friedman’s and U of Chicago’s influence on Reaganism and neoliberalism is hard to 
overstate. Friedman had won the John Bates Clark Medal before the age of 40, in 1951. 
Friedman had extensive contact, and drew extensively on, the poli-socio-economic theories 
of Hayek, who was based in the UK’s London School of Economics (LSE), but also lectured 
at U of Chicago. Hayek’s theory of a Road to Serfdom (1944) and planned economies’ or 
“big government’s” logical end result of peasantry were central to Friedman’s and other 
conservatives’ “smaller government” arguments. It seems unsurprising that neither Hayek 
nor Friedman only shallowly engaged in race and slavery at all, and their theories’ ostensible 
opposition to bigger government directly contributed to today’s neo-slavery.  
Hayek and Friedman both visited Chile during the Pinochet Regime in the 1970s and 
1980s, as did Thatcher and multivarious USA-UK financial and intelligence elites. Both 
supported the NGO think tank, Centro de Estudios Publicos (Spanish; English: Center of 
Public Studies) that, ironically enough, was critical in Chile’s legitimization of militarized 
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privatization. (Puryear, 1994: 90-95)  In 1976, Friedman won the Nobel Prize. U of Chicago 
claims 12 Economics Nobel Laureates, which is double the runner-up: MIT. In 1973, 
Stanford’s prestigious Hoover Institute was founded, which Friedman ran from 1977 to the 
2000s, while advising conservative elites. Throughout the 1980s, Friedman was a covert 
economic adviser for USA President Reagan, who awarded Friedman the National Medal of 
Science and the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1988. Friedman even created television 
series, Free To Choose, that popularize “free market” perspectives of capitalism and rational 
choice models beyond academia, from the 1980s to 1990s. According to the Economist, 
Friedman’s “smaller-government” neoliberalism was revolutionary.  
These works revolutionised the conduct of central banks around the world…[his] 
great achievement is not his challenge to Keynesian demand management, but the 
popular writings that challenged a consensus favouring ever-greater state intervention 
in the economy….the 94-year-old economist was still working to spread his ideas 
about free markets...In developed countries politicians may talk like Keynesians, but 
they behave like monetarists. 
(The Economist, 2006)  
 
Such relationships between prestigious academics, politicians, policy-makers, the 
media, and influential institutions highlight right wing re-commitment to individualism and 
markets, with academia increasingly on board. After Chile in 1973, subsequent military 
escalation in order to impose increasingly neoliberal capitalist logics elsewhere became more 
and more simplistically tied to “spreading freedom” rather than “spreading capitalism,” and 
Keynesianism became replaced by neoliberal monetarism. All of this occurred alongside 
massive, and violently suppressed, civil disobedience during the Civil Rights, Feminist, and 
Chicanx movements, as well as the collapse in trust of government following Nixon and 
Vietnam, the stagnation of the Carter presidency, and Iranian and USSR-Afghan challenges 
to USA power. In this context, neoliberalism / conservatism and renewed nationalism 
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encouraged society to accept as common sense a simplistic notion that spreading capitalism 
was spreading freedom.  Backlash against the subjective turn in academia coincided with this 
backlash against civil disobedience, which had been intimately connected to academia.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while the subjective turn afforded some emergent 
fields marginal power, the social sciences disciplines of IR, political science, and economics 
retained legitimacy and power within and beyond academia, while they embraced U of 
Chicago neoliberalism, and became preferred by NGOs and the state needing to legitimize 
neoliberal policies. As mentioned, as the USSR collapsed, academia and emergent 
Mainstream GS largely abandoned and further marginalized Marxist / development / 
dependency theory, yielding unimaginative, path-dependent, capitalist-realism as the order of 
the day.  
Neoliberalism’s De-Democratization and Ruination of HEIs 
The above events locally situate the foundations of Contemporary Globalization and 
its global, covert authoritarianism within the USA’s academic communities. Here, de- 
democratization of societies visibly accelerated through the ruination of HEIs, especially 
formerly public universities that had been visible sites of left wing imagination. The 
democratic elements of formerly public universities were central to maintaining public 
tertiary educational systems that are humane, empathetic, public services. Now, they more 
closely resemble inhumane, unsympathetic, private marketplaces, after decades of 
internalization and uncritical reification of neoliberalism, treating students as consumers, and 
instructors as exploitable labor.  
 I agree with Giroux that, to date, HEIs, and especially public universities, were the 
most viable institutional site for democratization. Through allowing academic freedom, 
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exchange of ideas, rigorous peer review, and fostering critical thinking, universities may be 
the only USA sites for alternative and radical imaginaries, including anti-capitalist, anti-
White, and pro-Black, -Queer, -Feminist, and/or -Chicanx challenges to authority. I also 
argue that because universities may promote radical hope and democratization, they are 
therefore targets of neoliberalism’s de-democratization and authoritarian destruction of 
anything challenging the authority of capital. While this may sound bleak, and Dicken would 
likely write off me, Newfield, Harney and Moten, et. al., below I briefly review how 
Contemporary Globalization has put into chains the university in ruins.  
In perhaps the least bleak, most optimistic terms, the issue of “university 
transformation” towards a new “entrepreneurial university” model in the 1990s was 
articulated 1990s by Clark.  
[There is] a growing imbalance between demands made upon universities and their 
capacity to respond if they remain in their traditional form...in societies around the 
world, especially in public universities supported mainly by a national or regional 
ministry… 
 
The capacity is limited by underfunding and by rigidified internal structures that 
were constructed in the simpler days of elite higher education.  
(Clark, 2001: 10-11) 
 
Clark does outline basic issues facing public universities around the world under 
Contemporary Globalization. Globally, universities had historically been founded on notions 
of some elite national HEIs, with colonial and/or Keynesian poli-socio-economics supporting 
them, in order to strengthen national power, and perhaps foster critical thought. Neoliberal 
globalization mandated change, though; as with global studies, just “change” is too vague an 
assessment. What specific changes were happening to universities, which Clark argued 
required them to be more entrepreneurial?  
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Universities, to continue being seen as worthy of state funding, had to increase and 
diversify both student enrollment and degrees offered - while simultaneously receiving fewer 
resources to do so. To remain competitive and forward-facing, universities had to become 
more internationalized, or globalized, and more inter-disciplinary - while simultaneously 
respecting the authority and autonomy of departments that refuse centralized control in order 
to maintain academic freedom. To continue serving the public, universities had to continue 
admitting certain numbers of certain categories of students - while primary and secondary 
education cuts degraded applicant quality, and students faced increasing barriers to entry.  
Simultaneously, following the conservative backlash to the subjective turn within 
academia, and the neoliberal turn beyond academia, the legitimacy of knowledge produced 
by critical or anti-capital SS and HFA departments was questionable, and therefore less 
authoritative should universities invoke that knowledge to justify policy changes that went 
against capitalist-realist IR or economics recommendations. Universities’ quasi-medieval, 
historically monastic and colonial, and only somewhat public-serving bureaucratic, 
departmental, instructional and financial structures were all inadequate to meet those 
demands. According to Clark, if universities became “entrepreneurial” in their competition 
for institutional survival, that might mitigate the state providing providing inadequate 
resources.  
I believe Clark’s highly influential theory, however, lacks significant critiques of 
existing poli-socio-economics, and so reifies the foundational components notions of 
neoliberalism.  Readings’ The University in Ruins (1996) took a much more radical and 
critical approach, which I must assume Clark did not read.  
The university is not just like a corporation; it is a corporation. Students in the 
University of Excellence are not like customers; they are customers… 
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Is it surprising that corporations resemble universities, health-care facilities, and 
international organizations, which all resemble corporations? Foucault’s Discipline 
and Punish explores the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reorganization of the 
mechanisms of state power, especially the judicial system, around the surveillance 
and normalization of delinquents in place of their exemplary punishment by torture 
and execution. Criminals are treated rather than destroyed, but this apparent 
liberalization is also a mode of domination that is the more terrible in that it leaves no 
room whatsoever for transgression. Crime is no longer an act of freedom, a remainder 
that society cannot handle, but must expel. Rather, crime comes to be considered as a 
pathological deviation from social norms that must be cured…. 
 
The British turn to “performance indicators” should also be understood as a step on 
the road toward the discourse of excellence that is replacing the appeal to culture in 
the North American University. The performance indicator is, of course, a measure of 
excellence, an invented standard that claims to be capable of rating all departments in 
all...universities on a five-point scale. The rating can then be used to determine the 
size of the central government grant allocated to the department in question…[in 
order] to introduce a competitive market into the academic world… 
...we must analyze the University as a bureaucratic system rather than as the 
ideological apparatus that the left has traditionally considered it… 
 
The replacement of culture by the discourse of excellence is the University’s response 
to 1968...Forced to describe itself as either a bureaucratic-administrative or an idealist 
institution, it chose the former. And consequently there is no way back to 1968; a 
repetition of the radical postures of the late 1960s is not adequate to resist the 
discourse of excellence... 
(Readings, 1996: 22, 24, 36, 150) 
 
Giroux echoed and expanded upon these sentiments a decade later in The University 
in Chains (2007), asserting that not only had the notion of a culturally rich, idealized, critical 
university been destroyed by neoliberalism and transformed into a transnational corporation 
selling itself on quantifiable “excellence” - but that this transnational corporation was 
subservient to the post-9/11 military-industrial and security-surveillance complexes. It seems 
accurate to consider neoliberalism’s defunding of HEIs in early Contemporary Globalization 
as yielding contingent funding of the university in the post-9/11, Islamophobic, proto-fascist 
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USA. Multiple other theories about the destruction of HEIs under neoliberalism exist, 
reflecting what I earlier referred to as an effective consensus amongst academics that 
neoliberalism is inhumane and unsustainable. Haiven and Khasnabish’s assess struggles in 
neoliberal universities after 2007:  
...the university has become a key site of struggle both in terms of what it could offer 
to capital (research and development, resources, expertise) and what it might do as a 
space - however imperfect - of critical and free inquiry. Within the university, the 
social engineering neoliberalism has sought to achieve more broadly has been 
replicated… 
(Haiven and Khasnabish, 2014: 36) 
 
Their text The Radical Imagination: Social Movement Research in the Age of 
Austerity outlines the omnipresent, slow, poli-socio-economic violence of neoliberalism 
across all of society, but especially in spaces and times where knowledge is legitimized, 
produced, and consumed - such as HEIs, and inside all humans’ imaginative minds. The 
authors outline how universities have become more socially stratified, ghettoized, and 
ultimately sites of precarious labor that tend towards contingent employment models. In 
these spaces, times, and movements, there is both a radical, hegemonic neoliberalization 
under way, and a consequential and simultaneous (Foran, 2014) radical, counter-hegemonic 
“imagination” of “prefigurative” alternatives, that cannot be safely articulated by with such 
transgressive thoughts, or what Giroux terms “dangerous thinking.” (2015)  Additionally, 
they argue, neoliberalism has promoted a lack of critical thinking all across society by 
forcing humans to replace creative, critical, or radical dreams with ideas of transactions and 
consumption.  
Williams’ analogy of “the sweatshop and the Ivory Tower” (2003) exemplifies the 
notion of the corporatized, for-profit university highly exploiting formerly, relatively-
privileged populations, such as graduate students, researchers, and lecturers. Pedagogists 
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from Finland have highlighted the new precariousness in the university amidst robust social 
democracies and formerly robust public educational systems, where such de-publicization 
had been unthinkable.  (Procoli, 2004; Nikunen, 2012)  Germany’s “academic communities” 
have transformed into bureaucratically managed corporations, too. (Reihlen and Wenzlaff, 
2013)  The UK’s shift to  contingent instructors mass-producing articles for the profit of 
departments or institutions both reifies the USA’s model, and drives other similar changes 
within Europe. (Harley, Muller- Camen, and Collin, 2004) This privatization of public 
universities a la plantation economics, but for academic production, is none other a 
destruction of public educational systems, encouraged by neoliberal /conservative politicians.  
Newfield argues that a right-wing political agenda, not any real economic imperative, 
drove the destruction of public HEIs from the 1980s onward, and drives the ongoing 
destruction of the formerly public UC. Newfield specifies how public universities’, and 
especially the UCs’, revenue shifts away from state budget appropriations to individual 
household tuition are the clearest econometric indicator of neoliberal practices of 
privatization and de-publicization. Newfield integrates an political-econometric analysis of 
state educational divestment with qualitative analyses of the university as a site of democracy 
and participation, which parallels Readings and Giroux. (Newfield, 2008)  Newfield 
specifically focuses on the ideal of California’s public HEIs public service of creating a 
stable, educated, growing middle-class that is truly diverse and upwardly socially mobile. 
This was the ideal of the UC in the 1960s, which went a step beyond simple national 
economic assistance from an HEI.   
This is only a slightly radical leftist notion of Fordism, Keynesianism, and the welfare 
state. Even though it is only slightly radical, it is and ideology that transgresses against 
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governance by capital, and so is incompatible with neoliberalism’s hyper-individualism, 
privatization, covert racism, and destruction of all public institutions that are not securing 
profitable capital flows for a select population. Newfield maintains that pre-existing systems 
and practices of higher education could be re-implemented as a relatively simple way to at 
least mitigate growing problems. Positing the university system as under attack by right-wing 
politics that have pre-existing left-wing solutions, which remain unimplemented due to a 
number of failures to create the political will, makes sense.  
I agree with these assessments, and that the damage done to the university as a 
dialectic of an ideal leftist concept, alongside a practical political-economy driver, is 
effectively ruinous. In the 1980s-2000s, unprecedented state cuts to public HEIs just erected 
during the 1940s-1970s became essentially state educational divestment. Subsequently, 
universities massively increased the tuition to be paid for by students’ individual, private 
households, unless they luckily lived in a state that had robust financial aid schemes. Massive 
tuition increases ostensibly made up for universities’ lost revenue, while the salaries of high-
ranking university administrators simultaneously, suspiciously inflated. In 1978, California’s 
Prop 13 infamously restructured educational and other public services finances by tying them 
to frozen property values, satisfying suburban homeowners with lower taxes, while gutting 
revenues for schools in poorer areas. The rest of the country took note, and this neoliberal 
policy in increasingly libertarian California drove similar policies elsewhere in the country.  
Post-9/11, for-profit HEIs seized on the business opportunity offered by state 
educational divestment by becoming a multi-billion dollar industry that disproportionately 
profited off of military veterans’ GI Bill funding. Ultimately, for-profit HEIs, with 
Corinthian Colleges an exemplar, became one of the few moments of cooperation between 
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Republican and Democratic legislators during the Obama Regime, surprisingly enough 
through tapping the brakes on total privatization and for-profitization of tertiary education. 
(Mettler, 2011) By the Global Capital Crisis 2000s, conservative performance indicators 
across the Western USA showed that, correlative with state educational divestment, severely 
negative patterns were emerging. Test scores, literacy, numeracy, and graduation rates in 
primary education; delays and/or failures to graduate from secondary school; and increasing 
racial disparities and costs at all levels permeated public education. (Ryu, 2011) Of course, 
this increased conservatives’ calls for more privatization of education, to remedy the failures 
of public education - which they conveniently ignored they had defunded. (Newfield, 2008; 
2011; Mettler, 2011)  
Harney and Moten argue that, much like my concept of governance by capital, 
students, instructors, and institutions are now entirely subjected to “governance by debt.” 
(Harney and Moten, 2013) Giroux conceptualizes existence in the neoliberal university as 
surviving a new form of “bare pedagogy,” (2010) adapted from Agamben’s notion of “bare 
life” (1995) or minimal, dehumanizing existence, originally ascribed to colonized people 
surviving absolute poverty. Post-9/11 especially, Giroux argues, instruction at almost all 
levels of primary, secondary, and tertiary education, in almost every part of the Global North 
and West, is now managed by capitalist-realist normalization, driven by endlessly seeking 
profit, and facilitated by the USA’s perpetual warfare to securitize that profitability. (Giroux, 
2010)   
Due to the USA’s overwhelming global hegemony, instead of South Africa’s theories 
of decolonization and housing, employment, and education entitlements spreading from the 
Global South to the Global North, “full-blown neoliberal compradorism became the 
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dominant (if not universal) phenomenon within the ANC policy-making elite,” (Bond, 2014: 
3) and the consequence of “permitting World Bank advisory teams to make a huge impact on 
social and economic policy, and in international trade relationships” meant “the combined 
logic of neoliberalism and uneven development had a devastating effect.” (Bond, 2014: 121-
122)  Not only did the USA’s OBE model become South Africa’s pedagogical model, in lieu 
of possibly better, indigenous models, but the implementation of OBE under extensive 
austerity measures was riddled with problems for instructors and students. (Jansen 1997; 
1999; Jansen and Christie, 1999) Ongoing failures in education of all levels in South Africa 
represents just one form of how, when Apartheid and the USSR collapsed, hope for 
democracy was replaced by disillusionment with neoliberalism and its ghettoization of 
fundamental public services.  
Instead of the ideas of Fanon or Biko or Freire or hooks being embraced by 
mainstream academics and policymakers, their ideas were further marginalized and only 
taught in underfunded critical SS-HFA departments, themselves situated within underfunded 
HEIs. As such, these ideas were forced into the margins of academia, already in the margins 
of society - the margins of the margins. Instead of the implementation of Freire’s and 
Gramsci’s radical notions of engaged instructors and students politically moving together, 
education has regressed to mere management of rote memorization of facts, critical thinking 
suppressed by exploitation and slow violence. Instead of the radical empowerment sought by 
critical pedagogy, and briefly glimpsed with the establishment of subjectivist Black, Queer, 
Feminist, and Chicanx Studies departments, we now have the neoliberal university, and 
institutionalized disempowerment.  
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I agree with the concept of a university in chains, shackled to a divested state married 
to the “free market,” which is in turn driven by military, security, surveillance, and extractive 
corporations, ultimately violating both students’ and instructors’ fundamental human right 
and desire to learn and to teach. (Giroux, 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011)  Amongst faculty or 
departmental bodies, as well as student associations, all student and faculty power over 
university policies or state laws is erased. As such, academic freedom protected by 
reasonable tenure, rigorous peer review, shared governance, and other democratic promises 
made by universities remain unfulfilled. In today’s neoliberal university, almost all behavior, 
and thought, and imagination, must conform to capitalist-realist common sense, in turn 
degrading all university populations’ critical or radical capacities. Impossible workloads, 
disempowered students, bureaucratic catch-22’s, and the omnipresent debt and lack of 
financing all intersect to disable the practice of radical politics. To transgress against the 
logic of constantly working for profit, in terms of more grants, more degrees, more grades, or 
more published articles, is to become an expendable supernumerary within the academic-
industrial complex, where union protections and academic collegiality are erased, and one 
exhausted academic laborer will soon be replaced by another desperately indebted 
competitor. The question then arises: how is it possible for academic laborers, students, and 
instructors to transgressively articulate radical alternatives, actualize radical democracy, and 
still survive within the university?  
 
Universities’ and Students’ Counter-Hegemonic, Radical, Transgressive Potential 
 
My thesis's third and final critical premise is a dialectic of my first two premises, and 
concludes the conceptual and theoretical reviews I feel are necessary to frame my South 
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Africa case study. My third critical premise is that, when sites of democratization, such as 
universities, encounter de-democratization and authoritarianism, such as neoliberalism and 
its destruction of public spaces, marginalized students drive protests through what are usually 
perceived as radical or transgressive tactics, and these in turn potentially drive social 
movements. I briefly review social movement theory generally, before specifically revisiting 
notions of radical and transgressive resistance, and how this may manifest within universities 
themselves.  
Wallerstein summarizes global-scale systemic thinking as being comprised of “the 
systems of production, the knowledge systems, and the anti-systemic movements” that drive 
transition from existing systems. (Wallerstein and Martin, 2008: 1) Wallerstein et. al. formed 
an “Antisystemic Social Movements” to working group at Binghamton University to “collect 
and analyze movement activity over several centuries...’movements’ encompass broadly not 
just organized, normative, and institutionalized collective activity as commonly defined, but 
disruptive, momentary, and noninstitutionalized collective action.” (Wallerstein and Martin, 
2008: 8) Having reviewed 250 years of revolution and antisystemic social movements, 
Martin highlights key challenges of counter-hegemonic social movements post-9/11:  
If the 1968 conjuncture was a worldwide one, it was also a brief one: everywhere 
anticapitalist and antistatist movements were rolled back in a flurry of fierce 
repression...the first response. Yet...those who wielded power and wealth were forced 
to confront the shattered legitimacy of liberal developmentalism… 
 
The first response toward these ends was the explicitly brutal, as the neoliberal 
counter revolution unleashed in the 1980s and 1990s reshaped the worldwide division 
of labor, disciplined unruly states and workers, and replaced liberalism with the harsh 
realities of the ‘free market’...  
(Martin, 2008: 172-173)  
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I translate contemporary anti-systemic movements as counter-hegemonic social 
movements, given the USA-driven global system of poli-socio-economics. I have focused on 
poli-socio-economics, knowledge systems of production and legitimation through HEIs, 
universities as critical sites of democratization, neoliberalism as fundamentally de- 
democratization, and my local experience within the UC system. I now explore how, under 
global neoliberalism and Contemporary Globalization, can universities remain sites of 
potential radical and transgressive imagination?  
Radical Transgression, Counter-Hegemonic Social Movements, or “Revolution”?  
Recognizing the inherent antagonism between global, counter-hegemonic ideals, 
existing within the minds of disempowered peasantry, Scott’s “normal exploitation, normal 
resistance” (1987) seems a prescient complement to Nixon’s slow violence. Understanding 
that revolutions are complex, multi-faceted, slow, violent processes, and not the overnight 
and bloodless revolution that yields everybody's’ utopia, seems to support notions that slow 
resistance is better than no resistance. But, as I address in my case study and conclusion, 
what about when the slow violence is never-ending? What about when slow resistance is not 
an option, given the slow, but inexorable and invisibilized, advance of global climate 
catastrophe? What about when the prestigious collection of theories, predicated on slow, but 
rigorous and democratic, academic review, is proven insufficient to practically apply 
knowledge beyond academia? What about when the Ivory Tower has become a sweatshop?  
We are taught about a world of this-or-that, mutually exclusive, binary, oppositional 
Cartesian dualism. Gunn would say that neoliberalism teaches us a Manichean good-or-evil, 
Islamophobic world order, with a gun held if not to our head, then to our neighbor’s. (Gunn, 
2013; 2015)  For the majority of the world population, simple existing while Black, or 
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Muslim, or Queer, or a Woman, or complex, or leftist, or anti-capital, is a transgression 
against the near-dystopian neoliberal order. For those within academia, acknowledging 
subjectivity transgresses against the hegemony of objectivity. Teaching emotionally or 
empathetically transgresses against the hegemony of rationality and logic. Expressing 
empathy or concern for fellow human beings transgresses against the hegemony of the 
neoliberal market, as humans supposedly have no purpose except for increasing profitable 
transactions.  
As Harney and Moten have argued, to simply exist within the neoliberal university as 
a human being and not as a consumer is to be a subversive and a criminal, transgressing 
contradictory rules which demand academically free thought, on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, demand slavish devotion to the university’s labor exploitation. If universities are 
one of the only spaces and times in society where such a radical imagination has been 
allowed, if only marginally and temporarily, and because universities are visibly impacted by 
neoliberalism, and because universities maintain elitism and conservatism through various 
Eurocentric disciplines and practices, then I argue that universities may potentially continue 
to experience radical clashes in imaginaries, and therefore help drive counter-hegemonic 
theories and actions.  
Perhaps universities will receive significantly increased funding, and their 
hemorrhaging will be staunched in the short term by maintaining public HEIs becoming 
common sense again. While I reduce Newfield’s argument somewhat here, they suggests this 
could work, at least short term. Right wing politics have left wing solutions; previous higher 
education policies could be restored to remedy growing problems. But, as Readings dismally 
notes, “there is no way to go back to 1968...Forced to describe itself as either a bureaucratic-
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administrative or an idealist institution, it chose the former...a repetition of the radical 
postures of the late 1960s is not adequate to resist” neoliberalism on a global scale. (1996: 
170-171) I agree; even if society were to shift back towards conventional leftism, the 
university has so globalized and corporatized itself that it cannot shake the spectre of 
neoliberalism, nor return to the hierarchical problematics of its colonial past. Harney and 
Moten argue for the need for “a criminal” relationship with a university no longer able to 
assist “the subversive intellectual,” in the act of teaching as resistance. (Harney and Moten, 
2013) Asserting how meaningless teaching in the neoliberal university is, they insist “It is not 
teaching that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side 
of teaching,” - an ethereal other side that the sold out university not only cannot help explore, 
but is indefinitely dedicated to suppressing. (2013: 27)  
Even if universities and societies further neoliberalize, a history of a promise 
unfulfilled, of an ideal but not utopian place of creativity may maintain the spark of asking 
“What if?” This in and of itself transgresses neoliberal insistence on obedience to only the 
market. This appeal to a human nature that includes, not precludes, curiosity and imagination 
as part of education might preserve a fundamental collectivity that education fosters. This 
reminder of an alternative, even one previously crushed, or marginalized as myth rather than 
thoroughly and legitimately historicized, may maintain educational institutions as sites of 
future quiet resistance, where students live out a “widely felt culture of opposition” (Foran, 
2014: 9) in an updated form of “everyday peasant resistance,” instead of trying to force 
neoliberal universities to re-emerge as sites of idealized rapid revolution.  
This necessitates preserving and communicating that history and idea of possibility in 
order to support others’ radical imaginations. I at first would have argued that an accurate 
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description and comparison of neoliberal wretchedness, alongside a hopeful alternative is 
necessary, to disrupt the false consciousness of today’s covert authoritarianism. As Foran 
said, under the Global Capital Crisis, counter-hegemonic social movements large or small 
“become even stronger when, to a widely felt culture of opposition and resistance, they add a 
positive vision of a better world, an alternative to strive for to improve or replace what 
exists.” (Foran, 2014: 9) Unfortunately, prefigurative politics and methodology is easier 
theorized than actualized, especially under the conditions of austerity, and after my two years 
of researching students and social movements under the terror of neoliberalism, I am no 
longer certain about the capacity for students to articulate a better world when constantly 
violated by the brutality of the neoliberal globality. I revisit this in my conclusion, after my 
case study, alongside the other theories in this final critical premise.  
The highly transgressive and radical nature of the protests in South Africa, especially 
by the Rhodes Must Fall movement for decolonization, exemplifies the actualization of a 
radical imaginary, at universities, under Contemporary Globalization.  I believe that RMF, 
OS, and similar student protests to date have achieved by making visible the invisibilized and 
often slow violence of neoliberalism, as well as interrogating fundamental assumptions about 
educational systems. Below is the not-so-subtle question that has haunted much of my 
discourse, as well as the recent struggles for public higher education in CA and South Africa.  
(How) Could Universities Drive Social Movements?  
So, if universities may, and should, realize their potential as a critical space in which 
imagination of resistance can occur - how does it happen? Neoliberalism violates universities 
and students so visibly, whereas its constant violation of the historically colonized elsewhere 
remains largely invisibilized, given its material near-indistinguishability from the previous 
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Cold War system. Claiming universities, which are historically colonial, exclusive 
institutions, are actually indispensable for radical and transgressive thinking and politics 
seems potentially Eurocentric and elitist. On the one hand, universities are historically 
colonial, exclusive institutions intended to produce knowledge that is legitimated by peer 
review and reliance on previously, similarly-produced knowledge. On the other hand, 
universities in the Global North and West, during the 1950s-1960s experienced a massive 
opening up to the general, actual public, with class, race, and gender barriers being reduced 
by both students and the state. Simultaneously, though constrained by the global Cold War, 
decolonization and anti-systemic movements significantly challenged the international Cold 
War world order from the 1940s-1960s, too.  
Consequently, the suppression of these movements also expanded quickly, be it as the 
neoliberal / conservative backlashes, or as internal disputes and internalization of oppression, 
alongside state infiltration, broke movements beyond repair. Recognizing the shortcomings 
of the ideal of revolution, via Gramsci, Scott, and their contemporaries, necessitates 
recognizing the shortcomings of specific, and now variously mythologized or pathologized, 
historical specifics of actual failed social movements.  
How do we reconcile the historical oppression and colonialism of universities with 
their potential democratization and emancipation? (How) Did universities drive this, though? 
(How) Did students support it? It is not difficult to find similarities between Malcolm X and 
Steve Biko or Franz Fanon; Fred Hampton and Thomas Sankara; Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Desmond Tutu or Nelson Mandela; Assata Shakur with Albertina Sisulu; and other 
ostensibly dissimilar radicals geographically separated, but racially and ideologically similar. 
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Does arguing that these cases are more similar than dissimilar erase the important and unique 
qualities of each movement?  
While HEIs, and particularly public universities, did promise to students and society 
to be sites of new discoveries, and even potentially radical new ideas, that time period was 
relatively short, and violently suppressed. (Altbach and Cohen; 1990; Broadhurst, 2014)  
Here is a particularly graphic recollection of what the LAPD were capable of, in case 
mythologies of student activism have glossed over it:  
Campbell Hall was sticky with the blood of students of color, who had been an earlier 
target of the day’s police assault.  
I walked in a daze through the red-stained corridor of Campbell Hall into the 
springtime California sun, the blood-smeared soles of my feet sucking at the 
pavement.  
Violent as it was, UCLA’s was one of the smaller [clashes] of that day’s... 
(Connery, 2011: 2)  
 
Over the course of the Cold War, the extreme violence of colonialism, the USA, and 
the USSR, both within states and beyond their borders, as well as within and beyond 
academia, radicalized students and non-university populations at the same time it applied 
radical violence to them. In this way, assimilation into the colonial power, or subordination 
to and collusion with the hegemonic force, also existed alongside, and prompted resistance 
to, the colonization, resulting in counter-hegemonic activity - which was often masculinist 
and driven by violent confrontation with a violent state. (Foran, 2014: 8)   
I argue that previously, prior to Contemporary Globalization, neoliberal academia, 
neoliberal media, and neoliberal states around the globe, the concept of formal higher 
education had been less normalized and commoditized. As such, today’s university varies 
significantly from universities during the height of the 1960s social movements, beyond just 
de-funding and suppression of anti-capitalist or otherwise radical thought. Changes have 
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occurred in who goes to public universities, what behavior is expected to be conformed to 
there, as well as a general increased formalization of “college life” as an idealized, 4-year 
period distinct and disconnected from normal American life, including increased political 
divestment than before college.  
I touch on Apartheid South Africa’s university students briefly in my next chapter, 
but the overwhelmingly White university students were much less influential in terms of 
direct political action than were overwhelmingly Black secondary school students, such as in 
Soweto, or the exceptional students, like Biko. Iran’s university students in the 1970s 
interestingly represent one of the exemplary cases of historical counter-hegemonic social 
movements being truly driven by diverse coalitions of university populations, including 
students, instructors, and recent graduates. (Abrihimian, 1982; Keddie and Richard, 2006)  
Altbach and Cohen have long argued (1989, 1990,) that the USA’s Free Speech Movement 
(FSM) and its associated anti-war, pro-integration movements, especially at UC Berkeley, 
and in connection with the SCLC in the USA’s South, remain watershed moments for student 
power.  
They still maintain this stance, insisting that as recently as the Ukraine, conflict, 
university “student were a key force in toppling Ukrainian autocrat Victor Yanukovych...on 
the Maidan battleground in Kiev from beginning to end.” (Altbach and Klemencic, 2014: 2)  
They both reinforce my assertion that in the neoliberalized university, some factors such as 
“diverse student populations, part-time study...non-elite social backgrounds...increasingly 
high cost…” could increase political action. (Altbach and Klemencic, 2014: 3) 
Simultaneously, they recognize that political action “depends on which part of the globe” 
students are in, and from, as “in Western societies where entire value systems have shifted to 
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postmodernism, students [are] becoming more individualistic and perhaps more interested in 
subjective well-being, self-expression, and quality of life" may work "against active political 
and social engagement." (Altbach and Klemencic, 2014: 3)  Given this disparity between the 
power of Global North and West students, even those who survive neoliberalism’s slow 
violence, I am skeptical of Mainstream GS and academic articles that lack critiques on most 
social movements’ patriarchy, sexism, and racism, including USA universities’ pro-
integration and FSM factions. I am especially skeptical of too much self-congratulations of 
CA and UC students regarding student campaigns c. the 1980s for student divestment from 
Apartheid South Africa.  
I want to highlight the conservatism of the 1980s, combined with USA student 
movements’ constant domination by white men (McAdam, 1988; Loeb 1994; Soule, 1995, 
1997; Barker, 2008), and the possibly exaggerated impact of student-initiated divestment 
from South Africa (Kaempfer, et al., 1987: 460) in facilitating the end of Apartheid. I argue 
that the 1980s USA student divestment campaigns better serve to teach lessons regarding 
intersectionality within movements, as well as the problematics of the privilege of Global 
North students’ focus on international, rather than local, racism. This is not to trivialize the 
achievement of USA student movements, which were considerable. The anti-Apartheid and 
anti-Reagan sentiments students vocalized in the 1980s transgressively challenged 
privatizing universities and militarization. I simple have to ensure that credit is given where 
credit is due, and for Apartheid South Africa, that means crediting the thousands of tortured 
and murdered Black Africans, and Cubans, who did far more to end apartheid than Global 
North and West students.  
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Keeping in mind the issue of accountability and who bears the brunt of the labor 
necessary for facilitating social movements, I conclude with the final critical concepts and 
questions that have informed my research and thesis thus far, before beginning my historical 
analysis of South(ern) Africa that precedes my case study of RMF.  
Can Universities Drive Social Movements Now?  
Given the above issues with the debatable impact and success of past university social 
movements, as well as the debatable “success” of non-university social movements that 
achieved only incremental reform in the face of neoliberal violence, the question remains just 
how much universities can, or do, drive social movements after the Global Capital Crisis. 
Are universities totally dispensable and unnecessary for social movements? Is academia? 
Given their history, I argue that while they are not dispensable, they are also not as important 
as some have made them out to be. I also predict that, pushed further and further to the 
breaking point, if universities in the USA drive a social movement, they may be radicalized 
far to one extreme or the other on an issue, given the extreme marginalization of the students 
likely to initiate it.  
Academia certainly has, historically, incubated both critical theories about, and actual 
political acts of, counter-hegemony. Even under increasing neoliberalism, academic 
institutions have attempted to ask and answer critical questions of not only “why” and “what 
if,” but also “how,” regarding counter-hegemonic social movements, including in the 
formerly public UC, at Santa Barbara. Foran’s attempts to move beyond Marx to "multiple 
meanings of revolution today: not taking state power, as the Zapatistas and...others, are doing 
so well; taking state power through elections...chang[ing] the world by not taking power 
violently” appeals to me not only because it embraces anti-masculinist ideals that transgress 
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against conventional narratives of idealized violent revolution. Their notion of “political 
cultures of opposition and creation” is useful for seeing how from radical oppression 
inadvertently yields radically imaginative, or creative, resistance. Foran’s pitching this to 
other scholar-activists forces consideration by those academics less engaged than they are in 
the urgent necessity of radical change. (Foran, 2014: 10-11)  But what if asking and 
answering critical questions isn’t enough to execute the “how”? What if the best theory, the 
best pitch, and the best connections are ultimately frustrated and undercut by the total 
delegitimization beyond academia of everything that the state and the markets collude 
against? What if the university has to be abandoned, and all its powers and privileges with it? 
What if the university is broken beyond repair?  
If we consider the privilege that insulates academia and academics from practical 
political action as a positive, we could say academia serves as an incubator or fermenter of 
ideas, and (formerly) democratically produced knowledge, or new, marginalized, radical, 
alternative knowledge, may originate or be refined by academia for later used by social 
movements.  
“Intersectionality” is my exemplar, both for my own experiences within the UC and 
social movements, as well as for RMF’s and OS’s deliberate invocation of it. The concept of 
intersectionality has been critical across multiple student movements of late, especially RMF 
and OS, as well as various campaigns in the UC. However, the failure of this term to transfer 
from academia, where it originated in the early 1990s, to mainstream usage, hints at the 
shortcomings of neoliberal academia. “Intersectionality” is concise, complex, nuanced, and 
flexible, as well as specific and practical; it took until 2014 and Black Lives Matter, which 
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arose distinctly separate from formal education systems, to make “intersectionality” close to 
a mainstream term.  
#FundTheUC and #IGNITE (Invest in Graduation, Not Incarceration, Transform 
Education), Occupy, The Tea Party, Barack Obama, anti-Bush Democrats - none of these 
university or widely known movements before 2014 centered their narratives on 
intersectionality. Each movement failed to teach mainstream America something that a 
neoliberal education system, and corporate media, never would. Since Black Lives Matter 
has appeared, universities have followed suit and begun, once again, to center narratives 
around identity politics, especially emphasizing Black Feminism, anti-Blackness, and 
intersectionality. However, that just furthers what I hinted at with the above notes on anti-
Apartheid protests in the 1980s: the unlikeliness of USA universities to be the first to put 
radical ideologies, like Black Feminism, at the center of their narratives, until marginalized 
people beyond academia have already done so.  
I remain unconvinced that the university is not broken beyond repair, necessitating 
total deconstruction and/or abolition - an act of institutional destruction, or even structural 
violence in some way. I argue that only in certain situations, and when certain conditions are 
met, can universities truly drive social movements - especially given the new, covert 
authoritarianism in place. This may come in the face of seemingly optimistic assertions, 
including my own hope, about radical resistance growing alongside the spread of radical 
neoliberalism (Starr, 2005; Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl, 2011) and the apparent growth in 
participation of in-the-street protests. (Dodson, 2015)  Unfortunately, my reading of Brown, 
Giroux, Robinson, and even Foran actually leads me to conclude that even with increasing 
protests and social movements, covert authoritarianism is increasingly making violence an 
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unavoidable and even necessary precondition for radical social change, which, if not 
repeating the past, is at least rhyming with it.  
Marginalized University Students’ Protests Actualize Prefigurative Politics 
As I proceed through my critical premises, global-colonial history of South Africa, 
and contemporary university students’ protests of South Africa, I hope to clarify how I 
believe UCT:RMF exemplifies one of the most likely possibilities for university-driven 
counterhegemonic resistance, which may in turn drive larger-scale, university-driven social 
movements. Lezra specifies how decolonizing epistemology and epistemography within the 
university is an uphill battle, as well as something that requires personal, interpersonal, 
departmental, and administrative structural investment in order to be effective. Lezra also 
specifies how tenuous and uncertain such a process is, given that decolonizing epistemology 
and epistemography within the university is institutionally resisted, as existing structures of 
educational systems are derived from colonial and industrial practices. Specifically looking at 
instruction and relations between authorities and students, Lezra’s position on social justice 
within the university is explicated as needing an intentional “process of de-colonization,” 
(2014a) which must occur especially in the teaching and analysis of violence and 
colonization to students. And yet, this theory, which originates in Global North and West 
academia, and which is rooted in theories of decolonization, post-coloniality, and critical 
pedagogy, is somewhat refuted within ongoing student protests and counter-hegemonic 
social movements. As I demonstrate by the end of my analyses, UCT:RMF deliberately 
centers their protests around “violence” in various forms, in order to evoke emotional 
responses from an apparently apathetic and/or unable and/or unwilling neoliberal society.  
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This notion of escalation in order to force a confrontation is a conventional, masculist 
approach to militant protests. As UCT:RMF demonstrates, their perceived necessity of 
violence in various forms, and the perceived transgression and illegitimacy of those claims, 
both highly problematize the accepted notions of violence as never acceptable. Foran has 
written extensively on how existing academic practices must radically transform and 
transgress further than they have thus far in order to address global crises. They have 
demanded academic transformations of studies into crisis- and justice-oriented “manifestos” 
and calls to action.  What I investigate here is the possibility for radical protests, and 
especially radical protests constrained by neoliberalized academia, to move "beyond 
insurgency," as Foran (2014) suggests, to less violent, more sustainable, and, as UCT:RMF 
claims, "truly decolonial" and intersectional social change models.  
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South(ern) Africa and (De)Colonization 
 
Today’s Westphalian-style nation-state unit known as the Republic of South Africa 
traces its origins to the Anglo, Dutch, German, and Portuguese colonization of Southern 
Africa c. the early 1500s, and accelerating as Europe imposed its world system was imposed 
upon the region and the globe. Colonization began with the naval conquests of Portuguese 
profiteers Bartolomeu Dias in 1486 and Vasco de Gama in 1497, in which saw Portugal’s 
autocracy claim territory at the southernmost point of the African continent. (Meredith, 2007; 
Giliomee, 2007) Despite Portuguese claims, in Southern Africa and what would eventually 
be known as today’s Republic of South Africa, there was minimal de facto European 
colonization beyond coastal raiding and trading excursions for materials, including slaves, 
until 1652. In 1652, the Dutch East India Company, representative of the ascendancy of the 
modern Dutch capitalist empire, created de Kaapkolonie (Dutch; English: Cape Colony) with 
the building of the de Fort de Goede Hoop (Dutch; English: Fort of Good Hope) which by 
1674 was the Castle of Good Hope.  
This Dutch colonization of land surrounding a military establishment, meant to secure 
trade and intimidate indigenous peoples, was the precursor to the settlements that would 
eventually evolve into the city of Cape Town, categorizing de Kaapkolonie as, initially, 
Osterhammel’s Type 1: Pure imperial colony. The geographical territory within the 
boundaries of this capitalist colony was de facto and de jure governed by the Dutch East 
India Company in an early form of governance by capital. This capitalist colony’s primary 
function was to resupply Dutch ships sailing along the profitable spice and slaves route 
between Europe and Asia. This function of re-supplying ships required agricultural 
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production in turn required appropriating resources from the indigenous peoples, primarily 
the pastoral Khoikhoi, and imposing capitalist privatization of the commons. This cycle of 
perpetual growth of the colony and colonization included, and I would say required, the 
mostly Dutch-speaking settlers violently displacing the indigenous people, mostly Khoikhoi, 
as they themselves were displaced from increasingly English-speaking settlers on the coastal 
urban centers. This mutual, reciprocal, perpetual displacement occurred with the backing of 
the government of the Dutch East India Company in order to establish farmsteads on newly 
private lots seized from KhoiKhoi, necessary for homesteaders to produce commodities. As 
the flow of capital continued to increase along naval trade routes, and became increasingly 
profitable for the firms with control of resources, more settlers and laborers were necessary 
to produce more resupply products demanded by the growing colonial-capitalist economy.  
Consequently, the Cape Colony became a Type 2: Imperial settlement colony. This 
cycle of European settler colonialism, while perhaps not the overt desire of the Dutch East 
India Company, was an inevitable outcome of the actions taken by those in charge of this 
capitalist firm, and which ultimately profited that firm and its stockholders. Throughout the 
1600s-1800s, as economic imperatives and religious violence globally drove various 
denominations of Christian Europeans West across the Atlantic to North America, so too did 
Dutch-, French-, German-, and English-speaking Christian Europeans flee South over the 
Atlantic to Southern Africa. Additionally, similarly to how violent and capitalist Christians 
colonized the indigenous peoples of North America in the British colonies, and later the 
Western region within the USA, so too did European settlers recreate their oppressive poli-
socio-economics systems in Southern Africa. (Schumacher, 2002)  This perpetual growth 
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saw influxes of entrepreneurial settlers seeking to serve Dutch, and increasingly British, 
colonial society, alongside settlers who wanted to flee such society.  
Critical to understanding contemporary South Africa is the inland migration of the 
colonial Dutch population, derogatively known as boers (colonial Dutch/Afrikaans: English: 
farmers) that was both oppressed by the British, and who internalized and then perpetuated 
this oppression against indigenous peoples. This voertrek (colonial Dutch/Afrikaans; English: 
great trek, great departure) became the fundamental creation myth of the colonial Dutch, or 
“Afrikaans” race.  (Roberge, 1993; Duffy, 2006; Thompson and Berat, 2014)  This 
increasingly inland colonization during the 1800s displaced more indigenous peoples, and 
recreated oppressive systems in each new geographical space. This always included at least 
by oppressing indigenous Africans, and usually by stratifying White society, too. With this 
settler colonization and indigenous displacement came sexual intercourse between Europeans 
and Africans, sometimes through ostensibly consensual civil unions, and more often 
widespread sexual violence. The archaic term “inter-marrying” is intentionally not used here, 
as it masks the sexual violence and technicality of the very specific action of intercourse that 
resulted in “mixed race” or “coloured” peoples in this region. Through this colonization, 
along with the mixing of ostensibly distinct “races” and nationalities, came the mixing of 
languages.  
The most relevant product of this mixing here is the concept of the language of 
“Afrikaans,” its derivative culture and ethnic identity of “Afrikanerdom,” and the people or 
demonym of “Afrikaners.” Afrikanerdom is a colonial Dutch identity and poli-socio-
economic construct created in the 1800s to benefit select populations of Southern Africa’s 
White colonizers. (Duffy, 2006; Giliomee, 2010; Giliomee and Mbenga, 2010; Thompson 
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and Berat, 2014) Afrikanerdom is inherently, overtly, and covertly White Supremacist racism 
in its mythology, theory, terminology, epistemology, language, and practice. In its 
terminology, Afrikanerdom and its derivative terms, especially the demonym Afrikaner 
(Dutch; English: African) asserts that White Dutch colonizers are “African,” invisibilizing 
people indigenous to Southern Africa. In practice, Afrikanerdom and its derivative languages 
and identities of Afrikaans and Afrikaners, respectively, are largely claimed by whiteness and 
Eurocentrism. This is despite Afrikaans being a “Creole” language that largely resulted from 
Black Africans and people of color innovatively modifying the language of colonizers to 
survive in a colonized space. (Roberge, 1993, pp. 68-70; Giliomee, 2010; Valley, 2010; Open 
Stellenbosch, 2015a) From the 1800s, to Apartheid South Africa’s Afrikaner National Party 
government, to contemporary university student protests against the pervasiveness of 
Afrikaner White Supremacy, it seems clear that this fundamentally colonial, racist 
appropriation continues to problematize notions of a post-racial, decolonized South Africa.  
By the 1700s, Dutch colonization and control of Southern Africa competed primarily 
with colonization by the British. Portuguese colonization occurred to a lesser extent on the 
eastern coast of Southern Africa, near present day Mozambique. German colonization 
occurred up the eastern coast in present day Namibia - though British influence was 
pervasive across the entire region, and continent. A series of bloody European wars for 
control of African land, labor, and other resources occurred in the late 1700s and early 1800s. 
That Europe’s power struggles consistently resulted in the mass murder, enslavement, and 
genocide of indigenous Africans sadly justifies ongoing use of Europe’s global eras to 
contextualize even critical histories of the continent and its regions.  
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South Africa in the Long 19th Century  
This section summarizes the historical period of roughly the late 1700s through the 
early 1900s, or Hobsbawm’s “Long 19th Century.” and “ages” of “Revolution” for 1789-
1848, “Capital” for 1848-1875, and “Empire” for 1875-1914. Hobsbawm is often critiqued 
for oversimplifying complex phenomena, especially underplaying the violence of c. 1900s 
socialist regimes in favor of critiquing capitalist regimes, alongside Eurocentric teleologies, 
methodologies, and epistemologies through their position as a Global North and West 
academic. Hobsbawm’s historical periods are problematic and do not perfectly fit Southern 
Africa. But, as noted above and in my GS Theory Review, global poli-socio-economic 
trends, and their local impacts, coincide with Hobsbawm’s historical delineations. This 
section consistently references Thompson and Berat’s widely-cited A History of South Africa, 
Revised 4th Ed. (2014) alongside Martin’s Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, 
and Making of South Africa (2007), Giliomee and Mbenga’s collaborative New History of 
South Africa, 2nd Ed. (2010) alongside Wallerstein, Osterhammel, and Stuchtey. I also draw 
upon Duffy’s The Politics of Ethnic Nationalism (2006) and W. Beinart and S. DuBow (Eds.) 
Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Arica (1995).  
1795-1824: Imperial Britain Creates the British Cape Colony 
Between 1795 and 1910, Southern Africa’s primary legal entity in control of territory 
in what would later be the Republic of South Africa was no longer the Dutch Cape Colony, 
but rather the British Cape Colony - colloquially known as the Cape of Good Hope. During 
1795-1824, the creation of the British Cape Colony marked the rise of Anglo-British global 
hegemony’s local articulation in the Southern Africa, and consequent de facto loss of 
significant Portuguese, German, or Dutch state control of the Southern African territory. The 
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1795 Battle of Muizenberg, as a direct result of the French Revolution in Western Europe, 
the British invaded the Dutch-controlled Cape Colony. Through this violence, the British 
Empire became the primary agent in control of Southern Africa. The 1802 Treaty of Amiens, 
also a result of French Revolutionary Wars, saw the UK cede the Cape Colony back to the 
Dutch. The 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, also due to the Napoleonic Wars, saw the UK re-
invade the Cape Colony. The Anglo-Dutch Treaties of 1814 and 1824 legally and politically 
reaffirmed British, control of the Cape Colony.  
As a direct result of France’s Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Dutch power 
decreased, while British Imperial power and global hegemony became reinforced through its 
imperialism and colonial possessions. Additionally, Eurocentric concepts of nationalism, 
racism, and industrial capitalist modernity were reinforced within European colonies, as were 
liberal notions of constitutional republics and individualist legal systems. The initial influxes 
of Dutch settlers, followed by later influxes of British settlers and colonial administrators, 
accompanied by racial, ethnic, economic, and military tensions, all laid the foundation for 
persistent racial, ethnic, and poli-socio-economic violence between Anglo-British and Dutch-
Afrikaner Whites.  
1795-1910: British Imperial Violence Encounters Violent Resistance 
Throughout this time period the region’s legal, linguistic, and poli-socio-economic 
systems maintained British Imperial state power. Anglo-British citizens sat atop a racialzied 
class hierarchy that oppressed Dutch-Afrikaner peoples, who in turn oppressed indigenous 
Africans or mixed race people, racialized as “Blacks” or “Natives,” and “Coloreds,” or 
“Indians,” respectively. As colonization continued, the territory over which the British 
Empire claimed sovereignty was contested by indigenous peoples. Some of the most notable 
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were the surviving KhoiKhoi in the west; the Xhosa in the west and south; the Zulu in the 
east; and the Swazi, Tswana, and Sotho. British Imperial power was also resisted by inward-
migrating Dutch-Afrikaner White people.  
In 1797, the first “pass laws” were implemented, so the state could better regulate 
“natives” on the basis of a de jure racial category. (Union of South Africa, 1920) The British 
Empire’s 1795-1910 control over the Cape of Good Hope, and later British Cape Colony, 
routinely experienced sub-state conflict between Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner Whites, 
or between Whites and indigenous Africans. After their voertrek, inland Dutch-Afrikaners 
claimed territorial sovereignty by establishing small constitutional “republics,” in a practice 
remarkably similar to USA settler colonialism’s “filibusters” (Nevins, 2002; Gonzalez, 2011) 
in present-day Texas.  Afrikaners’ employed mass displacement, rape, and murder to 
establish the ironically-named “Republic of the Free State.” Through this and several similar 
territorial claims, Afrikaners asserted their superior “Afrikaner” identity and right to 
indigenous land that the British also sought to colonize, due to its resources and 
exploitability.  Under the direction of profiteers like Rhodes, Anglo-British land claims to 
areas rich in diamonds, gold, and other resources drew the attention of the British, leading to 
attempts to displace White Afrikaners and indigenous Africans.  
The First and Second Boer Wars of 1880-1881 and 1899-1901, respectively, 
exemplify how Europe’s warfare became a definitive part of today’s Republic of South 
Africa. British Imperial forces waged brutal, industrialized war against the guerilla forces of 
the poor, often illiterate and innumerate, and rural, Afrikaners. Imperial Britain in the Boer 
Wars is the first known intentional use of modern concentration camps to commit mass 
slaughter, as well as biological warfare, resulting in the mass slaughter of thousands of both 
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Afrikaner and indigenous African civilians. The brutality of these conflicts established 
seemingly insurmountable mutual animosity between Whites in South Africa of different 
ancestry, that was only later overcome by mutual racism against Black South Africans - a 
dynamic that overdetermined poli-socio-economic identities up through Contemporary 
Globalization. (Legassick, 1995)  
In 1910, as a direct consequence of the Boer Wars and British Imperial power 
consolidation, the nation-state legal entity of the Union of South Africa, a “self governing 
British Dominion,” was created by combining the territories of the British Cape Colony, 
Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony, and Orange River Colony. Again, it must be reiterated that 
throughout the 1800s and throughout the extraordinarily violent inter-European White South 
African wars, indigenous Black Africans were routinely murdered, raped, enslaved and 
exploited for the most brutal and dehumanizing forms of labor. Indigenous people were 
oppressed in almost every way imaginable under both Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner 
systems, either in the British Cape Colony or the Dutch-Afrikaner “Republics” - all of which 
regulated electoral access by race. Despite this, the focus of the majority of Afrikaners 
remained their oppression by Anglo-British forces, rather than recognizing their oppression 
of indigenous Africans.  
1829 and 1866: The Creation of University of Cape Town and Stellenbosch University 
UCT’s and Stellenbosch University’s (SU) creation in 1829 and in 1866, respectively, 
were representative of institutions largely created and operated under ideologies of racist and 
colonial capitalist-realism, justified through the legal systems created by legislators entirely 
comprised of White men. In 1829, under British administration, UCT’s all-age predecessor 
school of the South African College was established. In 1874, the South African College was 
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split into a younger-age school for what would now be considered a primary and secondary 
school, and the older-age school for further education was named the University of Cape 
Town. In 1866, Stellenbosch Gymnasium matriculated its first students and began teaching 
with professors at the Master’s level, before it was renamed Stellenbosch College in 1881, 
and then renamed again to Victoria College in 1887. (Smuts, 1979) After receiving funds in 
1915 from a wealthy colonial winemaker, Marais, who mandated that at least half of all 
classes be taught in Afrikaans, the institution received full university standing in 1918, and 
was renamed SU. (Duffy, 2006; Pretorius, 2014)  
Through all of the colonial eras, maintaining de jure racism required the production 
of knowledge that explicitly reinforced racist state policies and legal systems, or knowledge 
that the state could easily co-opt and adapt to maintain a colonial status quo. Most social 
institutions, and especially universities as sites of knowledge production and legitimization, 
reinforced White Supremacy under South Africa’s dominant paradigms of Anglo-British 
colonialism c. 1790s-1940s, and then Dutch-Afrikaner colonialism c. 1940s-1990s. This 
thesis summarizes the military-industrial-academic complex in colonial Southern Africa as 
follows:  
1. "Black" and "Colored" laws created by non-representative state legislatures, and upheld 
through state courts; in a dialectic with  
2. Medical, social, and psuedoscientific theories produced and legitimized through 
academia and civil society; in a dialectic with  
3. Intersecting notions of the rationality, objectivity, and consequent superiority of 
European methodologies and epistemologies; therefore resulted in:  
4. A mutually-reinforcing elite discourse between the state, society, and academia that 
legitimized de jure and de facto White Supremacy.  
 
Stellenbosch University served as a site of legitimizing Afrikaner White Supremacy, 
evidenced by its politics and departments, especially its explicitly pro-colonial, -Dutch, and -
Afrikaans anthropology department, the first epistemology embraced by the university 
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(Duffy, 2016: 73-80; 200-205) and an epistemology with deep histories of helping colonial 
powers maintain notions of ethnic superiority. (Smith, 2012: 11, 66, 83)  Even when not 
overtly producing and legitimizing racist theories, colonial HEIs like UCT and SU covertly 
maintained Eurocentrism through individualistic, masculist, capitalist-realist pedagogies, 
which imported European structures for instructors, administrators, students, laborers, and 
physical space of the university campus.  
South Africa in the Short 20th Century  
In this section I defer to Westad’s The Global Cold War (2007) and Gleijeses’ Visions 
of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa 1976-1991 
(2012), in addition to the above-referenced texts and histories.  
1910s-1940s: from Anglo-British to Dutch-Afrikaner Hegemony 
As Europe’s wars of the 1700s and 1800s impacted European colonies in Southern 
Africa by shifting the global balance of power towards the British Empire, so too did the 
Europe- driven World Wars I and II shift the balance of power away from the British Empire. 
As noted in the GS theory review and my first critical premise, in the short 20th century the 
British Empire recalibrated and suffered through the early 1900s global economic depression, 
flu epidemic, and other conflicts of global hegemonic succession during and after World War 
I. This was locally articulated in Southern Africa as Afrikaner nationalism resurged in the 
Union of South Africa, generally exemplified by the founding and expansion of South 
Africa’s Afrikaner-driven National Party in 1915. (Legassick, 1995; Duffy, 2006) During this 
time period, up through the 1990s, South Africa’s colonization could be additionally 
considered a Type 3: Pure settlement colony, where massive land displacement, accompanied 
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by violence necessary for the sake of seizing territorial control, defined the processes of 
colonization.  
While Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner tension persisted, Whites in Southern 
Africa mutually supported overall White Supremacist laws. In 1913, the Union of South 
Africa created the “Natives Land Act,” also known as the “Bantu/Black Lands Act.” It is 
generally agreed to be one of the first sweeping land-based segregation laws in the region, 
and it specified that only approximately 10% of all land in the region could be legally owned 
by indigenous people. In 1915, during WWII, the Union of South Africa’s military, which 
was aligned with and an agent of British Imperial forces, invaded and conquered Germany’s 
South West Africa colony. This began a military occupation and struggle between colonial-
German, British Imperial, and indigenous African forces in South West Africa that continued 
for the next 60 years, through the 1980s decolonization into present-day Namibia. The 1923 
“Natives (Urban Areas) Act” laid the legal foundation for the coming decades’ explicit 
geographical segregation that made urban locations Whites-only, unless Black visitors or 
laborers held a special pass. The 1927 Immorality Act explicitly criminalized all sexual 
activity between White people, or “Europeans,” and Black people, or “Natives.” 
In the 1940s, the British Empire’s global hegemony and regional hegemony further 
collapsed during and after World War II, yielding to the USA’s and USSR’s bipolar global 
hegemonic contest of the Cold War. Throughout the post-WWII period and the Cold War, 
South(ern) Africa was a key site of conflict between poli-socio-economic systems, especially 
varieties of capitalism and its necessary cheap labor and constant growth. In South(ern) 
Africa, the Dutch-Afrikaner National Party espoused apartheid (Afrikaans; English: apart-
hood, or a state of being apart) to order society by the ideals of White Supremacy, and to 
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maintain poli-socio-economic and racial supremacy for a single social category within the 
social order.  
1940s-1990s: Apartheid South Africa 
In 1948, ascending to power in Whites-only elections, the Afrikaner White 
Supremacy  National Party imposed apartheid across South(ern) Africa, until the regime 
collapsed in the early 1990s after over 40 years of indigenous anti-colonial resistance. The 
seemingly endless atrocities of apartheid won’t be examined in detail in this thesis. However, 
the main critical, historical, legal, and social events are reviewed, with a focus on student 
actions, given their centrality to even a concise history of South Africa, and their necessity 
for any analysis that  considers contemporary resistance to ongoing colonization and state 
violence.  
Legalizing Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Segregation 
The 1950 Population Registration Act created what would become the foundation for 
apartheid: the dividing up of humans into racial categories, with the primary four categories 
of “White,” “Colored,” “Indian, and “Black” or “Bantu” or “African.” While some 
categories, primarily “Colored,” eventually received slightly more sub-categorizations, the 
primary hierarchy of the Union of South Africa’s racialized society shifted in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s under the National Party’s apartheid regime. The 1950 Population 
Registration Act combined and amended previous legislation, notably the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act (1949) that criminalized marriage between different races, and the 
Immorality Act Amendment (1950) which criminalized all romantic activity between White 
and “any non-White” peoples. It had previously only prohibited sex between “Whites” and 
“Blacks.” This slew of racist legislation immediately after the 1948 rise to power of the 
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Dutch-Afrikaner National Party is generally accepted as representing de jure post-WWII 
Apartheid South Africa, which explicitly formalized, legalized, and extended many de facto 
racist practices that had existed prior to 1948. The result of these laws, which required close 
interaction between the state and universities, was the creation of a racialized caste system 
under which all humans within Southern Africa, because of South Africa’s regional 
hegemony, became categorized and regulated by the authority of a powerful, industrialized, 
advanced capitalist state that formalized the ideology of White Supremacy into legal and 
cultural norms. 
The shift was from the above-described hierarchy of Anglo-British Whites over 
Dutch-Arfikaner Whites over all non-Whites. The shift was to European Whites, with a slight 
edge for Dutch-Afrikaner over Anglo-British Whites, over “Colored” and “Indian,” all of 
whom were situated over “Black.” In this way, the foundation for the racialized caste/class 
system of apartheid was explicitly anti-Black White Supremacy, with added privileges for 
those considered closer to Dutch-Afrikanerdom.  
TABLE 3.1: Racialized Class Hierarchy in Southern Africa 
Pre-Apartheid to WWII, 1795-1945 Apartheid, Post-WWII, Cold War, 1948-1994 
British Imperial, Anglo-British, “White” Afrikaner, “White” 
Colonial Dutch, Afrikaner, “White” British Imperial, Anglo-British, “White” 
“Natives” “Colored” and “Indian” 
 “Black” or “Bantu” or “Native” 
 
In the 1950s, largely as a consequence of such overt Dutch-Afrikaner White 
Supremacy, resistance to this authoritarianism massively increased. This is evidenced 
primarily through the growth of the existing African National Congress (ANC), as well as 
increased collaborations between civil society agents of “procedural democracy,” or 
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constitutional, electoral, liberal governments. Pro-procedural democracy agents included, but 
were not limited to: the ANC, the South Africa’s Indian Congress, and post-WWII groups 
such as the SAAC, PAC, ANC-YL, and SASO. I argue that South Africa post-WWII has 
much in common with other industrialized, racialized, and advanced capitalist societies. I 
argue that apartheid South Africa has much in common especially with the USA post-WWII, 
when multivarious counter-hegemonic social movements flourished. I argue there is 
significant overlap in terms of the USA’s and South Africa’s racialized state violence, 
racialized class systems, promotion of procedural democracy, and marginalization within 
social movements.  
Violent Oppression Yields Violent Resistance 
A global, colonial history contextualizes ostensibly disparate local resistances in 
southern and South Africa by noting that the post-WWII period saw the beginning of the 
collapse of the remaining British and French empires through colony states fighting for de 
jure decolonization and the rise of visible resistance around the globe in many different 
locations. Some of the most visible examples of this international contest is the Third World 
Project spearheaded by the likes of Nehru and Nkrumah and Sukarno in India and Ghana and 
Indonesia, respectively. In these cases, all of which were British or Dutch colonies, the 
decolonization transition saw colonial states and their legal figureheads attain some measure 
of nation-state agency and international legitimacy, under the leadership of a respected 
statesmen. Unlike India, Ghana, and Indonesia, which by no means were non-violent, but 
were arguably less violent, South Africa under Afrikaner apartheid was one of, if not the, 
most brutal sites of colonial violence. This contrast helps in understanding that under 
apartheid, White South African authorities’ brutal repression forced the likes of Mandela, 
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Mmbeki, Tambo, Sobukwe, and other resistance groups into the political margins of 
transgressive non-state action, denounced as treasonous or terrorist. These decolonization 
leaders had to exist in these margins far beyond the time of what the above-mentioned de 
jure decolonized states had to endure.  
In other colonial states, like those above, it is true that non-state action by civil 
society and/or militant groups, which could fit most definitions of terrorism, preceded 
decolonization powers that became accepted by the West and Global North as legitimate 
states, such as those in Ghana, India, and Indonesia. Despite overlap, however, significant 
differences are evident in the extent of White European populations and infrastructure, both 
physical and social, in  former British Imperial colonies, compared to former French, 
Portuguese, or Dutch Imperial colonies. In the more industrialized, significantly White-
settled, and advanced capitalist South Africa, which exercised regional hegemony over the 
less industrialized, less settled, and cruder colonial capitalist societies bordering South 
Africa, the White Supremacy authority and power of the state and civil society barred a 
figurehead. The established state apparatus of control of goods and services, as well as 
military-industrial complexes and security-surveillance complexes, ensured Afrikaner power 
was an almost totalizing, systematically legitimized, well-resourced authority.  
Ultimately, the strong authority of the state of the Union of South Africa decreased 
the likelihood of the eruption of an Algeria- or Vietnam-like war for independence, while 
maintaining a regime as or more brutal than French colonial regimes. Because of these 
factors, among others, in the 1950s non-violent, procedurally democratic movements 
emerged for South(ern) Africa’s decolonization, in the form of congresses, statesmen, 
petitions, and other forms of democratic proceduralism and civil society agency. However, 
 
 
172 
these broadly non-violent liberal agents, best exemplified by the ANC, were denounced as 
terrorist and delegitimized by the colonizer to a greater extent and for longer than similar 
movements in the above-mentioned colonial states, where Nkrumah’s and Sukarno’s 
movements eventually gained local, global, and international support.  
In 1955, the South African Congress Alliance, driven by the ANC, but including the 
South African Indian Congress (SAIC),  South African Communist Party (SACP), and other 
representative, liberal, multiracial, procedurally democratic, and generally anti-capitalist 
groups, convened in the history “Congress of the People.” This convention in the slum of 
Soweto was a watershed moment that included the famous Freedom Charter drafting, 
outlining basic demands for a liberal, multiracial, procedural democracy in South Africa, and 
prefaced by the primary demand: “The People Shall Govern!” Unfortunately, Union of South 
Africa state police broke up the convention on its second day, outlawed the ANC, and 
arrested many representatives, including figureheads such as Mandela, who were tried the 
following year in the 1956 Treason Trial. From 1955-1956, though many figureheads, 
including Mandela, were cleared of charges, the ANC and the SACP were outlawed, O.R. 
Tambo was exiled, and the Freedom Charter was criminalized on grounds of treason and 
violating multivarious apartheid laws.  
In 1959, Robert Sobukwe subsequently founded the PAC, fracturing away from the 
ANC’s liberal, multiracial, inclusive, procedurally democratic approach for a more militant, 
exclusively Black-led approach. This insistence on (a) more radical militancy and (b) 
exclusively Black leadership would later be replicated by Steve Biko with SASO in 1969, 
which broke away from the liberal, multiracial NUSAS, and by Rhodes Must Fall in 2015, 
which broke away from the liberal, multiracial SRC at UCT. Additionally the 1959 
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Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act began a process of internally displacing Black 
South Africans onto the infamous, small, resource-scarce territories termed “bantustans,” 
where they held primary “citizenship” for “self-determination,” while simultaneously losing 
South African citizenship. See Figure 3.1.  
FIGURE 3.1: Map of Apartheid South(ern) Africa, with “Bantustans” Detailed 
 
Source(s):  
Wikimedia User "Htonl," a DA Employee ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Htonl   
 
In 1960, the Sharpeville Massacre, commonly identified as one of, if not the, most 
visible atrocities of apartheid, marked another watershed moment in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. On March 21, 1960, 69 peaceful protesters were killed by state forces at a protest 
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against pass laws. Much like the 2012 Marikana Massacre over 50 years later, the Sharpeville 
Massacre locally, regionally, globally, and internationally highlighted the brutal violence of 
White Supremacy in South Africa, and the state’s authority over black and brown bodies 
struggling against overwhelmingly violent authoritarianism in order to achieve some form of 
democracy.  
After Sharpeville, the ANC created its armed military wing, Umkhonto-we-Sizwe 
(MK), with Nelson Mandela as its co-founder, and Chris Hani as its Chief of Staff. The PAC 
expanded its armed military wing Poqo (Xhosa; English: “pure” or “alone”) and renamed it 
to the Azania People’s Liberation Army (APLA). The term Azania refers to ancient Greek 
and Roman references for Southern Africa, and marks an attempt to subvert White European 
labelling and categorizations. This tactic is especially echoed by Rhodes Must Fall.  
MK and APLA differed in that MK attempted to minimize civilian casualties, 
whereas APLA explicitly stated they would harm civilian White South Africans. Both 
marked a major escalation in the use of violence by the anti-apartheid struggle after 
Sharpeville, which Mandela later described as “inevitable” in his closing arguments at 1963 
the Rivonia Trial. After Sharpeville, MK and APLA executed dozens of violent acts of 
sabotage and terrorism that often killed unarmed civilians in addition to South African 
military and police personnel, while the ANC and other civil society organizations executed 
peaceful, non-violent protests.  
Additionally, widespread, coordinated, militant, violent decolonization resistance 
swept across Southern Africa in the 1960s. In 1960 in Namibia, the Southwest African 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) formed out of a coalescence of previous civil society 
groups. The primary group was OvamboLand People’s Organization (OPO), which was 
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exiled after police murdered 11 leaders in one day. SWAPO led a coalition resistance against 
the Union of South Africa’s regional hegemony. SWAPO’s armed wing, also active 
beginning in the 1960s, was the People’s Liberation Army for Namibia (PLAN). 
Additionally, beginning in 1961, until 1974, Angola’s War of Independence began, which 
later became a site of South Africa exercising regional hegemony. See Table 3.2.  
TABLE 3.2: Overt Anti-Apartheid Resistance in South(ern) Africa 
Territory, 
Politics 
Acronym 
and Name 
Figureheads, 
most visible, 
in 
chronological 
order 
Tactics Main Opposition 
South 
Africa, 
center-left 
- ANC: 
African 
National 
Congress 
- Albert Lutuli 
 
- OR Tambo 
 
- Walter Sisulu 
 
- Nelson Mandela 
 
- Thabo Mbeki 
 
- Jacob Zuma 
- Protest and Performance 
 
- Coordinated Civil 
Disobedience 
 
- Elections 
 
- Court Cases 
- Apartheid Republic of South Africa 
- South African Police (SAP) 
- South African Defense Force (SADF) 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, 
STF) 
- Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) 
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS) 
- National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
South 
Africa, 
radical-left 
- PAC: Pan 
Africanist 
Congress 
- Robert Sobukwe 
 
- Clarence 
Makwetu 
- Protest and Performance 
 
- Coordinated Civil 
Disobedience 
 
- Coordinated Violence Against 
Military and Government 
Targets 
 
- Coordinated Violence Against 
Civilian Targets 
 
- Regional Support for Anti-
Apartheid Resistance 
- Apartheid Republic of South Africa 
- South African Police (SAP) 
- South African Defense Force (SADF) 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, 
STF) 
- Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) 
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS) 
- National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
Namibia 
- SWAPO: 
South West 
Africa People's 
Organization 
 
- OPO: 
OvamboLand 
People's 
Organization 
- Sam Nujoma 
 
- Andimba Toivo 
ya Toivo 
 
- Lucas Haleinge 
Nepela 
 
- Andimba Toivo 
ya Toivo 
- Protest and Performance 
 
- Coordinated Civil 
Disobedience 
 
- Elections 
 
- Court Cases 
- South-West Africa 
- South-West African Police (SWAPOL) 
- Apartheid Republic of South Africa 
- South African Defense Force (SADF) 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, 
STF) 
- Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) 
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS) 
- National Intelligence Service (NIS)   
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1961-1994: The “Independent” Republic of South Africa 
In 1961, the Union of South Africa technically achieved “independence,” was 
renamed the Republic of South Africa, and ended use of the British monarch as head of state. 
However, much like Rhodesia, one White Supremacist regime achieving independence from 
another did not actually self-determination for the majority of residents in that territory. In 
1963, Mandela and other figureheads were arrested and tried in Rivonia, where Mandela 
infamously outlined the inevitability of violent resistance to apartheid, before life 
imprisonment on Robben Island. In 1966, after SWAPO’s consistent petitioning of the 
UNGA and International Court of Justice, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2145, which 
declared as illegal South Africa’s occupation of South West Africa / Namibia. This laid the 
legal foundation for eventual elections in Namibia, with the UN an impartial observer. 
However, Apartheid South Africa’s covert USA backing and occupation of South West 
Africa / Namibia precluded democratic procedures.  
In the late 1960s, Apartheid South Africa passed increasingly authoritarian racialized 
laws, simultaneously further suppressing and radicalizing anti-apartheid movements. The 
1966 Group Areas Act, 1967 Terrorism Act, and 1968 Separate Representation Act all 
further stripped non-Whites, but especially Blacks, of rights, representation, labor 
protections, mobility, and property. The 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act even 
stripped Black South Africans’ citizenship, claiming they were only citizens of arbitrarily 
assigned, impoverished, and powerless Bantustans. Throughout this time, the “deep state” of 
South Africa, what has been called its “third force” (Ellis, 2007) developed with extensive, 
covert paramilitary, intelligence, and secret police units, like the Civil Cooperation Bureau 
(CCB), which executed the widespread torture that was critical to controlling the population.  
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1968-1970s: Steve Biko Writes, Students Radicalize, Biko Dies 
In 1968, a radical student from the University of Natal named Steve Biko founded the 
South African Students Organization (SASO), which was to be exclusively for and by Black 
South African students, and entirely led by Black South Africans - something that Rhodes 
Must Fall emulated in 2015. In 1971, SASO adopted a “Declaration of Student Rights” that 
resisted the conformist and White Supremacy racism of the existing pro-Dutch-Afrikaans 
legislation, and the group continued for the next years to politicize schools and townships 
around the country. (Badat, 1999) SASO marked a break from the multiracial and inclusive 
approach of liberal NUSAS, which to date had not been radical, or effective, enough. Biko 
alleged these groups served White culture through incremental reform more than they served 
Black culture through radical restructuring and thinking beyond Whiteness. Biko’s theories 
and political organizing with SASO massively expanded Black Consciousness across 
South(ern) Africa by demanding and creating space for Black students to transgressively 
actualize their radical, and criminalized,  politics of Black leadership without White 
oversight.  
The 1974 Afrikaans Medium Decree required that Afrikaans be the medium of 
instruction in all schools, including Blacks-only schools. In 1976, the Soweto Student 
Uprisings, led largely by secondary school students, marked the biggest and most visible 
counter-hegemonic social movement since the start of apartheid. Estimates range from 
10,000 to 20,000 protesters in Soweto alone, with sporadic violence and rioting sweeping 
across South Africa after the initial protests began by secondary school students in Soweto. 
(Ndlovu, 2004)  Over 500 people died during the Soweto Student Uprisings, over 100 of 
whom were under 18. Widespread protests and violence increased significantly after this 
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watershed moment, as did state suppression. By 1977, Biko was legally indefinitely detained 
under the 1967 Terrorism Act. Within months, he was tortured to death by the state and 
SASO was banned. In 1979, various students created first the Azanian Students Organization 
(AZASO) to succeed SASO; they later renamed it the South African National Students 
Congress (SANSCO). In 1979, yet another anti-apartheid student organization, the Congress 
of South African Students (COSAS), formed, but it primarily focused on supporting ANC 
priorities and strategies by supporting their boycotts, strikes, and rallies.  
1970s-1980s: Things Fall Apart, Violently 
From the 1970s onward, MK and APLA attacks increased in severity and frequency. 
After the 1975 Alvor Agreement, driven by the 1974 anti-colonial Carnation Revolution in 
Portugal, Portuguese de jure and de facto power in Angola and Mozambique yielded to 
multivarious armed decolonization movements, and the Angolan Civil War and the 
Mozambique Civil War began. In both Angola and Mozambique, proxy and paramilitary 
powers from the USSR, Cuba, USA, and South Africa waged covert battles for de facto 
control over the now de jure decolonized states. Mozambique’s civil war lasted until the mid 
1990s; Angola’s lasted until the early 2000s.  
In Namibia, between 1975 and 1989, SADF overtly fought proxy wars against 
SWAPO’s PLAN, and covertly used paramilitary forces against Angola’s leftist, Cuba- and 
USSR-backed Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). During this time, the 
USA and South Africa both provided material support to pro-capitalist Angola militants. The 
most notable was Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA). Cuba’s covert anti- capitalist war in Angola, via the MPLA, fought UNITA; over 
90,000 Cuban personnel were present at its peak, with estimates of up to 5,000 Cuban 
 
 
179 
soldiers dead due to combat alone. (Gliejeses, 2012) Additionally in the 1980s, in 
consultation with the USA, National Party leaders proposed a pro-capitalist multinational 
trade bloc: the Constellation of Southern African States (CSAS). CSAS represented a future, 
pro-Apartheid, pro-capitalist international system in Southern Africa. (Makgetlaneng; 2013) 
Should the various anti-apartheid conflicts failed, it is possible that the CSAS, and not 
SADC, would be the regional bloc driving Southern Africa’s policies todays. See Table 3.3.   
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TABLE 3.3: Covert Anti-Apartheid, Anti-Capitalist Conflict in South(ern) Africa c. 1970s-2000s 
Territory Acronym and Name Figureheads 
Main 
Allies Main Opposition 
South Africa 
- MK: uMkhonto 
we Sizwe 
- APLA: Azanian 
People's Liberation 
Army 
(Previously, Poqo) 
- Nelson Mandela 
- Cris Hani 
- Jacob Zuma 
- Kgalema Motlanthe 
- Robert Sobukwe 
- Matooane Mapefane 
- Potlako Leballo 
- ANC 
- PAC 
- SACP 
- USSR 
- CUBA 
- Apartheid Republic of South Africa 
- South African Police (SAP) 
- South African Defense Force (SADF) 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF) 
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS) 
- South Africa National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
- South Africa Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) 
- USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
- US Agency for International Aid (USAID) 
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Namibia 
- PLAN: People's 
Liberation Army of 
Namibia 
- Sam Nujoma 
- Herman Andimba Toivo 
ya Toivo 
- Dimo Hamaambo 
- ANC 
- USSR 
- CUBA 
- South-West Africa 
- South-West African Police (SWAPOL) 
- Apartheid Republic of South Africa 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF) 
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS) 
- National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
Angola 
- MPLA: 
Movimento 
Popular de 
Libertação de 
Angola 
- Agostinho Neto 
- Viriato da Cruz 
- José Eduardo dos Santos 
- ANC 
- PAC 
- SACP 
- USSR 
- CUBA 
- UNITA: União Nacional para a Independência Total de 
Angola 
- Jonas Savimbi 
- Isaías Samakuva 
- FNLA: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola 
- Ngola Kabangu - South African Defense Force (SADF) 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF) 
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS) 
- South Africa National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
- USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
- US Agency for Internaional Aid (USAID) 
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mozambique 
- FRELIMO: 
Frente de 
Libertação de 
Moçambique 
- Eduardo Mondlane 
- Samora Machel 
- Samora Machel 
- Joaquim Chissano 
- ANC 
- SACP 
- USSR 
RENAMO: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana 
Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe, 
Zambia) 
- ZANU: 
Zimbabwe Africa 
National Union 
 
- ZAPU: 
Zimbabwe African 
People's Union 
 
- ZANLA: 
Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation 
Army 
 
- ZAPLA: 
Zimbabwe People's 
Revolutionary 
Army 
 
- Enos Nkala 
- Robert Mugabe 
- Ndabaningi Sithole 
- Joshua Nkomo 
 
- Alfred Nikita Mangena 
- Lookout Masuku 
- ANC 
- SACP 
- USSR 
- Rhodesian Army, Air Force, Guard Force 
- Rhodesia Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) 
- British South Africa Police (BSAP) 
- South African Defense Force (SADF) 
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF)  
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At the same time that structural adjustments were implemented worldwide by the 
USA- and Europe-driven WB and IMF, HIV/AIDS began to sweep across Southern Africa, 
particularly devastating the absolutely impoverished, largely illiterate and innumerate, non-
White communities that had been denied healthcare, as well as education, housing, and other 
common social services. Throughout the 1980s, public service delivery further degraded, and 
impoverishment, malnourishment, and state violence further suppressed and radicalized 
South Africans. The precariousness further increased as increasingly coordinated militant 
anti-apartheid violence, and sporadic violence by common criminals, spread further and 
further into urban centers. Many pundits speculated that civil war would devastate South 
Africa, much as it had in Angola and Namibia. Throughout all of this, armed resistance 
throughout South(ern) Africa was generally articulated as USA- or South Africa-backed 
right-wing militias fighting Cuba- or USSR-backed left-wing militias.  
In 1984, the National Party unveiled constitutional reforms that offered some form of 
representation for “Coloureds” and “Indians” in a tricameral legislature and multiracial 
executive cabinet, with “Whites” retaining majorities both the legislature and executive. No 
“Blacks” were represented anywhere in this legislature. In fact, the 1984 reforms actually 
consolidated and therefore increased the authority of the state by combining the head of 
government (formerly, the president) and the head of state (formerly, the prime minister) into 
a single office of “die Staatspresident” (Afrikaans; English: State President). The State 
President had sweeping foreign and domestic powers, was highly partisan, and was therefore 
controlled by the National Party.  
In 1985, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was formed out of 
21 different trade unions joining together during a convention at the University of Natal. In 
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1982, Cyril Ramaphosa founded the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), one of the 
most important unions at this time, which would later be critical during the Marikana 
Massacre. This marked a significant increase in the power of low-paid service laborers and 
labor unions even under apartheid, and it added another dimension to the party-, militant-, 
and student-driven anti-apartheid actions thus far. In 1986, comprehensive divestment and 
sanction measures finally passed in the USA, despite the opposition of the Reagan regime 
and the USA President’s vetoing of such legislation. In 1987 during the national general 
election, over 250,000 mostly Black and Colored South African laborers went on strike, 
severely disrupting the routine White South African life and flow of capital, making many 
townships, suburbs, and even urban areas truly ungovernable. In 1988, with Mandela leading 
from prison, the ANC began covert talks with the National Party and FW de Klerk regarding 
possible negotiations.  
Universities’ Legitimization of Apartheid, Despite Protest 
While SU and UCT both remain bastions of Eurocentrism and capitalist-realism at the 
expense of truly African pedagogies, methodologies, epistemologies, SU stands out as the 
exemplar of military-industrial-academic complexes and collusion. Before and during 
apartheid, Stellenbosch University (SU) functioned as an intellectual and poli-socio-
economic stronghold of White Supremacy by providing intellectual legitimization of racist 
state policies, by justifying existing practices for integration into Apartheid South Africa’s de 
jure legal system.  
It is true that there were somewhat visible protests by university students against 
Apartheid between the 1940s and 1990s. (Badat, 1995) However, the overwhelming drivers 
of social change and protests under  Apartheid South Africa were not the overwhelmingly 
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White university students at overwhelmingly White universities that were heavily invested in 
maintaining White Supremacy. (Luescher and du Toit, 2008)  Instead, the social justice 
narrative at universities in Apartheid South Africa was, at best, “diversity” and 
“cosmopolitanism” that nonetheless resulted in “social segregation and exclusion,” if not 
narratives of “development” and “democracy” (Luescher and du Toit, 2008: 79, 80, 96-97)  
One of the simplest ways to evidence SU’s Afrikaner nationalism, racism, and 
involvement in upholding apartheid is the amount of powerful and influential pro-apartheid 
academics and politicians educated at SU. The list of such academics and politicians 
includes, but is not limited to, the following extremely influential White South Africans:  
● James Barry Munnik “JBM” Hertzog, a Boer general in the Second Boer War, and Prime 
Minister of the Union of South Africa, 1924-1939 
● Johannes Frederik Janse van Rensburg, lawyer and leader of Ossewabrandwag 
(Afrikaans; English: Ox wagon sentinel) a WWII, covert, far-right, pro-Afrikaner, pro-
Nazi, anti-British organization  
● Daniel Francois “DF” Malan, first apartheid-era National Party Prime Minister of the 
Union of South Africa, 1948-1954  
● Hendrik Frensch “HF” Verwoerd, second apartheid-era National Party Prime Minister of 
the Union of South Africa, 1954-1966, whose government ruled during the 1961 
Sharpeville Massacre, and independence from the collapsing British Empire  
● Balthazar Johannes “BJ” Vorster, third apartheid-era National Party Prime Minister of the 
Union of South Africa, 1966-1978, whose government ruled during the 1967 “Terrorism 
Act,” the 1968 “Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act”, the 1976 Soweto 
Student Uprisings, and the 1977 Steve Biko murder  
○ Vorster was also Minister of Justice during the 1963 Rivonia Trial of Mandela  
● Magnus Malan, apartheid-era Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa from 
1980-1991 during the bloodiest period of Southern African decolonization conflicts  
 
Another example of SU’s ongoing collusion with the state to maintain Dutch-
Afrikaner White Supremacy is its historical and contemporary connection with prestigious, 
militaristic think tanks, such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Relations (CSIR). 
Established in 1945 by the White Supremacy government, this para-statal body / public-
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private partnership facilitated and legitimized academic research on state violence and social 
control throughout Apartheid. Much like the USA’s Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), or 
the DARPA-MIT nexus, the research conducted through the SU-CSIR nexus in the name of 
“peace” and “security” lacks a critical frame, reifying violent state practices by making them 
policies.  
SU has remained an excellent real-world manifestation of Giroux’s military-
industrial- academic complex. To this day, CSIR conducts research that reinforces capitalist-
realist policies of surveillance and control, as indicated by their connection to drone warfare, 
or “unmanned aerial vehicles,” and is “a prime R&D agency and operates as [Republic of 
South Africa’s] strategic ‘in-house’ science and technology defence,” under their “Defense, 
peace, safety and security” program. (CSIR, 2014a)  To this day, CSIR maintains a mutually 
profitable, and legitimized, relationship with SU, which includes high tech security-
surveillance research and drone development. (CSIR, 2014b) Two members of RMF and OS 
both informed me that prior to their joining the protests, they had been recruited by CSIR. 
After they learned the extent of its ties to the military, police, and other state security forces, 
they could no longer continue, even if it meant incurring unmanageable levels of student loan 
debt.  
Furthermore, the military-industrial-academic complex in contemporary South Africa 
exemplifies neoliberal securitization of “insecure” black and brown bodies. Groups like 
CSIR coerce students, including lower-income and/or students of color, into employment 
with racist and violent, but profitable, military-industrial and security-surveillance inclined 
research. These research “opportunities” are offered in exchange for the firms’ financing 
tertiary education, often through loans or bursaries. In this way, not only does violence 
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against black and brown bodies continue to be both legitimate and a source of profit for some 
agents, but people of color are systematically coerced into collusion with this legitimization 
of racialized violence, through financial violence and precarity.  
Finally, to this day, while some of the chief architects of apartheid, such as SU alumni 
noted above, have died, been disgraced, imprisoned or otherwise held accountable for their 
crimes, this is not the case. The cardiologist Wouter Basson, who was acquitted in 2002 due 
to jurisdictional technicalities regarding prosecuting crimes committed in Namibia, openly 
admitted to directing Apartheid South Africa’s chemical and biological weapons program 
Project Coast during the 1980s, which had extensive involvement with CSIR. (UNIDIR and 
CCR, 2002: 31,169) One of Basson’s / Project Coast’s most infamous acts of mass murder 
was 1982’s Operation Duel, where over 200 SWAPO/PLAN members were poisoned and 
then had their bodies subsequently dumped from an airplane into the Atlantic Ocean. 
(Burgess and Purkitt, 2001: 22)  Basson also enabled the CCB to contaminate the Namibian 
Dobra refugee camp with cholera and yellow fever. (Burgess and Purkitt, 2001: 44)  
Like this entire chapter, what I have provided here is a fraction of what occurred, 
often due to the design of people with close ties to prestigious knowledge production and 
legitimization sites, like SU and CSIR. Despite this, these people still freely live a relatively 
luxurious life in South Africa. In the case of Basson, they have reinvented themselves as “a 
fashionable cardiologist in the upmarket suburb of Durbanville in Cape Town” (Underhill 
and Child, 2011) who gives motivational talks to exclusive, Whites-only private gatherings, 
like at Cape Town’s Kelvin Grove Club. (Davies, 2013) While not a formal lecturer at SU, 
Basson maintained ongoing contact and access to SU students until at least 2014 as a 
cardiological “tutor” (Stellenbosch University, 2015) as well as ran a private practice in 
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Durban. As of 2016, Basson is in the process of fighting to retain their Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA) credentialing, which was not revoked until 2013. Through 
these above examples, it is clear that the legitimization of state violence within advanced 
capitalist societies, if not always requires, still usually utilizes integration with academia.  
 
South(ern) Africa and Contemporary Globalization 
 
 
As analyzed in depth in my Introduction and GS Theory Review and three critical 
premises, the collapse of the USSR and consequent decrease in support for anti-capitalist 
movements, including Cuba, directly intersects with neoliberalism’s USA-driven ascent to 
global hegemony. It also intersects with and influences South Africa during its most 
significant power transitions since the rise of Apartheid immediately post-WWII. 
Contemporary Globalization also birthed a new regional Southern African order, 
subordinated to the USA’s global order.  
The long decade of the 1990s contained many transitions within Africa: state 
breakups; policy shifts; expansions of pro-capitalist poli-socio-economics; South Africa’s 
dismantling of de jure apartheid; and the collapse of anti-capitalist movements. As 
mentioned in my Introduction and Theory Review, the USA significantly changed its policies 
of covert support in order to maintain its legitimacy as an ostensibly “smaller government” 
and “democratic” authority, although its policies often applied mass state and non-state 
violence to humans in weaker or peripheral regions. Especially in Africa, (post)colonial 
nation-states continued to face intra- and inter-state conflict and breakup as weak and/or 
violent state governments, often influenced through covert foreign intervention that profited 
select populations.  
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Global Neoliberalism’s Violence Plagues Africa 
As a direct result of Europe’s colonialism limited political, social, economic, cultural, 
and physical infrastructures meant global neoliberalism’s structural adjustments compounded 
pre-existing wretchedness. This period of extensive state conflict throughout the 1980s and 
1990s has largely been termed “Africa’s Lost Decade” by conventional, capitalist-realist IR 
and economics theorists that seem to conveniently ignore colonialism and decolonization. 
Professor Kaldor, writing from the prestigious London School of Economics (LSE), 
theorized a highly-influential concept of “new” versus “old wars” in a global capitalist-realist 
frame. (Kaldor, 1999, 2007) Largely disregarding the intersections and histories of race, 
gender, class, and colonialism, Kaldor instead focused on “tribalism” of “underdeveloped” 
states, a la Huntington’s Islamophobic notions of civilizations basically doomed to conflict, 
lest they internalize neoliberalism. I prefer perceiving Africa’s ongoing conflict under 
Contemporary Globalization as a continuation of colonialism. After this final national and 
regional review of post-Apartheid South Africa, I continue to that which is still influenced by 
the transition era: student protests, like Rhodes Must Fall.  
Despite various aforementioned forms of de jure state independence, North Africa 
experienced extensive conflict during Contemporary Globalization. In the late 1980s into the 
1990s in Somalia, long-fermenting civil war resulted in a “failed state,” the emergence of an 
autonomous but unrecognized Somaliland, and the collapse of the Cold War USA-backed 
Barre Regime.  Beginning in the 1980s and continuing until 2005, the Second Sudanese Civil 
War unfolded, becoming one of the longest civil wars recorded, and only ending with the 
2011 partition of the state into Sudan and South Sudan. In 1990 in Chad, civil conflict ended 
a Global North and West-backed regime with a coup that brought Idriss Deby, who still rules 
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Chad as of 2016, to power. In 1991 in Western Sahara, a ceasefire between Spain and 
Morocco introduced a UN peacekeeping force to facilitate self-determination of that territory, 
instead of governance by Morocco - an issue unresolved as of 2016. In 1992 in Algeria, a 
state of emergency was declared for the ruling party to maintain power over religious 
military insurgence; this state of emergency would continued until 2001. In 1993, Eritrea 
achieved full independence from Ethiopia after a decades-long war of independence against 
the formerly USSR-backed Ethiopian state.  
Central and Western Africa also experienced massive armed conflict as “the end of 
history” yielded “freedom” and “democracy” as the new world order. From the late 1980s 
into the early 2000s in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire, brutal civil wars unfolded. 
They were noteworthy for extensive, profitable security and extractive firms’ interventions, 
as well as for Nigeria’s regional hegemonic influence via the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and its military monitoring group (ECOMOG). In 1994 in 
Rwanda, the infamous Hutu-Tutsi genocide unfolded without Global North and West 
intervention, other than profitable French and Dutch arms sales. Rwanda’s, Burundi’s, and 
Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) racialized class tensions still exacerbate regional 
conflict in Central Africa. In 1992-93 and 1997-99 in the Republic of Congo, two civil wars 
ravaged the country. From 1996 to at least 2003 in DRC, the deadliest war on earth since 
World War II unfolded in DRC. (Mullins and Rothe, 2008; Stearns, 2012)  Offshoots of it 
still continue, and South Africa maintains extensive economic and military involvement. (ISS 
2012, 2013a, 2013b; Nibishaka, 2011)   
In Southern Africa, Apartheid South Africa’s violence peaked in the late 1980s, with 
the militant violence waged by MK, APLA, PLAN, and the MPLA against the apartheid 
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regime, combined with sanctions by global powers including the USA, combined with 
widespread crime and ungovernability as a result of massive poverty and state-sanctioned 
violence. The 1988 Tripartite Agreement, formally signed in New York and so termed the 
“New York Accords,” officially ended South Africa’s and the USA’s, as well as Cuba’s and 
the USSR’s, covert intervention in both Angola and Namibia. This cleared the way for 
Namibia’s independence from overt Apartheid South African control. I agree with Gliejeses 
and Westad that these treaties occurred not because of USA-led diplomacy, but because of 
anti-capitalist violence waged Angolan, South African, Namibian, and Cuban soldiers - 
which I later discuss as problematizing notions of non-violence movements’ impact on 
abolishing de jure Apartheid.  
I argue that the USA and South signed treaties primarily because Cuban- and USSR-
backed anti-capitalist fighters effectively won a covert war of attrition against South Africa- 
and USA-supported pro-apartheid and pro-capitalist UNITA Angolan fighters. (Gleijeses, 
2012) The Angolan conflict was a long and expensive proxy war that the USA supported 
only as long as it profited the USA in its anti-USSR, anti-Cuba Cold War contests. 
(Gleijeses, 2003; 2012; Westad, 2007)  MK and APLA in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, 
and MPLA in Angola all attrited Apartheid South Africa’s power, with material and human 
resources supplied to them by the USSR and Cuba. Additionally, FRELIMO in Mozambique, 
and ZANU / ZANLA in Zimbabwe, all further drained South Africa’s military and economic 
resources. As South Africa’s and global regime changes appeared inevitable, the USA no 
longer profited from helping Apartheid South Africa pursue its pro-capitalist, pro-apartheid 
border wars. The USA, through structural and adjustment and covert authoritarianism, could 
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still wield global hegemony without Apartheid South Africa as necessary for maintaining 
profitable capital flows.  
As such, South Africa was forced to the negotiating table primarily by being worn 
down economically and militarily by MK, APLA, and MPLA; secondarily by losing the 
support of the post-Cold War USA; and additionally by growing international pressure. The 
defeat of Apartheid South Africa defeat in Namibia and Angola symbolically and politically 
weakened the hardline White Supremacy apartheid government of PW Botha, and 
contributed to his eventual resignation and succession by FW de Klerk in 1988. By 1990, 
South West Africa became Namibia and achieved de jure independence as Apartheid South 
Africa’s military withdrew from both Angola and Namibia. Conflict continued within 
Mozambique and Angola for several years, but the role of the USA, USSR, Cuba, and 
Apartheid South Africa decreased significantly, at least in terms of covert military 
involvement. Within a decade of major combat ending, Mozambique’s, Angola’s, Zambia’s, 
and Tanzania’s formerly African-socialist regimes had became local pro-capitalist forces 
who followed the lead of the USA and South Africa.  
South Africa in the Long Decade of the 1990s  
Between 1989 and 1990, Apartheid South Africa’s State President Botha suffered 
political and personal health setbacks, leading to their resignation and de Klerk’s succession. 
Similar to Gorbachev in the USSR in the late 1980s, de Klerk undertook tentative reforms 
that became a landslide of poli-socio-economic change as a result of the state’s precarious 
authority. Driven by the ANC and Mandela et. al., and faced with likely civil war, de Klerk 
capitulated.  
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De-Criminalizing Anti-Apartheid Politics and Civil Society  
In 1990, de Klerk announced in his inaugural address that the government would end 
its criminalization of Mandela, the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other anti-apartheid, socialist, 
and/or political parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In 1990 May, ANC and 
Apartheid South Africa negotiated at the presidential palace, Groote Schuur (Afrikaans; 
English: Big Barn), yielding the Groote Schuur Minute. This agreement laid the foundation 
for negotiations. It guaranteed immunity for exiles, release of political prisoners, and 
reductions of violence by both the Apartheid South African state, as well as non-state, anti-
apartheid groups’ violence. In August, negotiations were held in Pretoria, producing the 
Pretoria Minute, which led to the suspension of MK’s violence and the end of the long-
running formal state of emergency by the government. Additionally, in 1989, de Klerk 
overtly recognized Apartheid South Africa’s covert nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons by ordering their disarmament.  
In 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was formalized, 
and included the vast majority of political actors at the time, although the far-right, White 
Supremacy, pro-Apartheid Conservative Party, and the far-left PAC, both boycotted and 
denounced the group and its actions. South African Students Congress (SASCO) was formed 
by merging the liberal, multiracial NUSAS with the South African National Student 
Congress (SANSCO), formerly the Azanian Students Organization (AZASO) that succeeded 
Biko’s SASO. Driven by the ANC, CODESA compelled de Klerk to enact the Abolition of 
Racially Based Land Measures Act, which repealed many restrictions on Coloured, Indian, 
and especially Black South Africans’ rights to mobility, property, labor protections, legal 
representation, and citizenship. The major educational program to finance tertiary education 
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at HEIs was restructured into the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) which 
especially focused on Black South Africans. What would later become the Reconstruction 
and Development Program (RDP) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) were also 
devised by Mandela et. al. at this time. They could not be implemented, though, until 
elections officially removed de Klerk and other pro-Apartheid authorities. Additionally in 
1991 the newly-created UNESCO Félix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize was first awarded 
jointly to de Klerk and Mandela for their collaboration.  
Throughout 1992-1994, various actions destabilized negotiations between the ANC 
and the state, threatening mass violence. In March, a referendum limited to White South 
Africans yielded 68% in favor of negotiating an end to apartheid, with the far-right 
Conservative Party the most vocal opponent of the now center-right National Party’s 
reforms. At a CODESA convention in Boipatong, Gauteng Province, the Boipatong 
Massacre began with a fight between the ANC, state police, and the IFP, resulting in over 40 
deaths. After more violence seemed inevitable, de Klerk ultimately dismissed several high-
ranking SADF officials to purge hard-line right-wing individuals who might use military 
force to prevent imminent changes. As CODESA negotiations faltered, a new approach to 
incorporate more groups and create an interim constitution, called the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Forum (MPNF), helped include significantly disparate parties such as the NP, 
PAC, and the IFP into negotiations. It also included British and USA officials as mediators 
and advisors - an initial compromise that later neoliberalized the transition, but legitimized it 
in the eyes of hard-line pro-capitalist powers  
In 1993 April, MK Chief of Staff and SACP leader Chris Hani was murdered on the 
orders of former Shadow Finance Minister, and founder and head of the Conservative Party 
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Clive Derby-Lewis, potentially destabilizing the entire transition. However, Mandela and the 
ANC pacified near-rebellious factions, and ultimately accelerated negotiations for a less 
violent transition, allowing the MPNF to implement an interim constitution by November. In 
December, Mandela and de Klerk jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize.  
In 1994 April, the interim governing body, the Transitional Executive Council, 
oversaw the first ever multiracial elections. Mandela’s ANC won in a landslide, near super-
majority, with 63% of all votes; followed by de Klerk’s NP with 20%; and Buthelezi’s IFP 
with 11%. International observers declared the elections relatively fair and free of violence. 
Mandela appointed de Klerk, still head of a reduced National Party, as one Deputy President 
for the duration of the 1994-1996 transitional government, alongside Thabo Mmbeki as 
another Deputy President, who remained once de Klerk resigned in 1997.  
Post-1994: From Apartheid to What? 
Throughout the 1990s, ANC-NP cooperation established the Republic of South 
Africa as an internationally-legitimized, liberal, multiracial, procedural, Presidential 
democratic system of governance. Between 1994 and 1996, the Republic of South Africa 
continued to transition from de jure Apartheid with minimal coordinated, but much 
widespread, non-state violence. The racist SADF was abolished completely, and instead the 
military, no longer based on mandatory, Whites-only, male conscription, became a volunteer 
force renamed the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). Similarly, the brutal 
South African Police (SAP) were restructured and renamed the South African Police Services 
(SAPS). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), partly structured upon Chile’s 
post-Pinochet Rettig Report, (Wilson, 2001: 52) was established in 1995 by the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act. This attempt at restorative justice and national 
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reconciliation provided amnesty to those who confessed to human rights violations under 
Apartheid. TRC began public trials in Cape Town in 1996 and largely concluded by 2000. At 
that point, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), and NGO headed by Tutu, de 
facto executed analysis of reconciliation practices and policies for South Africa’s Department 
of Justice.  
Dominant narratives, academic theories, and common sense all identify 1994’s 
multiracial elections, the 1996 implementation of the new Constitution, and the TRC as proof 
of a transition “from apartheid to democracy.” After waging arguably the longest-running 
battle with overt colonialism within a decade the ANC had gone from a banned terrorist 
group, most of whose leaders were either exiled or incarcerated, to the elected majority party 
governing the nation-state with the largest economy in Africa. The ANC and Mandela et. al. 
had apparently triumphed an overtly White Supremacist, White minority-ruled, authoritarian, 
nuclear-armed regime that spread its violence across most of Southern Africa.  
However, how much South Africa actually diverged from its colonial apartheid past 
remains hotly debated, and this controversy is the centerpiece of the ongoing university 
student social movements presented in the next chapter. While I agree that the ascent of the 
ANC and collapse of de jure apartheid was a triumph, the post-1994 transition occurred 
under global neoliberalism, and amidst the wreckage and wretchedness of hundreds of years 
of colonialism. As such, it yielded little more than procedural democracy at best, and 
neoliberalism / covert authoritarianism at worst.  
My arguments are largely in line with Professor Bond’s sweeping analysis of the 
conditions birthing post-apartheid South Africa: Elite Transition: From Apartheid to 
Neoliberalism. Bond focuses on the political and economic compromises Mandela et. al. 
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made with agents of White-owned, global capital. I agree that the ANC prioritized preventing 
civil war and earning international legitimacy of Black majority rule, given the constraints of 
global neoliberalism. I also agree, however, that select political elites became a comprador 
bourgeoise class within the new South Africa. In line with Bond’s theories and South 
Africa’s ongoing protests, I argue that:  
1. Global neoliberalism’s pressure to abandon socialist / communist / anti-capitalist ideals in 
favor of capitalist-realist social structures; and,  
2. A complex combination of inadequate economic power, greed, and exhaustion from 
years of struggle drove ANC party elites to enrich and insulate themselves with relative 
wealth; 
3. Therefore, most ambitious, socialist, redistribution programs were abandoned by the end 
of the Mandela Regime, with neoliberalism fully imposed by the Mmbeki Regime.  
 
Talking Left while Walking Right 
Post-1994, the Republic of South Africa ostensibly attempted to implement social 
welfare programs that redressed colonialism’s massive inequality and structural violence. 
Initial plans for widespread socialist redistribution were the goal of multiple groups in 
CODESA and MPNF - but the ANC ultimately led most of these negotiations. The two most 
visible and ambitious programs, RDP and BEE, were poorly implemented and designed as 
the ANC began governing in 1994. (Nattrass, 1994; Ponte, Roberts, and van Stittert, 2007; 
Bond, 2006, 2014)  Even under the tragic poli-socio-economics the ANC inherited in 1994, 
Bond argues that “the RDP was not unrealistic or unfeasible” given enough national 
coordination. (Bond, 2014: 3) The ANC’s stated goals were to meet the basic needs of the 
vast majority of the population, which colonialism had deprived of modern housing, 
sanitation, electricity, or education access for hundreds of years. The ANC’s party platform, 
combined with the ideas of RDP, BEE, NSFAS, and TRC, and combined with one of the 
most pro-socio-economic rights constitutions in human history, put South Africa among the 
most progressive, tolerant, and capitally-redistributive social democracies - on paper.  
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Because of the constraints of global neoliberalism, during the 1990s transition era, a 
great many structural adjustments were made to South Africa’s economy in the interest of 
profitability and privatization. This was largely articulated through ANC-negotiated 
acceptance of strings-attached IMF loans, beginning as early as the 1980s, that precluded any 
truly radical restructuring of society away from free market logics. In this way, what was 
originally an ANC and SACP platform of industry nationalization, capital redistribution, and 
otherwise socialist programs became instead processes of privatization that appeased the 
IMF, WB, and WTO, while profiting both global agents of capital, and an emergent, local 
comprador bourgeoisie, comprised of ANC elites profiting from new local authority, 
regional power, and global legitimacy.  
By 1996 March, the core principles of RDP were abandoned. The former ambitions 
were secretly mocked as “Rumours, Dreams, and Promises,” as ANC elites and finance 
executives highlights their newfound aversion to nationalization or redistribution as a way to 
market South Africa to global financiers. (Bond, 2014: 70) World Bank staff “claimed 
successful penetration” into the TEC and RDP planning, as well as other transition offices 
“responsible for most of the [development] policies,” where ultimately “three of the four 
authors of the urban and rural [development] strategies were from neoliberal institutions.” 
(Bond, 2014: 82) In addition to this external infiltration, there was also good old fashioned 
corruption and selling out. This occurred at a time when South Africa’s economy was, quite 
simply, broken beyond repair by any but the most competent teams with the best resources. 
Decades of arms and luxury goods manufacturing, facilitated by reliance on de facto slave 
labor for services affordable only by White South Africans, yielded a totally unequal and 
unsustainable balance of capital. While it had been relatively advanced in terms of 
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industrialization during the Cold War, under Contemporary Globalization, and after years of 
violence bordering on civil war, the skewed demographics and high costs made it a near 
worst-case scenario for producers and consumers, in addition to the majority Black 
population. Here is a brief list of South Africa’s economic damage c. 1994, before 
neoliberalism:  
● Insufficient consumer buying power 
● Inadequate global competitiveness 
● Debilitating lack of international savoir faire (French; English: sophistication)  
● Structural bias of production towards luxury...goods and away from capital goods 
● Inefficiencies caused by enduring racial and gender imbalances  
● Drain of capital abroad or into speculative investment pools controlled by a small crew of 
unpatriotic [globalized] finances 
(Bond, 2014: 76) 
 
Some estimates place the value of the capital flight out of South Africa at around 6% 
of GDP per year from 1980 to 2000. (Mohamed and Finnoff, 2005: 93) As the rand 
repeatedly crashed, the economy recessed, political upheaval still threatened, and the state 
hemorrhaged resources of all types, some financiers saw an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
Bond asserts:  
Big capital had shown the capacity to cajole, threaten, and simply go on ‘investment 
strike’...even with the lifting of further exchange controls in mid-1996 - meant to 
soothe foreign and local investors - capital flight intensified and the rand kept 
crashing, leading business leaders to call for still further, faster liberalisation. The 
Finance Ministry could pursue what were widely recognised by orthodox 
commentators as ‘sound economic policies’, yet it was mainly hot money that 
erratically flooded in and out… 
(Bond, 2014: 63-64) 
 
Ultimately, at the time of transition, global neoliberalism demanded local obedience 
to governance by capital. Agents of capital, many of whom were embedded within the state 
and even in the transitional policy makers’ circles, convinced Mandela and Mbeki to “talk 
left” overtly, but covertly “walk right.” While select parts of the ANC profited from 
liberalization of the economy, and the many departing White economists and financial 
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executives were replaced by Black employees who became well-paid pro-capitalists, the vast 
majority of the population simply stayed almost as wretched as they had been before. Elite 
White South African capitalists retained significant power, and the many Black South 
Africans and politicians who ascended to power became a new form of elite. In a global lens, 
South Africa’s “democratization” under Contemporary Globalization shares much in 
common with Chile post-Allende in the 1970s under Pinochet, or Russia and eastern 
European states post-USSR in the 1990s.  
...selling out the poor and working classes on behalf of international finance was also 
the general fate of so many labour and social democratic parties… 
Even where once-revolutionary parties remained in control of the nation-state - 
China, Vietnam, Angola, and Mozambique, for instance - ideologies wandered over 
to hard, raw capitalism. 
(Bond, 2014: 161)  
 
In all of these cases, an influx of “hot capital” with re-regulation in favor of 
maximizing only a select number of industries’, institutions’, and individuals’ profitability 
led to massive privatization, erratic FDI, and occasionally good GDP growth. It also yielded 
the curses of neoliberalism: market instability, persistent inequality, the defunding of public 
services, such as education and healthcare, and the excessive influence of profitable firms 
and their agents on the state and policymakers. 20 years after "democratization" supposedly 
ended minority rule, but it would seem that governance by capital has yielded negligible 
changes to material quality of life. See Tables 3.4-3.5 for textual data sets, and Graphs 3.1-
3.2 for visual data sets.  
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TABLE 3.4: South Africa Nation State Critical Economic Indicators, 1990-2014 
Indicator 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
I-HDI Value 0.72 0.733 0.696 0.604 0.621 0.666 
GDP, Total, $Billion 349.7 365 418.8 505.5 593 641.4 
GDP, Annual % Change -2.3 0.895 1.65 3.88 1.52 0.079 
GDP, Per Capita 9934.8 9331.4 9519.1 10610.7 11650.8 12105.6 
GNI, Per Capita 9987 9566 9719 10935 11833 12122 
FDI, Net Inflows, % of 
GDP -0.1 0.8 0.7 2.5 1 2.1 
Inflation, GDP Deflator, 
Annual % Change 15.5 10.2 8.8 5.45 6.35 5.8 
Unemployment, % of 
Total Labor Force 24.5 16.9 26.7 23.8 24.7 25.1 
Youth Unemployment, % 
of Labor Force Ages 15-24, 
Male-Female Combined 
Average 
48.65 33.6 45.55 48.95 51.2 52.95 
All values are in terms of 2011 PPP$, unless otherwise noted. 
Source(s):  
World Bank; Statistics South Africa; United Nations Development Programme; UNDP Human Development 
Report 2015 
 
TABLE 3.5: South Africa Nation-State Critical Inequality and Poverty Indicators, 1993-2011 
1993 1995 2000 2005 2008 2011 1993 
GINI Index 59.3 63 57.8 64.8 63 63.4 
Absolute Poverty, $1.90 
per Day, % of Population 31.9 34.9 35.2 35.2 15.1 16.6 
Absolute Poverty, $3.10 
per Day, % of Population 49.2 52.7 52.5 44.6 33.3 34.7 
All values are in terms of 2011 PPP$, unless otherwise noted. 
Source(s):  
World Bank; Statistics South Africa; United Nations Development Programme; UNDP Human Development 
Report 2015  
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GRAPH 3.1A: 1990-2014 South Africa Nation-State Inequality, I-HDI Value  
 
GRAPH 3.1B: 1993-2014 South Africa Nation-State Inequality, GINI Index  
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GRAPH 3.2: 1990-2014 South Africa Nation-State Unemployment 
 
 
GRAPH 3.3: 1993-2011 South Africa Nation-State Absolute Poverty 
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As indicated by Tables 3.5 and 3.6, alongside Graphs 3.1A-B and Graphs 3.2A-B, the 
economic stagnation of South Africa post-1994 has resulted in very real, quantifiable, and 
qualifiable suffering that remains comparable to that of Apartheid. Even disregarding less 
widely-accepted indicators such as Youth Unemployment and the “around x$ a day” poverty 
line, in terms of every major, conservative economic indicator, the material quality of life in 
South Africa has remained almost the same as it was in the early 1990s.  
Almost every indicator above has flatlined; the Inequality-Adjusted Human 
Development Index (IHDI) indicator has barely changed, nor has its GINI Index (inequality) 
value. While Absolute Poverty, both in terms of surviving on “less than $2 a day” or on 
“around $3 a day” has relatively decreased, it remains staggeringly high at around 15% and 
35%, respectively. Modest decreases in Absolute Poverty are offset by relatively increased 
unemployment. Adult and Youth Unemployment have remained at crisis levels for at least 20 
years, with over half of young people unemployed, exacerbating the risk of crime and long-
term depressed income.  
For the majority of South Africa’s population surviving in bare life, impoverished, 
unemployed, illiterate, uneducated, and unable to access healthcare, there has been little 
material change post-1994. In this way, despite all of the noteworthy praise for the overthrow 
of de jure Apartheid, disarmament of White Supremacy, and claims to democratization, there 
has sadly been only continued existence of wretchedness. For most, there was no actual 
transition from minority rule - except upon the shift from elite rule on the basis of race to 
elite rule on the basis of capital. Because of neoliberalism, South Africa has simply shifted to 
ruled by an elected, wealthy, multiracial elite, as opposed to its historical rule by an 
unelected, wealthy, uni-racial White elite. This elite transition, from racial to class apartheid, 
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from de jure and de facto Apartheid to covert, de facto apartheid of a different sort, to covert 
authoritarianism, occurred because of Contemporary Globalization’s multivarious processes 
of global neoliberalization. Rather than “freedom” or “democracy” spreading worldwide and 
leveling the playing field, there has been reinforcement of global apartheid between the 
Global North and West and the Global South. Now, state and non-state forces, agents of 
capital, academics, and perhaps worst of all, common sense, all assert that there is no 
alternative to capitalist-realist, neoliberalized, procedural democracy.  
South Africa: Thabo Mbeki and the Post-9/11 Global War on Terror 
The USA exploited its global hegemony in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by 
coercing many states to adopt, if not the USA’s policies, at least the USA’s discourse around 
state violence, terrorism, and security. The USA-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and 
Iraq in 2003, as part of the Bush Regime’s GWOT, ostensibly legitimized massive state 
military and surveillance action around the world, under the auspices of securing 
“democracy” in the form of a capitalist-realist nation-state with stable economic growth.  
As noted before, the UNSCR vote against Iraq did not stop Iraq from being invaded. 
The USA, the UK, Poland, and Australia committed overt invasion and occupation that 
technically violated international law and the UN. While only those 4 states contributed 
military personnel, the USA coerced at least 45 others into publicly signing onto the idea of 
its invasion to legitimize it. While this may have been more of a “coalition of the billing,” 
(McClure, 2003) the “shilling,” Ali, 2004) and/or the “bribed and bullied,” (Newnham, 
2008), these states subscribed to the rhetoric of being “willing” to overtly invade, occupy, 
and restructure a state for the purpose of establishing a capitalist-realist regime, and they 
profited from this process while “helping to vindicate the American military action.” 
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(Althaus and Leetaru, 2012) While torture, as opposed to military force, is not detailed here, 
the USA’s widespread legalization and application of what most of the world overtly 
denounces additionally exemplifies the de facto rules of the international community: the 
USA does what it wants, because might makes right.  
While I’ve addressed USA-driven global militarization generally, in terms of Africa 
specifically, the establishment of USA’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) is an important 
development directly related to the GWOT, which this thesis considers a major component of 
the contemporary global order. South Africa was a vocal opponent of AFRICOM being 
established at all, and especially against it being established in an African locale. Because of 
South Africa’s influence in the AU, and Gaddafi’s then influence in it, the AU strongly 
opposed AFRICOM. As such, AFRICOM was established in Germany, not anywhere on the 
actual continent of Africa.  
On the one hand, this could be seen as an effective use of complex interdependence 
mitigating militarization and the USA’s global hegemony. On the other hand, despite this, the 
post-9/11 USA military action across Africa has gradually increased as ostensibly religious, 
“tribalist,” extremist, non-state terrorist threats have increased during the GWOT. In fact, 
what the USA has done with AFRICOM under the GWOT is little more than an overt and 
now fully-legitimized re-iteration for Contemporary Globalization of the USA’s support of 
strongmen such as Pinochet or Mobutu during the Cold War. The difference now is that most 
of the influential forces on the planet agree that there is no alternative to capitalism. Now, the 
USA holds greater political and cultural power, in addition to a discourse in their favor about 
how applying military and economic violence to secure profitability is legitimate.  
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FIGURE 3.2: 2014 Map of Overt USA Military Operations in Africa 
 
 
Source(s):  
Taylor, A. and Karklis, L. (2014) “MAP: The U.S. military currently has troops in these African countries,” The 
Washington Post (May 21, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/21/map-the-
u-s-currently-has-troops-in-these-african-countries/. Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Nash Holdings LLC.   
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FIGURE 3.3: 2014 Map of Alleged Covert Military Operations in Africa 
 
Source(s):  
Nick Turse and @Tom Engelhardt, “Tomgram: Nick Turse, AFRICOM’s Gigantic ‘Small Footprint’,” 
www.TomDispatch.com, September 5, 2013, http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175743.  
 
Nick Turse, “The USA Carried out 674 Military Operations in Africa Last Year. Did You Hear About Any of 
Them?” The Nation, April 14, 2015. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/us-carried-out-674-military-operations-africa-last-year-did-you-hear-about-
any-them/   
 
David Wiley, “US Military Averaging More than a Mission a Day in Africa,” www.AfricaMilitarismWatch.org, 
March 28, 2014, http://africamilitarismwatch.org/2014/03/us-mil-averaging-more-than-a-mission-a-day-in-
africa/.  
 
Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Weighs Base for Spy Drones in North Africa,” The New York Times, January 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/us/us-plans-base-for-surveillance-drones-in-northwest-africa.html?_r=0.  
 
Craig Whitlock, “U.S. expands secret intelligence operations in Africa,” The Washington Post, June 13, 2012, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations-in-
africa/2012/06/13/gJQAHyvAbV_story.html.   
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These sub-state threats classified as “terrorism” and mandating now-legitimate USA 
or South Africa intervention largely expanded and diversified after the invasions and 
destabilizations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Interventions by the USA have occurred almost 
everywhere on the continent with great frequency, except Southern Africa. In northern 
Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has expanded in Algeria and Mali, and the 
USA’s policies of intervention have resulted in a failed state, civil war, and widespread 
terrorism in Libya - along with the de facto toppling of long-time anti-capitalist Gaddafi. In 
eastern Africa, Al Shabab has expanded in Somalia and Kenya. In central Africa, Seleka and 
Anti-Balaka militias and terrorist groups have expanded in Central African Republic (CAR). 
In each of these instances, the USA has had an opportunity to deploy more military forces in 
Africa, either directly or through peacekeepers, allied nation-states’ militaries, or private 
security initiatives. With each deployment, profitable capital flows have been maintained, not 
the least of which are those connected to USA arms manufacturers and other agents of 
military-industrial complexes.  
SADC: Regional Integration, Complex Interdependence, and Capitalist-Realism 
Sweeping discourses centered on the state’s legitimate use of violence in the form of 
surveillance, the police, and the military to stop alleged terrorists extended to Southern 
Africa. Post-1994, South Africa joined the international community, was affirmed as a 
member of the Commonwealth of Nations, and had significant political, social, and cultural 
clout due to the figureheads of Mandela, the ANC, and others’ long fight against apartheid 
and colonialism. South Africa, colloquialized as “The Rainbow Nation,” and legitimized 
locally and globally, was dubbed a democratic authority and representative of Africa’s 
potential development. In 1994, South Africa possessed the largest economy on the continent 
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of Africa and the region of Southern Africa. Its military remained formidable. Its population 
boasted a large, liberated, pro-African culture - and media exports. As such, South Africa 
possessed simultaneous military, economic, and cultural dominance - the three qualifiers for 
being hegemonic.  
Similar to Apartheid South Africa, the Rainbow Nation became a regional proponent 
of capitalist-realism. Largely through its integration into, and dominance of, the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), South Africa began reinforcing the authority of 
states, rule of law, as well as pro-capital regional integration, replacing its former Pan-
African socialism with belief in complex interdependence. While not promoting all of the the 
same ideologies as apartheid-era designs for CSAS, South Africa’s domination of SADC, 
and expansion of the Southern African Customs Union, (SACU) reflected its increasingly 
neoliberalized, though not overtly racist, economic restructuring of the region and 
enrichment of its own state power at the expenses of other African states and peoples in the 
region. See Figures 3.4.A-3.4.B, Graphs 3.4.A-3.7.D, and Table 3.6.  
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FIGURE 3.4.A: Map of SADC, SACU, Southern Africa, Overlay 
 
 
Source(s):  
Wikimedia User "Htonl," a DA Employee ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Htonl   
Wikimedia User “Mrtimothyirvine,” ; https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Mrtimothyirvine  
SADC History http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/  
SADC Treaty http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf  
WTO SACU Secretariat Report https://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp213_e.htm 
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FIGURE 3.4.B: Map of SADC, Political Detail 
 
Source(s):  
SADC (2011) Regional Agricultural Policy Review Report.  
http://www.sadc.int/files/7113/5293/3509/Regional_Agricultural_Policy_Review_Reports_2011.pdf Accessed 
06/20/2016. South Africa: SADC. 
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GRAPH 3.4.A: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Armed Forces Personnel, Disaggregated Percentages 
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GRAPH 3.4.B: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Population, Disaggregated Percentages 
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GRAPH 3.4.C: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, Aggregate 
Percentages 
 
GRAPH 3.4.D: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, 
Disaggregated Absolutes 
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GRAPH 3.5.A: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, Aggregate 
Percentages 
 
GRAPH 3.5.B: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, 
Disaggregated Absolutes 
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GRAPH 3.6.A: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, GDP, Disaggregated Absolutes, $B  
 
 
GRAPH 3.6.B: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, FDI, Disaggregated Absolutes, $B 
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GRAPH 3.6.C: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, GDP, Aggregate Percentages  
 
GRAPH 3.6.D: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, FDI, Aggregate Percentages 
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GRAPH 3.7.A: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, GDP, Disaggregated Absolutes, $B 
 
 
 
GRAPH 3.7.B: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, FDI, Disaggregated Absolutes, $B  
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GRAPH 3.7.C: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, GDP, Aggregated Percentages  
 
 
GRAPH 3.7.D: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, FDI, Aggregated Percentages  
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TABLE 3.6: South Africa and SADC Military and Economic Power Disparities  
 
Population, 
Total, 1995 
Armed Forces 
Personnel, 
Total, 1995 
% Total SADC 
Armed Forces 
Personnel, 1995 
% Total SADC 
GDP, 1995 
GDP, 
Total, 
$b,  
1995 
FDI, 
Net 
Inflow, 
$b,  
1995 
% Total 
SADC 
FDI, Net 
Inflow, $b, 
1995 
SADC, All 11 Member 
States, 1995 122,913,000 568,900 100.0% 100.0% 191.751 2.65584 100.0% 
SADC, 4 Most Powerful 
Member States, 1995 82,000,000 502,800 88.4% 90.1% 173 2 73.7% 
South Africa 39,100,000 277,000 48.7% 81.1% 155.46 1.248 47% 
Angola 13,000,000 122,000 21.5% 2.6% 4.968 0.472 18% 
Botswana 1,580,000 8,500 1.5% 2.5% 4.731 0.0704 3% 
Lesotho 1,750,000 2,000 0.4% 0.4% 0.859 0.275 10% 
Malawi 9,820,000 9,500 1.7% 0.7% 1.397 0.00564 0% 
Mozambique 15,900,000 12,000 2.1% 1.3% 2.522 0.045 2% 
Namibia 1,650,000 8,100 1.4% 2.1% 3.942 0.153 6% 
Swaziland 963,000 3,000 0.6% 0.9% 1.699 0.0518 2% 
Tanzania 29,900,000 36,000 6.4% 2.7% 5.255 0.12 5% 
Zambia 9,250,000 23,000 4.1% 2.0% 3.807 0.097 4% 
Zimbabwe 11,700,00 67,800 11.9% 3.7% 7.111 0.118 4% 
DRC 42,200,000 65,100 0.0% 0.0% 5.841 -0.0224 0% 
 
Population, 
Total, 2014 
Armed Forces 
Personnel, 
Total, 2014 
% Total SADC 
Armed Forces 
Personnel, 2014 
% Total  
SADC GDP, 
2014 
GDP, 
Total, 
$b, 2014 
FDI, 
Net 
Inflow, 
$b, 
2014 
% Total 
SADC 
FDI, Net 
Inflow, $b, 
2014 
SADC, All 15 Member 
States, 2014 312,560,000 507,440 100.0% 100.0% 680.722 18.5129 100% 
SADC, 5 Most Powerful 
Member States, 2014 220,200,000 412,500 81.3% 84.0% 571.66 9.96 53.8% 
South Africa 54,100,000 82,300 16.2% 51.4% 349.873 5.792 31.3% 
Angola 24,200,000 117,000 23.1% 18.6% 126.775 1.922 10.4% 
DRC 74,900,000 134,000 26.4% 4.8% 32.782 -0.344 -1.9% 
Tanzania 51,800,000 28,400 5.6% 7.1% 48.03 2.045 11.0% 
Zimbabwe 15,200,000 50,800 10.0% 2.1% 14.197 0.545 2.9% 
South Africa, Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and DRC are bolded and highlighted to emphasize regional 
power. SADC total values do not double-add; 1995 numbers do not add DRC to SADC totals. All values are 
in terms of 2011 PPP$, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Source(s):  
World Bank; OECD; SIPRI; International Institute for Strategic Studies; CCR;  
 
  
 
 
220 
As the above Figures, Graphs, and Tables detail: South Africa remains the 
overwhelming regional power within Southern Africa and SADC, through persistent, 
significant economic and military power advantages relative to other member states. While 
there has been a significant decrease in the number of armed forces personnel within South 
Africa, relative to each other individual state, South Africa remains evenly balanced. When 
factoring in the history of the professional military in South Africa, alongside its economic 
resources, there reduced military personnel still rival that of the other most powerful SADC 
member states. Even with the relatively greater population and armed forces personnel of the 
DRC, the persistent economic dominance of South Africa’s economy in terms of relative and 
absolute FDI and GDP mitigate the DRC’s potential influence within SADC.  
Recognizing that under governance by capital and the new, covert authoritarianism in 
which South(ern) Africa is situated, South Africa’s might would appear to make it right, too. 
With newfound authority and clear regional hegemony, South Africa could legitimately use 
violence against terrorists or other sub-state combatants in order to secure state power, the 
rule of law, and profitable capital flows. Since 1994, SANDF has been involved in at least a 
half a dozen inter-state conflicts under the auspices of peacekeeping. Most notable are the 
direct SANDF unilateral interventions in the name of state stability in Lesotho in 1996, (de 
Coning, 2000) and multilateral intervention in the DRC in 1999 with the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, which continues as of 2016, under the auspices of UN peacekeeping.  
From 1999 to 2008, the Mbeki Regime and ANC governed South Africa during a 
period of further stagnation of South Africa’s material quality of life, concomitant with 
accelerating global, regional, and local neoliberalization. The Mbeki Regime marks a clear 
bridge between the initial, hopeful, post-1994 Mandela-era of the Rainbow Nation, and 
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today’s increasingly unequal and violent South Africa. Mbeki exemplified Bond’s theory of 
“Talk Left, Walk Right” by being one of the most visible figureheads of supporting an 
“African Renaissance,” or moving beyond Africa’s Lost Decade and ostensibly tribalist 
violence. Mbeki’s demeanor and British education simultaneously represented African 
respectability, as well as assimilation into Eurocentric, capitalist-realist concepts of education 
and success.  
The Mbeki regime, while publicly denouncing “global apartheid” and disparities 
between the Global South and Global North and West, ultimately furthered neoliberalism in 
South Africa by reducing state spending, increasing “de-regulation,” and fully shifting South 
Africa away from social democracy, towards market fundamentalism - despite rhetoric to the 
alternative. If Mandela et. al., in capitulation to agents of global capital, laid a pro-capitalist 
foundation of post-1994 South Africa with a compromised RDP and development plans, then 
Mbeki, and later Zuma, built up the neoliberal house. Mbeki was instrumental in talking up 
the potential of South Africa despite neoliberal globalization, and ensuring a high regional 
visibility through SADC and the AU. Mbeki’s flagship diplomacy in their regional 
hegemony was known as “soft diplomacy” with Zimbabwe, where Mbeki supported state 
authority at the expense of suppression of both anti-capital and pro-capital sub-state 
dissidents. This ultimately perpetuated widespread perception of the Mbeki and Mugabe 
Regimes as corrupt, undemocratic, and unable to govern a capitalist-realist state, 
notwithstanding the long exploitation of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa by colonial 
and neocolonial forces.  
Possibly the worst moments for the Mbeki regime came with the peak of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Mmbeki’s speculation that HIV/AIDS was not a viral infection 
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tarnished his reputation, although he emphasize the connection between poverty and poor 
healthcare and overall quality of life. A major win for fighting HIV/AIDS came about 
through public pressure led by non-state forces, such as the NGO Medicins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) (French;English: Doctors Without Borders) to circumvent international capitalist 
copyright laws, empowering South Africa and other hard-hit states to important Brazil-
produced generic anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). (Babovic and Wasan, 2010) One of the most 
significant interactions between South Africa and the USA in this time period was the 2003 
creation by the USA of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). 
PEPFAR was both a public relations project to humanize the Bush regime through promoting 
the image of “compassionate conservatism,” especially after the drawn-out fights over access 
to generic ARVs, opposed by profit-seeking pharmaceutical corporations. Additionally, 
PEPFAR was an attempt to alleviate the impact of HIV/AIDS on emerging economies and 
workforces to aid  capitalist-realist development.  
As the 2000s rolled onward, Mbeki accelerated South Africa’s privatization, market 
liberalization, poor growth, delays or failures in land reform and basic needs projects, poor 
education, and healthcare failures. The majority of the population remained trapped in 
poverty through low-paying service jobs, while a minority, especially those in government or 
finance, maintained high-paying jobs. Additionally, South Africa’s economic dependence on 
extractivism for a major part of its economy expanded, rather than decreased (Bond, 2014b) 
while South Africa greenwashed its behavior through rhetoric about the importance of 
addressing global climate change.  
However, the USA’s, the EU’s, and China’s economies especially thrived, and global 
capital around the world accrued and increased due to financialization and the ever-profitable 
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military-industrial(-academic) complex of the USA. This prosperity erratically extended 
somewhat to Southern Africa, now playing by the rules of capitalism. 1995 and 2005 
especially saw relatively high year-to-year GDP growth and decreasing unemployment. 
Unfortunately, while the profits of neoliberalism were erratic, its violence appeared ready to 
stay indefinitely.  
South Africa: Jacob Zuma and the Global Capital Crisis 
As the Global Capital Crisis began with the 2007 bubble’s burst, Southern and South 
Africa experienced democratic and economic stagnation, alongside ideological fractures. The 
2008 Mbeki to Zuma Regime change in 2008 represented this fracture, and further 
neoliberalization, as Mbeki’s neoliberal house was not quite as luxurious as Zuma’s mansion. 
After a 2007-2008 probe into Zuma as possibly corrupt, which Mbeki allegedly 
mishandled, the ANC began to impeach Mbeki, who capitulated to prevent a drawn out crisis 
in South Africa. Then-Secretary General of the ANC, and former MK member, Kgalema 
Motlanthe, a Zuma loyalist, succeeded Mbeki and effectively served as acting President until 
the following election. In 2008, the ANC again won reelection by a large margin. Zuma 
became President and appointed Motlanthe as Deputy President. Ramaphosa became an 
ANC party executive, until their 2014 appointment to Deputy President, replacing Motlanthe, 
who failed in a 2012 challenge to replace Zuma as president.  
Zuma’s past included entrance into the ANC via the SACP, and then MK, which 
yielded 10 years imprisonment on Robben Island alongside Mandela. Zuma’s post-
incarceration time was dedicated to strengthening the ANC and anti-apartheid resistance, 
mostly in Mozambique. He had no formal education, but extensive informal education in 
KwaZulu-Natal, as well as military training with MK. Zuma’s post-1994 political career 
 
 
224 
could almost be defined by scandal and controversial allegations of corruption. Zuma, always 
a high-level ANC party loyalist, faced a 2005 rape trial resulting in acquittal, as well as the 
above-mentioned corruption probe, resulting in acquittal, related to governmental arms deals 
and fraud. Zuma’s questionable challenge to, and replacement of, Mbeki was a self-serving 
act that mirrored most of their political career: technically legal, and highly profitable.  
Allegations of corruption and mismanagement continued to circulate amongst the 
party under Zuma’s leadership, and the ANC’s influence began to see some potential threats 
in other parties. In 2008, the Congress of the People (COPE) split from the ANC, and in the 
2009 general elections the main post-1994 opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), a 
combination of various opposition groups, including remnants of the old NP, won over 20% 
of the general vote. Another significant internal power struggle in the ANC arose out of the 
ANC Youth League (ANC-YL) that was historically a strong source of new recruits and 
politicians for the ANC. The ANC-YL was led from 2008 to 2012 by Julius Malema, whose 
intense anti-capitalist comments on land redistribution were often characterized as too 
radical. Malema’s ardent anti-Whiteness and anti-White Supremacy was often qualified as 
hate speech and inciting violence. In 2013, after being censured repeatedly, Malema left the 
ANC-YL to found the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and focus on a platform of 
aggressive socialist resource redistribution, marking the EFF as more radical and farther to 
the left of the ANC.  
Elections in 2014 and 2016 elections were significant because they represented a true 
post-Mandela South Africa, not only since they were the first since Mandela’s death. Instead, 
the optimism and pride in an “African Renaissance” had, like the economy, stagnated. 
Scandals, corruption, unemployment, and inequality dampened hope. The Tripartite Alliance 
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between the ANC, COSATU, and SACP became more and more strained. In the 2014 
national elections, the EFF captured over 6% of the vote, winning recognition and seats in 
the national legislature, and the DA captured 16%. The ANC retained a majority and 
landslide victory with 62% of the votes. In the 2016 sub-national (district, metropolitan, and 
provincial elections) elections, for the first time in history, the ANC overall received under 
60% of votes at all levels. Only four district councils did the ANC win 61% of all votes. 
Across all of the Western Cape, the DA won a majority or plurality control of municipalities.  
FIGURE 3.5: South Africa’s National Assembly Composition, by Party 
   
Text Description(s): 
Graphic visualizing change over time in the composition of South Africa's National Assembly. Solid vertical 
lines denote elections. Dashed vertical lines denote "floor-crossing" periods. Furthest-right solid vertical line 
indicates constitutionally-mandated election in April–July 2019.  
ANC: African National Congress; (N)NP: (New) National Party;  
DP/DA: Democratic Party or Democratic Alliance; COPE: Congress of the People;  
IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party; UDM: United Democratic Movement;  
EFF: Economic Freedom Fighters 
Source(s):  
Wikimedia User "Htonl," a DA Employee ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Htonl  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Assembly_(South_Africa)_party_composition_history.svg 
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Everywhere except the Western Cape, the ANC remained in power, though by 
slimmer margins, and with more visible and more viable challengers, than ever before. 
Protests and scrutiny increased on Zuma and the ANC, with two severe recent scandals. One, 
“Guptagate,” included revelations of ongoing, mutually-profitable, but technically legal 
exchanges between Zuma and a wealthy Indian family with ties to high-tech IT, media, and 
extractive firms. Another, “Nkandlagate,” included revelations that Zuma’s private mansion 
had been upgraded with military-grade security systems, a helipad, and medical facility, at 
the cost of over 200m ZAR (over 15m USD, using 2011$PPP) paid for by various 
government bodies. Simultaneously, and contradictorily, Malema’s own publicly-funded 
private mansion prompted a scandal, but was considered resolved when it was auctioned and 
purchased by a wealthy ANC party member. Not only had Mandela died, in a way 
abandoning the ANC and South Africa to survive neoliberalism without his political power, 
but so had Desmond Tutu publicly denounced the ANC after a lifetime of support.  
2011: Marikana Massacre, Turning Point(?)  
It is true that South Africa has not visibly adopted all of the USA-driven rhetoric on 
terrorism, terrorists, and the disavowal of all wrongdoing by a presumably democratic state. 
In the DRC, Zimbabwe, and with its own extractive-industrial complexes, however, South 
Africa has very visibly applied military force, through militarized domestic police and 
internationally through SADC- or AU-legitimized interventions, to secure state stability, and 
simultaneous profitability. Recent rhetoric and behavior of the state, especially in the case of 
the Marikana Massacre, perilously mirrors the repressive discourse of Apartheid South 
Africa, only now situated within the USA’s neoliberal logics of securing profits at all cost.  
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One of, if not the, most visible and important events of contemporary, post-1994, 
post-9/11, South Africa under the Global Capital Crisis was the 2012 Marikana Massacre. 
Drawing upon “abyssal thinking,” “coloniality,” and “non-being,” Ndlovu (2011) offers my 
preferred description of the context of the platinum miners who went on strike to demand 
safer conditions, better pay, and an end to their “hell.”  
What can be understood about the black population in South Africa is that the large 
majority belong to the zone of non-being that is generally characterised by hellish 
living conditions, such as low wages, hard labour, squalid accommodation and 
premature death….in almost all private sectors of the economy, whites constitute 
management/ownership, while blacks are the source of cheap labour...according to 
the mineworker, the command to shoot the protestors [sick] came from a white 
man… 
instead of regretting the death of human beings, the state/capital became concerned 
about how ‘investor confidence’ would be affected, this means that the identity of a 
‘black body’ lacks the required ‘ontological density’ to warrant regret, even after 
being violated. Thus, after the Marikana massacre the state (together with capital) 
sought to exonerate itself… 
 
Coloniality as a murderous structure has survived by hiding, which means there is a 
need to reveal its location and presence by employing a decolonial approach. 
 
While there is no disputing that the persons who committed the Marikana massacre 
and the Sharpeville massacre (in 1960) were South African police officers acting on 
behalf of the state, the target has always remained the black population.  
Thus, although the composition of the police force which committed the Sharpeville 
massacre was predominantly white, while those  who presided over the Marikana 
massacre were predominantly black, the target of the massacre has remained the 
same.  
What this shows is that the structure of coloniality is a racist one.  
(Ndlovu, 2011: 55-56, 53, 54) 
 
Alexander (2014) can supplement this with the following specifics about the LonMin 
platinum miners specifically in 2010 and 2011.  
...risks intensified by pressure to work in hazardous locations; the arduous character 
of work, which often, because of production targets, included shifts lasting 12 hours 
or more; doubled-up bodies endlessly shaken by heavy drills; artificial air full of dust 
and chemicals; high levels of sickness, including TB; and managers (often white) 
who were disrespectful and adversarial.  
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In many cases workers were caught in a debt trap, leading to forced deductions from 
wages and payments to micro-lenders and lawyers that left some workers paying 15 
times the value of their original loan (Bond 2012).  
Income was further stretched by the need to support old and unemployed dependants, 
and, since most workers were oscillating migrants with two families, costs were often 
doubled.  
Housing conditions were generally abysmal.  
In 2010 Lonmin admitted that half the people living within 15 km of its mines lived 
in informal housing, and a high proportion of these were miners and their families.  
 
Workers also complained about the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), to which 
most workers belonged before the strike.  
They mentioned its corruption and its collaboration with management... 
 
On 13 August, Frans Beleni, NUM’s general secretary, called for ‘the deployment of 
the Special Task Force or the South African Defence Force’ (Alexander et al. 2012, 
178).  
Three days later it was the task force that carried out the massacre.  
(Alexander, 2014: 3) 
  
LonMin miners began striking with demands for roughly $1,200 per month, or double 
to triple their current salaries of $450 to $650 per month, respectively. On the basis of this 
salary as their main income, they are not within the Absolute Poverty zone of surviving on $3 
per day or less. However, considering the miners’ support of unemployed family members, 
lack of reasonable union protection or representation, and incredibly high-risk occupations, 
they maintained an overall wretched quality of life despite a relatively lower-middle class 
income, with few to no opportunities to be employed in any other capacity.  
It should be reiterated that Cyril Ramaphosa, who founded NUM in 1982, sat on the 
board of LonMin during 2011, while also serving as the second highest party official in the 
ANC. It should also be noted that on August 15, Ramaphosa sent emails to the board asking 
for actions against the miners, whose strike he labeled as “dastardly criminal” behavior. 
(Smith, 2012)  LonMin’s 2014 reported net revenue was $965m, with net income of $204m 
and operating income of $52m. LonMin is a combination of “London” and “Rhodesian 
Mining and Land Company,” which was incorporated in the UK in 1909.  
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On August 16, 2011, 34 miners were shot to death by Black, mixed race, and White 
South African Police; 78 others were wounded, and 2 other strike protesters had been killed 
in the week leading up to the Marikana Massacre. According to Rhodes Must Fall’s 
memorial to the murdered, a leader of the strike, MgCineni “Mambush” Noki was “shot 14 
times by the police, including in his head, neck, legs, button, elbow, calf, and thighs.”4 The 
details of the massacre are as follows:  
There is no doubt that police gunfire was the immediate cause of the massacre. The 
police killed all 34 men (and no police were injured)....The strikers had been sitting 
peacefully on and around the mountain when the police reeled out razor wire in front 
of them.  
Fearful of being penned in, they began to leave the area, most walking northwards in 
the direction of Nkaneng, the nearby informal settlement where many of them lived.  
Video footage shows that the workers were not running and not a threat to the police. 
It was at this point that the police started shooting. Only then did the men begin to 
run, but they were scattering, not charging at the police. At some point, a middle-
ranking officer tells his men to shoot if they feel threatened, which, in the context, can 
be interpreted as permission to kill.  
Within a few seconds, 20 strikers were shot dead by task team gunfire… 
 
Many workers then retreated towards a low koppie about 300 metres west of the 
mountain. Here they were surrounded, and a further 14 were slaughtered.... 
14 of the 34 dead men were shot in the back or the back of their head... 
These task teams were armed only with automatic weapons loaded with sharp 
ammunition, making it almost inevitable that workers would be killed.  
Indeed, the police ordered four mortuary vehicles early on the morning of the killings, 
so they were expecting deaths to occur... 
(Alexander, 2014: 2, 3) 
 
In mid-June 2015, the South Africa national government publicly released and 
summarized the 600-page report by the judicial commission on the Marikana Massacre. This 
commission was created by South Africa President Jacob Zuma in August 2012, who 
appointed as chair Retired Supreme Court of Appeals Judge Ian Gordon Farlam. (South 
Africa Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2015)  Farlam is on the UCT 
                                                   
4 UCT: Rhodes Must Fall, (2015) August 16, 2015. Facebook.com. (August 16, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/a.1554076651534494.1073741825.1554073211534838/161
7121091896716/?type=3 Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.   
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Governing Council, and UCT has strategic investments in LonMin, as well as other 
extractive industries. The Marikana Massacre Report absolved ANC party elites, including 
then-South Africa Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa, and 2014-2016 South Africa Deputy 
President Cyril Ramophosa. (Smith, 2012)   The report’s strongest indictment of a politician 
was a recommendation of an inquiry into South Africa National Police Commissioner Riah 
Phiyega, and pointing out that the tactics selected by the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) were likely to result in bloodshed, if not better executed next time. On the one hand, 
the Marikana Commission Report yielded “a mood of profound disappointment in Marikana 
itself over what they saw as the commission’s failure to hold senior politicians to account.”  
Through a questionable, but technically legal, adjudication process, the state’s 
absolution of any wrongdoing or responsibility for massacring civilians furthered its official, 
legal use of deadly force. If the ANC government can keep the violence of Marikana 
invisible through official rhetoric of police simply dealing with terrorists or criminals, and 
only a few inquiries or reforms here or there, then the neoliberal system may continue 
undisturbed by the worst massacre since apartheid.  On the other hand, the attempt to 
invisibilize the Marikana Massacre poured fuel onto the hot rage at universities and around 
the country that Rhodes Must Fall and Open Stellenbosch had begun kindling in early 2015. 
This unprecedentedly tense and precarious situation, of awakening students, of disillusioned 
dreams, and of widespread wretchedness and perpetual slow violence is the context for 
2015’s eruption of the most significant, widespread, impactful, radical student protests in 
South Africa since the 1976 Soweto Student Uprisings.  
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FIGURE 4.0: Photograph of discarded protest sign; Profile Picture of UCT: Rhodes Must Fall 
 
Text Description(s): Dear history / this revolution / has women, gays, / queers & trans / remember that / 
#RhodesMustFall  
 
Source(s): UCT: Rhodes Must Fall and UCT: The Trans Collective. (2015) Profile picture. Facebook.com. 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/a.1554076651534494.1073741825.1554073211534838/170
4672829808208/?type=1&theater Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
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Introduction and Emergent Critical Themes  
Thus far, my thesis has presented a summary of South(ern) Africa’s global, colonial 
histories of (de)colonization, from modernity up through Contemporary Globalization. I have 
emphasized the ideas of violence and the issues of local and regional powers struggling 
against, and been both co-opted by, and in collusion with, global hegemons. I have hopefully 
clarified how these contests for power, legitimization, and ultimately authority have impacted 
the region of Southern Africa specifically, post-Cold War, through the post-9/11 Global War 
on Terror, and during the Global Capital Crisis. In this chapter, I bring these issues together 
with my brief history and analysis of contemporary protests and social movements in South 
Africa. Focusing on UCT’s Rhodes Must Fall (UCT:RMF) and SU’s Open Stellenbosch 
(OS) in late 2015 to early 2016, I argue that South Africa’s contemporary protests and social 
movements may be thematically understood as:  
1. Renewing the visibility of identity politics in terms of intersectionality, race, sex, 
gender, and class, in opposition to, and in conversation with, respectability politics 
2. Marginalized university students’ “leading” discourses and protests, and 
subsequently driving social movements with local, regional, and global impacts  
3. Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing against common 
sense narratives of The New South Africa, The Rainbow Nation, and so forth 
4. Performative and artistic protests re-centering narratives on violence and pain of 
Black and Brown bodies  
5. Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media  
 
The structure of this chapter consists of this brief introduction to this case study 
specifically, which includes the above above general reiteration of my critical premises and 
global, colonial histories. I then present a summary of critical events and images of the 
protests to date. As this history is for the completion of a Master’s-level thesis, it is an 
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inadequate and all-too-brief summary of RMF and OS.5 I have selected as many critical 
images as possible, that I argue are representative of the above themes I have identified. 
Following this visual and textual history, I conclude with by lead-in to final chapter: 
qualitative analyses and comparisons.  
 
Critical Events and Images from South Africa 
 
Pre-2015: High Tensions and Dissatisfaction  
2014 began amidst calls for protests, most visibly by Student Representative Councils  
(SRCs) on various campuses. Throughout the year, protests increase in number and intensity, 
but were not driven or led by university students or their demands/rhetoric. As early as 2014 
May, ""Remember Marikana” Stenciling/Graffiti appears, credited to a “collective of 
anonymous graffiti artists” called Tokolos Stencils who claim responsibility for 
stencilling/graffiting the UCT Rhodes Statue. See Figures 4.1.A-4.1.B.  
 
                                                   
5 Appendix B of this thesis provides hyperlinks to an ongoing project to historicize the movement, which has 
yielded hundreds of pages of footnoted, month-by-month documentation of events, beginning in late 2014. Due 
to its length and dynamic nature 
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FIGURE 4.1.A: “Remember Marikana” by Tokolos Stencils Art Collective 
 
Source(s):  
Tokolos Stencils Art Collective. (2015) Remember Marikana. (August 16, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/tokolosstencils/photos/a.629743910419633.1073741825.629743673752990/629743
923752965/?type=1&theater Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
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FIGURE 4.1.B: “Remember Marikana” Stenciling Upon the UCT Rhodes Statue 
 
Source(s):  
Cape Argus (2015) “What UCT’s Not Telling their first-years,” Independent Online, Cape Argus. (January 19, 
2015) http://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/what-ucts-not-telling-their-first-years-1806441#.VlDbAFWrR58 
Accessed 06/20/2016. South Africa: Independent Media Group.  
 
The 2015 academic year began in January with high tensions high, after 2014’s 
recognition as the most turbulent year of violent protests since 1994. (Chigwata, T.C., 
O'Donovan, M., and Powell, D.M., 2016)  NSFAS and higher education was already a 
visible, publicly-recognized, critical issue. Protests increase in intensity, originating at CPUT 
in the Western Cape, with SASCO and SRCs complementing some students staging sleep-in 
occupations of administration buildings. In early 2015 April, Rhodes Must Fall emerged.  
2015 March-April: “Rhodes Must Fall” at UCT; “Open Stellenbosch” at SU  
The initial event was a small protest of a few people, centered on Chumani Maxwele, 
with Wandile Kasibe serving as a documentarian who produced artistic and high resolution 
photographs of the protest. On March 9th, 2015, Maxwele, with signs reading "Exhibit: 
White Arrogance," perpetrated a highly visible, transgressive, and illegal act of heaving 
buckets of human excrement onto the Cecil Rhodes statue at UCT.  
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FIGURE 4.2.A: Chumani Maxwele throwing human feces on the UCT Rhodes Statue 
 
Source(s):  
Kasibe, W., Maxwele, C., and Bester, J. (2016) Protesters throw poo on Rhodes statue. (March 9, 2015) 
Facebook. http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/protesters-throw-poo-on-rhodes-statue-
1829526 Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
 
The statue occupied a highly visible location at the center of UCT, amidst the main 
staircase up the hill on which UCT is located, between the rugby field and a primary on-
campus student activities building, Jameson Hall. #RhodesMustFall emerged on social 
media. It rapidly spread throughout the UCT campus and became a massively popular in the 
streets uprising against "White Supremacy and privilege," driven by "the justified rage of 
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black students." The UCT:RMF collective asserted "the removal of the statue will not be the 
end of this movement, but rather the beginning of the decolonisation of the university....We 
want to state that we adopt an unequivocally intersectional approach to our struggle against 
racism..." Pressured by increasing student-driven protests and sharp critiques of the 
universities’ lack of post-1994 transformation, the UCT Council began deliberations on the 
future of the statue.  
FIGURE 4.2.B: “Rhodes Must Fall” crowd holding a banner and defacing UCT Rhodes Statue 
 
Source(s):  
Fekisi, L. and Vollenhoven, S. (2015) We Love UCT: Says student who covered Rhodes in shit. The Journalist. 
(March 25, 2015) http://www.thejournalist.org.za/spotlight/we-love-uct-says-student-who-covered-rhodes-in-
shit Accessed 06/20/2016. South Africa: The Journalist.  
 
In 2015 April, Rhodes’s statue fell, and Open Stellenbosch at emerged at SU. On 
April 9th, 2015, the Rhodes statue was removed while throngs of students watched, cheered, 
and documented the event. On April 10th, 2015, “approximately 50-70” students, led by 
Mbali Matandela, a Black South African woman and a UCT student, continued occupying 
the Bremner administration building. The students renamed it "Azania House," referring to 
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only by that name moving forward, and placing signs all over the building. The occupying 
UCT:RMF protesters declared they “want to encourage the university to engage with their 
mandate of transformation...the protests were always about addressing transformation at the 
university.”  
On April 16th, under 100 UCT students, largely comprised of members of the 
UCT:RMF collective, marched to and held a demonstration in front of a parliamentary 
building in Cape Town, in a protest that referenced Biko and Fanon to challenge “a Black 
government and White Supremacy.” The group demanded that “Afrophobia Must Fall” as 
they marched. Upon arrival at the government facilities, the small group is attacked and 
dispersed by security personnel using stun grenades. UCT Sociology Professor Xolela 
Mangcu said in an interview with The Times that "the university has made inroads with 
curriculum reform in faculties," especially focusing on creating “decolonized” Black Studies 
curricula, with the support of “Tom Moultrie, president of the UCT academics’ union.”  
Despite this, as of 2015 April, there was only one Black woman Professor at UCT. 
The explicitly youth-focused, alternative news site The Daily Vox ran an extensive piece by a 
UCT student, identifying “The movement after the statue” as including 5 key parts of 
UCT:RMF: 
● Decolonising the University 
● Moving Beyond UCT, to Other Campuses 
● Staying Student-Centric and Apolitical 
● Confronting Management 
● Being Transgressive 
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On April 15th, a student demonstration called “Who Belongs Here?” initiated what 
soon became Open Stellenbosch (OS). The collective soon identified itself through social 
media as:  
a group of students, staff and faculty working together to bring about change…[an] 
anti-racist, anti-sexist, non-partisan movement working in a space of deeply 
entrenched structural and institutional racism and patriarchy...the university 
management has consistently conceived of transformation in unproductive terms… 
FIGURE 4.2.C: “Open Stellenbosch” protesters, all in black, holding “I Can’t Breathe” signs in front of SU 
 
 
Source(s):  
Open Stellenbosch and The Citizen (2016) Stellies Students Protest Language Policies, The Citizen. (July 28, 
2016) http://connect.citizen.co.za/news/11577/stellies-students-protest-language-policy/ Accessed 06/20/2016.  
South Africa: The Citizen.  
 
The name itself was the core demand of this university student social movement and 
protest. “Open Stellenbosch,” demanded reforming an existing institution so that it is “open” 
and not “closed,” “inclusive” and not “exclusive,” and achieving this primarily by focusing 
on a language policy that shifts away from Afrikaans, towards English for all classes. This 
idea of the inclusivity of multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-partisan social movements, as well 
as an end goal of English language instruction, is the first ideological distinction between OS 
and UCT:RMF. UCT:RMF explicitly excluded non-whites in leadership circles, and always 
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asserted "decolonization" of society as the end goal - not "transformation" of the existing 
university or other institutions founded on British Imperial, colonial, or otherwise 
Eurocentric ideas.  
Additionally, OS immediately adopted USA-based protest demands such as “I can’t 
breathe,” the last words of Eric Garner before he was choked to death, on camera, by New 
York City police. UCT:RMF was wary of being too USA-centric, and skeptical of the 
growing Black Lives Matter movement as seeking integration into, rather than abolition of, 
the USA capitalist-realist system. Despite this, later April OS demonstrations were attended 
by UCT:RMF protesters, who declared solidarity with OS’s short-term goals, while noting 
divergent strategies and tactics. OS, like RMF, also created a robust online presence through 
social media accounts. These social media accounts maintained member anonymity, eased 
facilitating rapid local organizing, generated significant national online support in a short 
amount of time, and established the movement in the collective consciousness of university 
students in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, and elsewhere.  
In 2015 May, despite threats, both movements grew. UCT:RMF focused less on 
protests and instead on facilitating "plenaries," or teach-ins, that focused on intersectional, 
Pan-African, Black Feminism. Having been forced out of Azania House, UCT:RMF 
continued to occupy another building, consequently renamed "New Azania House," 
throughout the end of the month. OS meanwhile increased its activity through a series of 
demonstrations, and circulated images through social media and the physical SU campus to 
clearly explicate the demands outlined in their initial statements and interviews. In early 
May, highly visible OS spokesperson Sikhulekile Duma received a threatening and profane 
SMS. After searching social media for the sender’s phone number, they identified the sender 
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as SU Nuclear Physics Lecturer Anton Stander. Stellenbosch University immediately 
suspended the lecturer, temporarily. A May 10th statement from SU denounced protests thus 
far, by invoking student procedures and respectability politics, saying they were possibly 
unconstitutional and an act of intimidation.  
Like UCT:RMF, OS proceeded to facilitate a “lecture and workshop” on “The 
Decolonization of the University,” as well as other on-campus seminars and discussions 
regarding social movements and White Supremacy. OS very visibly demanded apologies for 
university suppression of dissent; they also focused public attention on an imminent removal 
of a significant on-campus plaque commemorating HF Verwoerd. On May 15th, SU fired 
Anton Stander, who admitted to threatening the student with racial slurs. Despite this, many 
other OS members beyond just Duma maintained they also received threats for their 
involvement, from other SU employees, and Stander’s “was [only] the first one which 
members were able to trace to a possible source.” On May 28th, the large and prominently 
displayed “H.F.” Verwoerd plaque was removed, 15 years after the 2000 renaming of a 
major university administration building that formerly was named after Verwoerd.  
In June, OS hosted an “Open Stellenbosch Student Congress” on South Africa’s 
national Youth Day, aiming to bring together students focused on institutionalizing social 
movements trying to transform universities and education. During this time, which was South 
Afria’s winter break, UCT:RMF visibly decreased its activity and went through internal re-
organization, and changed their profile pictures on social media to an image of a discarded 
protest sign that read: “Dear history, this revolution has women, gays, queers, & trans / 
remember that / #RhodesMustFall,” with the caption “Lest we ever forget.” See Figure 4.0 
above.  
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In late June, UCT administration attempted to take punitive action against over 200 
supporters or the UCT:RMF protests, centering around their occupation and obstruction of 
administrative offices. Additionally, in mid June, Rhodes Must Fall In Oxford (RMFO) 
begins its first protests at meetings against monuments still standing around Oxford 
University’s Oriel College. As noted earlier, the Marikana Commission Report absolved 
ANC party elites of the Marikana Massacre. Driven by UCT:RMF students, visible critiques 
emerge across South Africa regarding the the military-industrial-academic complexes, and 
the interconnections between extractive industries’ dominance of the economy, political 
parties that benefit from profitable extractivism, and universities who are governed in part by 
elite individuals involved with such mutually-profitable relationships. UCT:RMF updated its 
social media at the end of June with the Telekos Stencils “Remember Marikana” and 
Mambush graffiti. See FIGURE 4.1B for details. On June 28th, OS also updated its social 
media to reflect solidarity with Marikana. 
On July 22nd, 2015, the newly-created Decolonise UCT Law group announced a 
victory of sweeping law curricula reform. New curricula would include Mamdani, Mbembe, 
and African American critical race theorists - as previously, the curricula had not required 
this. On July 29th, OS staged a highly visible disruption of an SU career fair. This yielded 
significant administration and community backlash and threats against the collective, which 
usually manifested as racial slurs and notions of student being "disrespectful" or 
"unappreciative" of their "privilege" of living in Stellenbosch or attending SU.  
2015 August: “Remember Marikana” and “Max Price for Black Lives?”  
August 2015 marked a turning point and significant escalation by university students, 
especially UCT:RMF. August 16 marked the 3 year anniversary of the Marikana Massacre, 
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and UCT:RMF focused their protests against dehumanization of Black Africans by 
highlighting universities’, and specifically UCT’s, investments in White-, or USA- and/or 
UK-controlled, firms that exploit labor. On August 18th, UCT:RMF described the 
interconnections between universities, banks, extractive firms, and political parties as “the 
thinly veiled web of wealth, domination and violence that UCT has continuously benefited 
from since its establishment,” highlighting UCT’s retirement investments in LonMin mine, 
which operates in Marikana as of 2016.  
On August 16th, UCT:RMF publicly released a video detailing their allegations 
against UCT in relation to Marikana, LonMin, and (neo-)colonial extractive industries more 
generally, while calling students to action on an August 20th mass demonstration. From 
August 16th to the 17th, UCT:RMF undertook a massive stencilling/graffiting campaign 
across the campus, followed by a press conference attended by over a hundred students in 
Jameson Hall. The phrases “Remember Marikana”; “Max Price for Black Lives?”; “UCT is 
Anti-Black”; and “UCT Has LonMin Shares!” were graffitied on all of the most visible parts 
of campus. Tokolos Stencils’ artistic rendering of a photograph of the strike created one of 
the most iconic symbols of both UCT:RMF and post-Marikana protests: Mambush, raising 
his fist, clutching a spear, wearing a simple green blanket as a cloak, and opening his mouth 
in a scream. See Figure 4.1A.  
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FIGURE 4.1.A: “Remember Marikana” by Tokolos Stencils Art Collective 
 
Source(s):  
Tokolos Stencils Art Collective, Remember Marikana. (August 16, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/tokolosstencils/photos/a.629743910419633.1073741825.629743673752990/629743
923752965/?type=1&theater Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
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The UCT students’ use of Tokolos Stencils’ previously marginalized (and illegal, 
graffiti-based) image, in time with growing discontent beyond universities regarding the 
Marikana Report, drove an increasing, online, social media, and in-the-streets discussion. 
The demand was clear: “remember Marikana.” Recognize the worst massacre since 1994. 
Remember the ongoing exploitation of Black South Africans. And, driven by UCT:RMF, 
they insisted on connecting this ongoing exploitation to the overwhelming White-owned 
firms affiliated with extractivism.  
FIGURE 4.3.A: “Remember Marikana” and “Max Price for Black Lives” Stencils and Graffiti at UCT 
 
Source(s):  
UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) PICTURES: #RhodesMustFall PRESS CONFERENCE. Facebook.com. 
(August 17, 2016) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/?tab=album&album_id=1617870801821745 USA: 
Facebook.  
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FIGURE 4.3.B: 34 white crosses at “New Azania House,” close-up: memorial of MgCineni “Mambush” Noki 
 
Text description(s): 
“‘Mambush’ The Man in the Green Blanket; Mambush was from Twalikhulu in the Eastern Cape. He began 
working for Lonmin in 2009 and was a leader of the strike. On 16 August 2012 Mambush was killed at scene 1 
after being shot 14 times by the police, including in his head, neck, legs, buttock, elbow, calf, and thighs. He left 
behind his wife and five young children, as well as his sister and niece who also depended on him for financial 
support. According to his sister, Nolufefe Noki, ‘It was really painful to hear about my brother’s death. I have 
seen a doctor at the very least three times since his death. I was in a state of shock and was stressed. There is no 
one to look after us now that my brother is dead. My two sisters are married and live in their homes. I live here 
with my orphaned niece. We both depended on Mgcineni.’”  
Source(s):  
UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) August 17. Facebook.com. (August 17, 2016) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/?tab=album&album_id=1617870801821745 USA: 
Facebook.  
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On August 15th-16th, UCT:RMF facilitated another student occupation of New 
Azania House. On August 17th, in solidarity with the survivors and victims of the Marikana 
Massacre, Open Stellenbosch facilitated simultaneous protests with UCT:RMF at 
Stellenbosch University and UCT, respectively. They planted, in highly visible locations, 34 
white crosses for the 34 victims, alongside descriptions of the victims' families and deaths. 
On August 19th, Open Stellenbosch facilitated a screening of a recently-released 
documentary on the Marikana Massacre, Miners Shot Down (Desai, 2014).  
In addition to insisting that South Africa remember Marikana, they further demanded 
remembrance of the humanity of the miners murdered by police, as well as the shocking 
inhumanity of what could not be reasonably interpreted as justifiable force against the 
miners. On August 20th, UCT:RMF facilitated a visible and disruptive mass demonstration 
of up to five hundred students in the center of the campus next to Jameson Hall, near where 
the Rhodes Statue had formerly stood. During this August 20th action, a UCT:RMF member 
scaled the university main building and replaces the UCT and South Africa flags with the 
green blanket worn by Mambush, the Marikana Strike leader. See Figures 4.3C-4.3.D.  
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FIGURE 4.3.C: Screenshot of social media; close-up: Mambush’s green blanket on UCT flagpole 
 
Source(s):  
UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) Mambush’s blanket now flies above UCT #RememberingMarikana. 
Facebook.com. (August 16, 2015) https://twitter.com/RhodesMustFall/status/634369446782595077 Accessed 
06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
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FIGURE 4.3.D: Photo of protests in front of Jameson / Marikana Memorial Hall; background: Mambush’s 
green blanket on UCT flagpole 
 
Source(s):  
UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) Prior to Joseph Mathunjwa’s address in front of Marikana Memorial Hall. 
Facebook.com. (August 20, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/a.1554079018200924.1073741827.1554073211534838/161
8652975076861/?type=3&theater Accessed 06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
 
Additionally on August 20th, Cape Town Contraband media group released #Luister, 
a 34 minute documentary featuring interviews with SU students of color regarding 
harassment and exclusion. #Luister spread the demands and issues of OS much farther than 
had previously been done, prompting significant community support - as well as retaliation 
and requests to stop their protests. By the end of September 2015, #Luister had over 300,000 
views.  
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In early August, a rape at SU had been highly visibilized in the media. OS only 
released a statement trusting that SU administration would act in a timely manner to 
investigate it. Little progress had been made, and tensions with the masculinism of both 
UCT:RMF and OS led to a desire to focus explicitly on how women were excluded both in 
society and in social movements. On August 26th, Open Stellenbosch held a mass march 
specifically against sexual violence, and the policies of administration that  exclude and 
dehumanize survivors of sexual violence, especially women of color. Many White university 
student bystanders taunted demonstrators during the march, which was almost entirely 
comprised of women of color and queer people of color, who chanted variations on “Rape 
Culture Must Fall!” and “Sexism Must Fall!” UCT:RMF attended this protest, but comments 
from one of the male members criticizing the tactics of the sexual violence protest 
highlighted a rift between the masculine radical militancy of some members of UCT:RMF, 
and the more inclusive, more respectable tactics of Open Stellenbosch.  
However, throughout the end of 2015 August, OS coordinated with UCT:RMF to bus 
in masses of students from other universities, especially UCT, to different universities with 
their own growing protests. On August 30th, UCT:RMF threw its now considerable weight 
behind OS’s #Luister documentary, and OS's upcoming early September OS March Against 
Apartheid Culture. Additionally, at the end of August, ANC elite and Department of Higher 
Education and Training (DHET) Minister Blade Nzimande reviewed #Luister, then publicly 
called for investigations into SU. Yvonne Phosa, the Chair of a parliamentary portfolio 
committee on higher education and training, specifically addressed troubling reports of 
violence against SU students, and highlighted Stellenbosch’s inadequate rate of 
transformation post-apartheid. SU Rector and Vice Chancellor Wim de Villiers, and other 
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university administrators, were questioned before the parliamentary committee, where 
Villiers insists that the university is listening to students, but that students were failing to 
respect existing procedures.  
In September, ongoing OS- and UCT:RMF-driven protests escalated confrontations, 
growing students’ support, and simultaneously growing anti-protest backlash.  On September 
1st, 2015, the OS "Mass March Against Apartheid Culture" drew thousands of predominantly 
non-white students from around Western Cape, including thousands from UCT, Cape 
Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT), University of Western Cape (UWC), and RMF 
members now starting groups across these different institutions. UCT:RMF attended with 
banners, busses, and other material and human resources in support of the action, despite 
above-mentioned ideological differences. ANC-YL, SANSCO, EFF, and DA political parties 
all had supporters, if not representatives, in attendance, wearing party colors and regalia. 
Amongst other supportive social media coverage by UCT:RMF, they published on Twitter a 
photo of a person of color, wearing the EFF red beret and a Pride t-shirt, standing alongside 
the entirely black and colored cadre of armed private security guards protecting the SU 
administration building. The caption read “Gatekeepers of White Supremacy,” and this 
concept became a focal point of media, supporters’, and detractors’ analysis of the protests.  
On September 2nd, immediately after the Open Stellenbosch Mass March Against 
Apartheid Culture, several white South African students create an event titled 
“#WhereIsTheLove?” that explicitly sought to create “lekker” (Afrikaans; English: “good” or 
“fun”) “vibes” and silence those creating “not lekke vibes around Stellenbosch University” 
by “put[ting] an end to this destruction and negativity.” There is no other way to describe 
#WhereIsTheLove, which changed its description after massive online backlash, besides as 
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an event that identified the overwhelmingly Black and Colored students protesting as 
destructive, negative, and ultimately not adding value to the campus.  
In mid september, from September 15th-17th, violent protests with property damage 
at UKZN and VUT were triggered by two off-campus international students being murdered 
and sexually assaulted, as well as changes in university financial aid “funding requirements 
from a 50% pass rate to 70% [pass rate].” As a result of this, UKZN significantly increased 
its security presence with “140 guards….drafted to keep the calm at the campus.” By the end 
of 2015 September, the SU Council took action, after sustained and increasing public 
scrutiny and pressure from OS. Namely, the SU Council announced they would be:  
● appointing a committee to investigate employees for anti-transformation comments;  
● removing the word “safeguard” from their academic policy in regards to Afrikaans;  
● increasing the speed of development of isiXhosa as an academic language.  
 
OS fired back that this was not enough, and demonstrated again for greater 
transformation, including dissolution of the SU Council, at a protest outside of the Council’s 
next meeting. Lastly in September 2015, on the 30th at UCT, a planned speech on wealth and 
income inequality by Thomas Piketty was disrupted by UCT:RMF. They took over the stage 
when logistical failures prevented Piketty from arriving and speaking. Besides highlighting 
the inequality present in UCT, and through ongoing exploitation of Black Africans for cheap 
service labor, UCT:RMF reiterated the taunting phrase “Max Price for Black Lives?” to the 
entire audience, until security forced them to leave.  
2015 October: “End Outsourcing,” “Fees Must Fall,” and a “National Shutdown”  
In 2015 October, tuition increases sparked the #FeesMustFall movement, which was 
driven by the fertility of the RMF and OS movements. This was a watershed moment for the 
year, arguably a turning point for all protests and social movements in South(ern) Africa, as 
well as for student protests around the world. Students allied with outsourced laborers to 
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focus on demands for living wages, fair labor practices, insourcing of outsourced / 
subcontracted service laborers, and to end outsourcing entirely. Alliances between students, 
laborers, and both students’ and laborers’ families yielded record numbers of stakeholders 
becoming protesters who shut down streets - largely facilitated by student groups 
coordinating activity via social media.  
By the end of 2015 October, South Africa had been stunned by nearly 2 weeks of 
protests on a scale unseen since the 1976 Soweto Student uprising and the collapse of 
apartheid. While I argue that the protests and social movements were driven by university 
students, they needed support from laborers, and not necessarily labor unions, as well as 
sympathetic community members, especially family members. The outcomes of the Fees 
Must Fall movements were at least a short-term goal of tuition fee freezes, as well a long-
term shift in discourse towards “fallism,” or abolition, or that “X must fall.”  
By early October 2015, months of university student protests have forced a national 
discussion in the media, amongst politicians, and across nearly every university about 
violence, exploitation, and colonization, rather than security, development, or ANC-DA-EFF 
political platforms. On October 3rd, UCT:RMF broadcast across their social media platforms 
a new campaign, building on the momentum of their Marikana focus: “Workers and Students 
Unite Against Oppression.” The earlier October protests emphasized the fact that the most 
exploited of outsourced workers remain overwhelmingly Black and overwhelmingly women, 
who still lived in and commuted long hours from townships on the periphery of metropolises 
in to largely White or upper class areas. A massive banner in the streets comparing 
Sharpeville with Marikana, the 34 white crosses from the Marikana protests in August, and 
robust online and social media messaging maintained visibility through UCT:RMF 
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throughout the protests. The most visible labor union in support of UCT:RMF attending these 
early protests were members of the National Education, Health, and Allied Workers’ Union 
(NEHAWU).  
FIGURE 4.4.A: #EndOutsourcing Protesters, with sign reading “Outsourcing is neo-liberal exploitation” 
 
Source(s):  
Dlakavu, S. (2015) This pictures from a @RhodesMustFall protest captures the exploitation that comes with 
outsourcing #EndOutsourcing. @SimamkeleD. Twitter.com. (October 25, 2015)  
https://twitter.com/simamkeleD/status/658264138737676289 Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Twitter.   
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FIGURE 4.4.B: #FeesMustFall / #RMF and UCT: Trans Collective leader Hejin Kim, with 2016 protest sign 
 
Source(s):  
Kim, H., Kasibe, W., and UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) Facebook.com. (October 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/UoBrokenGlass/ Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
On October 6th, UCT:RMF once again led student occupations, this time of multiple 
buildings, which included teach-ins and inclusion of community members. This time students 
explicitly expanded appeals to laborers and unions at the university, and held small 
community screenings of their new documentary, “#Outsourced.” Once again, UCT:RMF 
tore down the UCT and South Africa flags from the main university administration building 
and raised the green blanket of Mambush, while simultaneous demonstrations disrupted 
activities in the center of the campus. On October 6th, in Johannesburg, over 2,000 Wits 
students turned out in solidarity with many outsourced workers to protest. While there were 
many protests of varying sizes, and especially police-on-student violence and property 
damage near Johannesburg and in KwaZulu-Natal, the most visible and focused of all 
remained the articulate and well-mediated campaigns in Western Cape, led by UCT:RMF at 
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UCT, and OS at SU. On October 7th, UCT:RMF publicly released their documentary, 
#Outsourced, publicizing interviews with exploited and impoverished university employees 
of sub-contractors. Many of those testifying noted that, though unionized, they remain highly 
exploited and maintain a precarious existence of wage slavery and perpetual indebtedness.  
On October 13th, University of Witwatersrand (Wits) announced a much higher-than-
expected tuition fee increase: 10.5%. This prompted massive student demonstrations across 
the campus that generated national coverage, and called attention to other planned tuition/fee 
increases of between 9% and 12%, also made public by various universities just a few days 
before. Within 24 hours, UCT:RMF and OS facilitated protests that shut down both 
universities and nearby communities, and coordinated mass civil disobedience in other 
universities and communities across the Western Cape, including UWC and CPUT. Protests 
almost simultaneously exploded at Rhodes University in south-eastern South Africa and at 
UKZN in campuses Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Rhodes University and Wits suspended all 
lectures and implemented emergency curfews.  
A common theme of the protest was the fact that education, particularly free and 
accessible education to Black South Africans, had been a key ANC promise for post-
apartheid, as well as a central part of the Soweto Student Uprisings in 1976. Again, it is clear 
that the contemporary demands of university students and student-driven protests are 
reiterations of previous demands under anti-apartheid struggles for decolonization. See 
Figure 4.4.C. These various protests all coalesced under the social media hashtag 
#FeesMustFall, which conventional media circulated and began referring to. UCT protests 
very visibly and significantly continued for days to shut down entire neighborhoods further 
and further away from UCT. Streets were blocked as thousands-strong marches converged on 
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critical governmental and parliamentary buildings and police stations. By October 18th, SU 
students controlled the primary SU administrative building "Admin B," which they renamed 
"Winnie Mandela House." On October 19th, OS announced that management had gone to 
court and received a high court interdict to authorize police use of force, pleading on social 
media for support. Additionally on October 19th, a UCT-requested high court interdict 
authorized police to use force against any protesters “interfering with university operations." 
UCT targeted not only key individuals of the protest groups, but almost comically targeted 
the hashtags used by the groups themselves. See figure 4.4.D.  
FIGURE 4.4.C: Crowd of Fees Must Fall protesters; standout: Black woman holding sign reading “1976?”  
 
Source(s):  
Christian, I. and UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) Photo credit: Imraan Christian. Facebook.com. (October 21, 
2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/a.1554079018200924.1073741827.1554073211534838/163
8490743093084/?type=1&theater Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
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FIGURE 4.4.D: Cape Town high court interdict for UCT against twelve respondents 
 
 
Text Description(s):  
In the matter between University of Cape Town  
Rhodes Must Fall, First Respondent; #Fees Must Fall,, Second Respondent; Left Students Movement, Third 
Respondent; UCT Trans Collective, Fourth Respondent; SASCO UCT, Fifth Respondent; PASMA UCT, Sixth 
Respondent; Patriarchy Must Fall, Seventh Respondent; UCT Left Students Movement, Eighth Respondent; 
Thato Phule, Ninth Respondent; Brian Kamanze [sic], Tenth Respondent; Ru Slayen, Eleventh Respondent; 
Mzomhle Bixa, Twelfth Respondent;  
 
Source(s):  
News24 (2015) UCT obtains court order while Rhodes, Wits suspend lectures – As it happened. News24. 
(October 19, 2015) http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Rhodes-University-shut-down-amid-
nationwide-fees-protests-20151019 Accessed 6/20/2016. South Africa: News 24.   
 
 
260 
 
Less comical, however, was the increasing use of riot police deploying flashbangs, 
stun grenades, rubber bullets, tear gas, water cannons, and armored personnel carriers to 
violently disperse crowds of students and other protesters. There were instances of property 
destruction, and one instance of protesters overturning a vehicle and injuring the driver after 
an attempted to move through crowds onto the Wits campus. However, the overwhelming 
majority of protesters had peacefully occupied and disrupted university activities. Despite 
this, at least 23 UCT students were arrested, detained, and charged. Some of those arrested 
were charged with trespassing and illegal gathering. Some, however, including Chumani 
Maxwele, were initially charged with high treason. Legal and public pressure later saw the 
most severe charges dropped due to lack of evidence.  
By October 20th, DHET Minister Nzimande resolved to cap tuition/fee increases at 
6% nationwide. Students continued to protest, now in the tens of thousands in almost every 
city with a major university. By this point, for almost an entire week, student-driven protests 
had now severely disrupted many cities, and at the least shut down almost every university 
campus. Hereafter, protests only increase in size, as police increasingly tried, and failed, to 
disperse students with increasingly violent tactics. Mass arrests prompted students to shift 
protests to police stations, and focus on circulating images and videos of police brutality. On 
October 22nd, UCT students continued to occupy and control the UCT physical campus. At 
one point, students forced vans of police to flee the campus, followed by a triumphant post 
from UCT:RMF declaring “The students have driven off the police. Viva students!” UCT 
students then graffiti-ed/stenciled signs renaming Jameson Hall "Marikana Memorial Hall." 
They additionally placed photographs of miners murdered in the Marikana Massacre over 
“the faces of the white male Vice Chancellors” whose portraits adorn that building.  
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By October 23rd, protests were at their climax. Largely due to (UCT:)RMF pushing 
for a #NationalShutdown, coordinated through both social media and in-the-streets 
organizing, South Africa universities, media, and politics was totally occupied by the Fees 
Must Fall protests. Tens of thousands of students, laborers, community members, and even 
sympathetic and/or opportunistic politicians were occupying universities and marching on 
local government/parliamentary buildings nationwide. As the 10th consecutive day of 
massive and increasingly disruptive protests began, massive crowds of at least 10,000 
converged on the national capitol in Pretoria. Largely using social media and SMS, 
UCT:RMF led the coordination of UCT, UWC, SU, and CPUT students’ and laborers’ 
movement of resources around Cape Town and Western Cape, shutting down different 
campuses and police stations, and bringing aid.  
In the morning of October 23rd, many protesters, especially those from CPUT and 
UWC, with UCT:RMF in support, attempted to shut down the Cape Town International 
Airport. A thousands-strong crowd marched for over an hour, heading for the air traffic 
control terminal and runways, blockading roads en route. They were ultimately blocked by 
riot police who issued ultimatums and fired non-lethal ammunition from armored personnel 
carriers and fire hydrant trucks. Fear of the use of lethal ammunition also deterred protesters 
from continuing. On October 23rd, within the protection of a board room in the Pretoria 
Capitol building, Zuma, announced a 0% tuition / fee increase for the coming year. The 
triumphant spread of “#FeesHaveFallen” swept social media; this was immediately countered 
by UCT:RMF as untrue, arguing that a 0% increase is not the same as the intended goal of 
fee abolition. UCT:RMF continue to drive discussion that #EndOutsourcing must be 
achieved through an ongoing #NationalShutdown and more protests. UCT:RMF, now 
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comprised of as many laborers as students, continued to protest highly visibly in Cape Town, 
while protests elsewhere subsided after news of the 0% increase.  
On October 28th, 2015, after 2 weeks of non-stop protests of thousands of students 
and laborers often clashing with police, UCT management finally promised to end 
outsourcing, and to begin to insource all workers per the demands of UCT:RMF under the 
auspices of the #EndOutsourcing campaign. After the October 28th announcement, 
UCT:RMF held an evening plenary and sent out calls out to “Comrades at CPUT, UWC, 
Stellenbosch and other higher edu [sic] institutions. Mobilise your constituencies for 
parliament.” On October 29th, thousands of students and laborers descended on the 
parliamentary government buildings in Cape Town, delivering a list of demands to 
Ramaphosa for national university reforms to end outsourcing, and to instead insource labor. 
Additionally, On October 31st, OS released a statement reframing their protests now on 
“corruption” of the university, as “the question naturally arises of what areas of the budget 
will be affected in making the books balance.”  
Post-“Fees Must Fall” 
The Fees Must Fall movement, established after the weeks-long national shutdown in 
October, represented a shift away from, and yet driven by, UCT:RMF. Ultimately, the short-
term victories of the Fees Must Fall protests and the longer-term, more incremental reform-
oriented strategies of Fees Must Fall diverged from Rhodes Must Fall’s initial, more radical 
demands for decolonization. Within a few months student protests had largely lost 
momentum and begun to fracture, largely due to fissures within the Fees Must Fall 
movement and idea, which continued to consist of extremely diverse populations, as well as 
due to the fissures regarding gender and sexuality within the (UCT:)RMF movement(s).  
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2015 November: “A Luta Continua” and “Izwe Lethu”  
In early 2015 November, protests continued across the country in varying but 
generally decreasing levels of intensity and violence. UCT and Stellenbosch held mass 
demonstrations that received less police attention than the higher-black population student 
bodies at UWC and CPUT, where police act more aggressively and violently towards 
protesters. UCT:RMF focused on shaming both Price and the UCT SRC for negotiating 
specifics of insourcing agreements without consulting protesters, arguing that their social 
movements were less corrupt than SRCs and university administration. From November 7th 
to the 9th, UCT:RMF disrupted a series of attempted meetings between Price, the SRC, and 
labor unions. UCT:RMF insisted on mass attendance at these negotiations, and deliberately 
defied expected codes of conduct and established procedures for collective bargaining. 
UCT:RMF protesters occupied closed spaces, challenged union representatives and 
university administrators, sang and chanted when negotiations were attempted, and broadcast 
it all on social media, increasing online and on-the-ground attention.  
On November 7th, OS released a statement outlining the problems of outsourcing and 
the role universities play in exploitation via outsourcing, as well as support for protesting 
laborers. OS advertised and promoted more upcoming #EndOutsourcing mass 
demonstrations on SU’s rooiplein, bringing the labor exploitation focus from Cape Town into 
Stellenbosch. SU mass demonstrations against outsourcing occur without incident, until a 
small fire is lit at a statue to Afrikaner nationalist Jannie Marais. From November 10th to the 
11th, after protests with significant police violence at UWC and CPUT, UCT:RMF put out 
social media calls asking for “airtime, medical and food supplies,” as well as bail money for 
the “targeted #FMF [#FeesMustFall] leadership team.” Images posted by various protesting 
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groups showed a grim scene at UWC: squads of heavily armed and armored riot police, 
security buildings on fire, and students demonstrating wounds from rubber bullets, stun 
grenades, batons, and other crowd control weapons.  
On November 18th, OS declared support for laborers, asserting that “whatever 
‘destruction’ or ‘violence’ occurred yesterday was a direct result and reaction to years of 
continual onslaught on workers’ rights and their dignity.” Additionally, within a day of the 
Marais statue-burning protest, nearly 100 professors, PhD candidates, and administrators 
signed a letter supporting SU’s new English language policy. On November 23rd, OS 
condemned another round of fire-based property destruction as the actions of “opportunists” 
now expelled from laborer and student protests, but OS also re-affirmed solidarity with 
laborers. Despite property destruction and pressures to either escalate or disperse, by the end 
of the month, over 200 instructional and administrative employees of SU had signed on to 
endorse OS's demand for English instruction.  
Throughout this time, UCT:RMF and OS, through support from and to laborers, kept 
protests in the Western Cape visible at a national level. Increasingly, Pan-Africanist and 
nationalist claims dominated the demands of students. At this time, Izwe Lethu (Xhosa, Zulu; 
English: our land) and A Luta Continua (Portuguese; English: the struggle continues) became 
highly visible as UCT:RMF adopted these slogans in order to connect their contemporary 
social movements with earlier anti-apartheid struggles of Southern Africa. Increasingly, 
UCT:RMF pushed the discourse towards land reform, reparations, and the persistence of 
White and upper-class minority control and ownership of most urban spaces in South Africa, 
as well as of most of the means of production and economic power in the region.  
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FIGURE 4.5.A: Student Protesters’ “Izwe Lethu” Salute 
 
Source(s):  
UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2015) Added a new photo. Facebook.com (November 26, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/a.1554076651534494.1073741825.1554073211534838/164
8053892136769/?type=3 Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
 
Throughout early December, OS focused public scrutiny on the SU Council, which, 
as of 2016, remains entirely comprised of older White men, most of whom are Afrikaners. 
OS argued that the SU “Council, yet again, has shown that its interest rests primarily with the 
preservation of not a language but an oppressive cultural system which allows a white 
minority group to flourish..."" UCT:RMF continued to drive a narrative of celebrating the 
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power of students and laborers protesting together, including a horn recital at a formal 
concert hall in commemoration of students. CounterPunch and other Global North and West 
anti-capitalist media sources continued to increase the visibility of RMF and decolonization 
in discussions over education, HEIs, public universities, institutional racism, and social 
movements.  
Meanwhile in the USA, in October, the movement “Harvard: Royall Must Fall” 
emerged. Students protested their institution’s symbol, a shield reading “Veritas” above three 
sheaves of wheat, which referenced its major financial founder, and former slaveowner, Isaac 
Royall, Jr. The original symbol conspicuously lacked references to the production of said 
wheat, which Royall Must Fall altered to be carried upon the backs of Black slaves. See 
Figures 4.4E-F. In the UK, Rhodes Must Fall in Oxford increased in power while Fees Must 
Fall led to South Africa’s national shutdown. Several hundred Oxford students had presented 
a petition to the executives of Oriel College, demanding removal of its Rhodes statues and 
plaques. Rallies of hundreds of students in Oxford complemented these petitions, and Oriel 
College stated that it would remove at least a plaque commemorating Rhodes, with 
consideration of future removal of a statue. An Al Jazeera interview with a RMFO member, 
Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh, increased visibility of the movement and different RMf and Fallist 
collectives around the globe.  
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FIGURE 4.4.E: Harvard Law School crest, 1936-2016 FIGURE 4.4.F: Harvard: Royall Must Fall  
Alteration of Harvard Law School crest 
 
 
Source(s): Annear, S. (2016) Harvard Law School to 
ditch controversial shield. The Boston Globe. (March 
14, 2016) 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/03/14/harvar
d-law-school-ditch-controversial-shield-with-elements-
from-slave-owning-
family/UIYgbyviFdwwGKjexZgWqN/story.html 
Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Boston Globe Media 
Partners.  
Source(s): Harvard: Royall Must Fall (2015) Artist’s 
statement: The crest. The crest. The crest. (November 
30, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/RoyallMustFall/photos/a.15
8535214496363.1073741825.158532991163252/17639
6009376950/?type=1&theater Accessed 6/20/2016. 
USA: Facebook.  
 
 
In 2016 January, negotiations and protests both variously continued and broke down. 
In the UK, backlash against RMFO grew significantly, following attacks on student by 
visible politician, such as South Africa's de Klerk, Australia's Abbott, and the UK's Phillips. 
On January 20th, the student government at Oxford voted 245-212 in favor of supporting 
removal of the Rhodes statue, in addition to the plaque. Within only a few days, however, 
following revelations that at least 1.5 million pounds of donor funding had already been 
pulled due to RMFO, Oriel College is ""panicked into cancelling the proposed six-month 
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[statue] consultation, and the plaque...will also stay, but both will have an accompanying sign 
providing historical 'context'." 
UCT:RMF began the year with several protests with banners reading “#FeesMustFall 
2016” and noting “in the wee hours of 1st January 2016 in Longstreet, we sent a friendly 
reminder of the continuation of the previous year’s struggle,” attempting to maintain 
visibility after the temporary tuition freeze. Various student protest spokespeople, identified 
as Simone Cupido for OS, Chumani Maxwele for RMF, and former wits SRC President 
Shaeera Kalla for #WitsFeesMustFall, were cited in an article predicting expanded protests 
related to extant fees. A DHET preliminary report, based on Nzimande’s meeting with 
representatives of HEIs estimated at least 150 million ZAR in damages from protests in 
2015, with HEI executives saying increased security will be necessary. Alex Hotz, from 
RMF, and Simone Cupido alleged that “men in black,” or private security contractors used 
by universities and deployed by UWC against overwhelmingly majority Black students, 
included Vetus Schola. This for-profit security firm is allegedly mostly comprised of 
Apartheid-era SADF veterans, according to OS and UCT:RMF protesters.  
For UCT:RMF, mid-January signalled a shift towards ""Black cis and trans women 
and non-binary people"" who ""reclaimed the space after the patriarchy by cis het men again 
perpetuated oppression at a meeting at Azania House," marking growing divisions between 
highly masculine and more intersectional/feminist factions within UCT:RMF. Though public 
support and attention shifted after the tuition freeze, OS continued to highlight language and 
corruption issues at SU; UCT:RMF continued to highlight student and labor exploitation 
through increasingly evocative performance art installations that served a dual role as protest 
sites and as histories of the larger social movements.  
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2016 February-March:  “Echoing Voices from Within,” “Shackville,” and “I am the 
Last Respondent”  
 
In 2016 February, a student art piece, Shackville, was demolished by the university, 
and at UFS, overwhelmingly White rugby fans beat Black protesters who disturbed their 
match by occupying the field, chanting, and singing. The destruction of colonial art, a part of 
the Shackville protest, alongside students resisting the police and private security forces, led 
to UCT suspending students through a court interdict. In 2016 March, an art exhibition of 
RMF, “Echoing Voices from Within,” was facilitated by the UCT's Center for African 
Studies (CAS) and a male member of UCT:RMF, the documentarian Wandile Kasibe.  
However, the exhibition was shut down by a protest from the UCT: Trans Collective, 
some of whose members stripped naked and blocked access to the building, and smeared red 
paint across photographs. One went so far as to write in red paint the word "rapist" across the 
iconic image of Maxwele throwing feces onto the UCT Rhodes Statue. The protest was led 
by Hejin Kim,a previously outspoken supporter of (UCT:)RMF. The destruction of the 
student artwork by both students and university authorities marked increasing divisions 
between different factions within UCT:RMF, each of which alleged the other was erasing or 
prohibiting their own struggles for decolonization - and each of which were marginalized by 
the university.  
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Figures 4.5.A and 4.5.B below represent how evocative artwork has played a 
significant role in both promoting and generating support for these protests, as well as how it 
has been a central site of contesting the violence of various agents involved in social 
movements. Figure 4.5A, “Chapungu” (Shona; English: Bateleur Eagle) is an iconic photo of 
a Black woman, adorned with wings and in a black leotard, with arms outstretched in front of 
the UCT Rhodes Statue as it was removed in front of throngs of students. The image has 
been interpreted as representing the rise, power, and resilience of colonized peoples, and their 
triumph after struggle against colonial violence. However, its questionable use as an 
advertisement, and perhaps a cover for the violence of misogynistic actions within 
(UCT:)RMF, also highlights how claims to legitimacy by protesters have been highly critical 
and centered on performative visualizations and artwork.  
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FIGURE 4.5.A: “Chapungu,” photo, advertising UCT CAS “Echoing Voices from Within” Exhibit.  
 
Source(s):  
Msezane, S. and UCT: Rhodes Must Fall. (2015) Chapungu. Photograph taken at UCT, Cape Town, South 
Africa. Facebook.com. (April 9, 2015) https://twitter.com/sthemse/status/601688723307286530 Accessed 
06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
 
Kasibe, W. (2016) Advertisement for Echoing Voices from Within Exhibit. UCT CAS: Center for African 
Studies. Facebook.com. (February 7, 2016) https://www.facebook.com/events/1772531186314673/ Accessed 
06/20/2016. USA: Facebook.   
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FIGURE 4.5.B: UCT Trans Collective Disrupts “Echoing Voices from Within” Exhibit  
 
Source(s):  
Hendricks, A. (2016) Rhodes Must Fall exhibition vandalised in UCT protest, Trans Collective splashes red 
paint on photos. Ground Up. (March 10, 2016) http://www.groundup.org.za/article/rhodes-must-fall-exhibition-
vandalised-uct-protest/ Accessed 6/20/2016. South Africa: Community Media Trust.  
 
Figure 4.5B, almost perfectly captures the internal antagonism ofdifferent factions of 
(UCT:)RMF. The perplexed expression of a White employee of UCT pleads with a trans 
activist painting the word “rapist” across Maxwele’s iconic image. This is a photograph of a 
radical activist protesting violence, by disrupting an art exhibit about radical activists 
protesting violence. This is both affirmation and condemnation of the pervasiveness of this 
type of disruption within UCT at this time. It is a disruption of a disruption, a re-
appropriation of a re-appropriation, and a challenge to the university’s institutional decisions 
about who deserves exhibition. The human body takes center stage in both cases; Maxwele 
heaves human fecel matter onto a colonial monument, and Hejin Kim paints blood-red words 
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of condemnation across the university’s exhibition of Maxwele. These antagonisms represent 
the inherent discord and self-reflexive criticiques of UCT:RMF, as well as how the 
institution, typically represented by a perplexed White man, pleads for it to stop.  
In Figure 4.5.C, the Shackville protest is captured in images. In front of Marikana 
Memorial Hall, near where the UCT Rhodes Statue previously stood, UCT students installed 
one of South Africa’s common shanty-town dwellings: a shack made of corrugated tin, no 
more than ten by fifteen by eight feet. These structures are transportable by a group of 
dedicated laborers, and are one of the most common household structures across the region, 
and this represented how most of Cape Towns’s township residents still live - but injected 
into the upper-class site of UCT. Students painted on the shack the words: “Shackville”; 
“UCT Housing Crisis”; and :UCT is Anti Black”. After the shack stood for a day, during 
which time activists and homeless students would gather around it to discuss politics with 
passers-by, UCT students escalated the protest. They collected colonial artwork from around 
the campus and nearby neighborhoods and created a large bonfire adjacent to the shack, 
around which students danced and chanted, while being encouraged to add to the bonfire.  
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FIGURE 4.5.C: Collage of “Shackville” and Colonial Art Demolition Protests 
 
 
Source(s):  
Denita, A. and The Cape Argus. (2016) #Shackville: UCT Protests Flare Up Again. The Cape Argus. (February 
17, 2016) http://www.capetownetc.com/blog/news/shackville-uct-protests-flare-up-again/ Accessed 6/20/2016. 
South Africa: Independent Media Group.  
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FIGURE 4.5.D: UCT security forces demolish Shackville  
 
Source(s):  
Petersen, F. and Albert, W. (2016) How Shackville started a war. City Press. (February 21, 2016) http://city-
press.news24.com/Voices/how-shackville-started-a-war-20160219 Accessed 6/20/2016. South Africa: 
Interactive Advertising Bureau SA / Digital Media and Marketing Association NPC.  
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FIGURE 4.5.E: Protesters and security forces near burning truck following demolition of Shackville 
 
Source(s):  
Holder, T. (2016) [Gallery] Stun Grenades and Torched Vehicles...Welcome to #Shackville. Eyewitness News. 
(February 17, 2016) p. 1-7. http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/17/Rubber-bullets-stun-grenades-and-torched-vehicles-
welcome-to-Shackville Accessed 06/20/2016. South Africa: Primedia Broadcasting.  
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FIGURE 4.5.F: A blanketed UCT:RMF leader sits in front of the charred wreckage of Shackville 
 
 
Source(s):  
Mlandu, M. and UCT: Rhodes Must Fall. (2016) March 14. Facebook.com. (March 14, 2015) 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/a.1554127881529371.1073741828.1554073211534838/168
6749844933840/?type=3&theater Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
 
UCT:RMF’s Shackville, the climax of which is portrayed in the above Figures 4.5C-
E. represents the peak of UCT:RMF protests after Fees Must Fall, which explicitly violated 
the Eurocentric sanctity of artwork, especially colonial artwork. This protest was based on 
public, simultaneous art performances and political interventions, and intended to escalate 
confrontations and encourage students’ emotional response to the idea of decolonization as 
an active demolition of colonialism. Unfortunately, Shackville occurred at a time of 
increasing internal antagonism within these counter-hegemonic social movement. Laborers’ 
insourcing negotiations had dragged on for weeks, and most other universities had either 
suppressed protests or accepted a 0% fee increase for the time being. Public attention and 
support had shifted to the elected SRCs and negotiations to mitigate education costs, and 
against the ostensibly radical, transgressive, and increasingly criminalized UCT:RMF agents. 
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The result was indeed a confrontation and escalation - but one in which it appeared security 
forces and the university decisively won.  
As UCT’s suppression of protests became increasingly effective, student demands 
shifted to “Bring back our cadres,” referred to the widespread intimidation of protesters by 
security and administrators, in addition to the several de facto expelled students listed on the 
interdict. Students continued to shame UCT for failures to address housing, in addition to 
previous failures to adequately “transform” post-apartheid, compounded by the slow and 
usually hostile responses to student protesters - but all of this increasingly occurred with 
eroding public and student support. Not only was the art installation destroyed, but there 
were fewer supporters than usual in attendance at both the students’ daytime demolition of 
colonial art and the university’s  nighttime demolition of the art installation.  
Finally, the university successfully secured a high court interdict against specific 
UCT:RMF leaders after Shackville, banning them from campus and classes until trials would 
be held. The high court interdict, which included sixteen respondents, along with the 17th 
respondent described as “any persons associating themselves with unlawful conduct on 
campus and/or protest action at any of the applicant’s [UCT’s] premises.” The phrase “I am 
the last respondent” became another rallying cry by UCT:RMF and OS, emphasizing how all 
students were, sooner or later, going to end up as respondents on legal documents should 
dissent continue to be criminalized.  
UCT:RMF also created a petition demanding a “Shackville TRC,” whereby 
university and security personnel could be held responsible for using force against students, 
in exchange for student forgiveness, and reparations to the students affected by the police 
violence. UCT:RMF, had long critiqued the transition from apartheid to neoliberalism, 
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arguing that there was ongoing punishment against Black and Brown bodies, while White 
South Africans received amnesty and forgiveness. UCT:RMF sought to expose the hypocrisy 
of a university that held students accountable to a higher standard than it held itself, and 
which unevenly enforced “political violence” (Concerned South Africans, 2016).  
Their petition and critique of selective enforcement of public reconciliation processes 
may be summarized through this excerpt:  
It is either that restorative justice is desirable and a Shackville TRC is established or 
that the University of Cape Town must admit and reject publicly the legitimacy of 
post-1994 TRC as a process that, among many things, was tasked with addressing the 
legacy of political violence (and facilitating constructive reconciliation of 
communities in conflict). 
 
Is restorative justice reserved for powerful whites or when they are involved in 
political violence? Or can it also be used to provide different forms of engagement for 
the disenfranchised and dispossessed? Is restorative justice a luxury or an option? 
 
While many student collectives, persons and organisations involved have taken 
particularly harsh positions on the South African TRC and its failings we must call 
upon those proponents, the University of Cape Town being of them, to step forward 
and demonstrate the capacity and potential for restorative justice in post-conflict 
societies and communities. 
 
The liberal institutions who laud these TRC processes must be put to the test, let us as 
a community see whether they are capable of living up to the rhetoric they readily 
prescribe for conflicts and political violence that exist beyond the comfort of the 
ivory tower. 
(Concerned South Africans, 2016) 
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2016 March-June: “End Rape Culture” and “Death of a Dream” 
In 2016 April, video and photos emerged of Maxwele and other high-visibility male 
RMF members physically fighting with a Queer woman at a demonstration. At the same 
time, highly visible rapes at SU reminded the social movements of the persistently high 
levels of violence against women of color. OS tried to both address sexual violence, as well 
as keep pressure on SU to reform its language policies, increasingly focusing on the 
disproportionate exclusion of women students at SU, and gender inequality. 
#EndRapeCulture and Take Back the Night became visible demands and groups that OS 
made and allied with, respectively - all while losing public and student support.  
At UCT, similar increases in attention to the gendered power imbalances within 
society, within HEIs, and within social movements increasingly pitted more masculist 
factions against more intersectional feminist factions. This is exemplified by a march through 
UCT to a police station, and then back up to Marikana Memorial Hall, titled “Patriarchy 
Must Fall,” and which prominently displayed a Rhodes Must Fall banner throughout - but 
which had only around a hundred marchers at its peak. See Figure 4.6.  
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FIGURE 4.6: A UCT student supported of UCT:RMF’s #IamTheLastRespondent Campaign, 2016 March 
 
Source(s):  
Kasibe, W. and UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2016) I AM THE LAST RESPONDENT “and when we speak we are 
afraid / our voices will not be heard / nor welcomed / but when we are silent / we are still afraid / So it is better 
to speak / remembering / we were never meant to survive” - Audre Lorde. Facebook.com (February 29, 2016) 
pp. 1-7. 
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/photos/pcb.1681331698808988/1681331552142336/?type=3&thea
ter Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook. 
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In 2016 May, the Cape Town high court ruled that five of the highest-visibility 
students who were the critical drivers of UCT:RMF were guilty of criminal behavior. They 
had to pay many of the legal costs of UCT’s prosecution and management of protests and 
were indefinitely suspended, and effectively expelled.  The desperation of students was 
exemplified through the artistic interventions and performances of "The Death of a Dream," 
which alleged UCT was where Black students' dreams went to die. Students dressed 
themselves entirely in black robes, with Wanelisa Xaba posing from high resolution 
photographs, acting out being shot in the head. Her makeup consisted of bullet wounds to the 
neck and forehead - many photographs suggested a shooter firing at her from behind. 
Additionally, full-sized body bags were deployed around Marikana Memorial Hall for the 
entire day, with tags describing students and miners placed alongside them, as well as 
references to Shackville. See Figures 4.7.A – 4.8.B.  
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FIGURE 4.7: “Patriarchy Must Fall” marches in Cape Town, 2016 February.  
 
 
Source(s):  
Kim, H., Dlamini, P., and UCT: Trans Collective (2016) “Today I protested with other fallist women (cis and 
trans) comrades from UCT: Rhodes Must Fall and Open Stellenbosch against white supremacy and patriarchy 
after rape threats were amde against comrades…” Facebook.com. (March 4, 2016) Pp.1-11. 
https://www.facebook.com/UoBrokenGlass/posts/1691679507786057 Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook.   
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FIGURE 4.8A: Wanelisa Xaba’s Death of a Dream, 2016 May.  
 
 
Source(s):  
Xaba, W. and Christian, I. (2016) #DeathOfADream, South African Universities. A place where dreams go to 
die. Facebook.com. (February 29, 2016) 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1588432731476404&set=a.1435024713483874.1073741828.10000
9290783076&type=3&theater Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Facebook.  
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FIGURE 4.8B: Protest Collage: Rhodes Must Fall, “Death of a Dream,” 2016 May. 
 
 
Source(s):  
Ayesha (2016) DEATH OF A DREAM, @RhodesMustFall I am blown away. @AyeshaTape (May 12, 2016) 
https://twitter.com/AyeshaTape/status/730670469549047808 Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Twitter.  
 
Tsek (2016) #DeathOfDreams, @Things_fall_. (May 12, 2016) 
https://twitter.com/Things_fall_/status/730667147924516864 Accessed 6/20/2016. USA: Twitter.  
 
Amidst setback after setback, public opinion shifted to understanding that “UCT is 
winning.” (Teagle and Ngongoma, 2016) As the Winter break approached, multiple setbacks, 
student expulsions, upcoming elections, and the exhaustion of a year of traumatic and violent 
struggle against seemingly insurmountable odds, combined with increasing internal divisions 
within student protest groups, significantly slowed down social movements previously driven 
by universities, and now witnessing the collapse of those bearing the brunt of the backlash 
from the powers that be. What had been accomplished within roughly a year? How does it it 
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fit into a global context? Throughout the 16 months that I tracked the movement, UCT:RMF 
consistently and unapologetically asserted that South Africa’s students and citizens were 
colonial subjects, and that a process of necessarily violent - at least structurally - 
decolonization, a la Fanon, was the only solution to end ongoing colonialism. (UCT:)RMF 
significantly shifted the local, regional, and even national discourses of student movements 
towards demands for radical change, founded upon the radical suffering experienced by most 
students.  
I expand on my five identified themes below, before moving on to my concluding 
chapter of contextualizing these themes and this case study amongst potentially comparable 
social movements elsewhere post-2007. To reiterate, I interpret South Africa’s contemporary 
protests and social movements as consistently manifesting the following themes:  
1. Renewing the visibility of identity politics in terms of intersectionality, race, sex, 
gender, and class, in opposition to, and in conversation with, respectability politics 
2. Marginalized university students’ “leading” discourses and protests, and subsequently 
driving social movements with local, regional, and global impacts  
3. Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing against common 
sense narratives of The New South Africa, The Rainbow Nation, and so forth 
4. Performative and artistic protests re-centering narratives on violence and pain of 
Black and Brown bodies  
5. Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media  
 
Renewing the visibility of identity politics 
 
The first and perhaps most obvious theme of UCT:RMF, OS, and other related 
movements in South Africa has been their renewing of the visibility of identity politics. Prior 
to UCT:RMF, the polite discourse of progress, development, The Rainbow Nation, and 
change via elections dominated most household discussions, even post-Mandela. UCT:RMF 
changed that by forcing people to confront the way that violence remains overwhelmingly 
determined along lines of identity established hundreds of years ago under European 
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colonialism, and which were primary methods of identification and political action during 
anti-apartheid struggles.  
This renewal has been deliberate, and UCT:RMF and OS both explicitly focused on 
intersectional identities. Race, sex, gender, ethnicity, language, national origin, education 
level, family background, political affiliation, physical and mental ability, socio-economic 
status, and class more generally have all been critical to the intellectual and political actions 
of UCT:RMF. Despite tensions between various factions and different times, UCT:RMF 
consistently tried to prioritize women, queer folk, and especially queer women of color as 
leaders within the movement. They also deliberately excluded students from leadership 
positions on the basis of race, in direct violation of liberal, institutional protocol.  
Additionally, their divergent but complex approach to leadership access placed them 
in direct opposition to, and in conversation with, respectability politics both in terms of what 
universities expected, as well as what social movements expected. Notions of consensus 
decision-making or shallowly democratic hierarchies were both discarded in favor of 
demanding that students follow the leadership of those suffering the greatest, directly 
drawing upon Fanon’s “the first shall be made last,” and “the last shall be made first.”  
Placing Fanon, and not Mbembe or Mamdani or Ghandi, at the center of their 
narrative and intellectual critiques, marked the group as problematically approaching theories 
of violence and social change, in the eyes of White, liberal, capitalist-realist institutions. 
Unapologetically doing so, while at the same time recognizing issues of violence within 
social movements and the importance of Black Feminism and intersectionality, marked the 
group as transgressive both to highly masculist reliance on violence and traditionally feminist 
non-violent discourses. While there was extensive use of Audre Lorde and Assata Shakur, 
 
 
288 
even the women of color leading UCT:RMF tended towards Biko, if not Fanon, in terms of 
insisting on immediate, rapid social restructuring, even if it meant institutional violence, 
property damage, or confrontations and clashes between dissidents and the state.  
 
Marginalized university students’ “leading” discourses and protests 
 
UCT:RMF differed from OS in that, while OS had elected positions, spokespeople, 
and a clear, if mostly horizontal, hierarchy, UCT:RMF tried to reject hierarchies completely, 
while still subscribing to historical Pan-African socialism and not subscribing to Western, 
industrialized anarchist ideologies. In this way, UCT:RMF leaders described to me their 
organization as spontaneous collective that strived to be structureless and leaderless. The 
closest analogy they provided to me was that of Occupy. And, as I expand in my final 
chapter, like Occupy, the vague structure in some ways benefitted the legitimacy of the group 
as a social movement truly representing grassroots demands, while also undermining the 
ability to overcome internal antagonisms.  
Despite this, as evidenced by the specific respondents on the high court interdicts, a 
group of under a hundred UCT students did serve as the intellectual and tactical core of 
UCT:RMF. Their expulsions and the subsequent loss of momentum of the collective 
evidences this, if nothing else did. However, consistently throughout 2015, a group of around 
one dozen students, all Black or mixed race, were the most visible “leaders” or “facilitators” 
of the group, for lack of a better word, despite no formal elections or hierarchical governance 
structures. In that way, critical feedback, new leaders, fresh perspectives, and power shifts 
kept the group accountable as students joined, and as problems with the organization were 
pointed out. Additionally, UCT:RMF inspired similar RMF and “must fall” movements 
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around the world and South Africa - making UCT:RMF as a group itself a leader of sorts, 
especially in terms of other groups’ adopting their discourse of decolonization. UCT:RMF 
also maintained intense self-reflexive critiques regarding intersectionality and not 
perpetuating oppression within their own movement - which occurred despite their best 
efforts to the contrary - and in so doing set a standard for other groups to emulate. Without 
UCT:RMF as an example, there may never have been Fees Must Fall - or it likely would not 
have had the abolitionist “must fall” demand at its center. Furthermore, the return to Fanon 
and insistence upon their inclusion, as well as the correction of the shocking exclusion of 
many Black Consciousness theorists in curricula nationwide, may not have happened without 
UCT:RMF insisting on a decolonized curricula, both within social movements and within 
educational institutions.  
Because of the exclusivity of UCT:RMF’s leadership by non-White students, the vast 
majority of whom were either conscious of oppression or survivors of it, the discourse of 
UCT:RMF was not constrained by any form of conventional liberal respectability politics. In 
other words, the raw, unapologetically Black, unapologetically decolonization-focused work 
was achievable because it was led by marginalized students who lacked the privilege to 
follow the respectable and slow processes of the institutions they sought to ultimately 
abolish. SRCs that were largely comprised of politically-inclined or -affiliated students, 
usually who were either loyal to the ANC or the SACP, but were always loyal to the liberal 
electoral system that had elected them to a position of relative power in the first place.  
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Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing common sense 
 
The demands of UCT:RMF and, to a lesser extent, OS were both perceived as 
ostensibly radical. As noted above, the failure of both groups to be acceptably “respectable" 
in the eyes of their educational institutions and cities made them stand out as leaders and 
drivers of social movements. However, this standing out was inherently a transgression 
against what was acceptable - belief in The Rainbow Nation and capitalist-realist, electoral, 
procedural democracy inevitably solving all problems without violence. OS, even though 
initially seeking only to change the university, was immediately criminalized and denounced 
as disrespectful misbehavior of ill-informed children. Simply existing as non-Afrikaner 
people in Stellenbosch was an act of transgression against the entire history of Stellenbosch, 
both city and university, as a bastion of White Supremacy. To attempt to reform the 
institution as students and not as professors, and to do so by peacefully disrupting university 
events, was perceived as highly transgressive and out of line with what was expected and 
normal behavior of non-White SU students.  
UCT:RMF explicitly noted that they intended to be transgressive, beginning with 
Maxwele’s feces-centered protest, and all the way through the continual struggle for 
increased visibility of Black and trans women within the movement, despite decades of 
patriarchal social movement theory seeking to render their contributions invisible. From the 
explicit comparisons of Marikana to Sharpeville, to the allegations that UCT’s retirement 
investments in extractive firms bloodied the hands of individual UCT administrators, to the 
constant return to destroying colonial artwork, UCT:RMF escalated and confronted 
colonialism almost entirely through transgression. The act of attempting to block an 
international airport, even at the height of the Fees Must Fall protests, was a truly radical 
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break from peaceful protests that obeyed the law and did not interfere with the global flow of 
capital.  
 
Performative and artistic protests re-centering narratives  
 
The above issues of identity politics, marginalized students’ leadership, and 
transgression all may be seen as what UCT:RMF and OS did; these two themes focus on how 
they did it. On the one hand, UCT:RMF and OS wrote expansive, well-cited, articulate pieces 
in English, as well as pieces in Zulu, Xhosa, and Afrikaans, outlining their stances, goals, and 
next steps. However, these lengthy pieces remain inaccessible to vast swaths of the 
population, many of whom are illiterate and innumerate, or deeply constrained by 
technological and intellectual disparities. This is not to say that the millions of South African 
township residents lack the intellectual capacity to understand (UCT:)RMF’s lengthy 
descriptions of why Mbembe’s post-coloniality is a watered-down and White-friendly 
version of Fanon’s decolonization.  
Instead, it is to recognize, as UCT:RMF themselves acknowledged, that most South 
Africans’ brutal poverty and bare life survival render them incapable of having the time, 
energy, or even internet access to participate in online-only political discourses full of 
academic jargon. In this way, much like how there may never have been Fees Must Fall 
without Rhodes Must Fall, there may never have been attention paid to these movements had 
they remained strictly intellectual activities that adhered to the respectability of the Ivory 
Tower and its exclusive educations. The Piketty lecture that UCT:RMF exemplifies this 
notion, where a European economist was to fly to UCT to lecture elite professors and 
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administrators on inequality, without any township or labor representatives present to 
participate, let alone listen and learn.  
The content of their messages coincided with their format: violence and violation of 
Black and Brown bodies was communicated through performative and artist protests. The 
pain and anguish of surviving colonial, direct, physical, indirect, slow, and financial violence 
took center stage. As I note in my next and final chapter, South African students prioritized 
the following issues of violence with their performative and artistic interventions:  
● Racial violence, especially historical exclusion from decision-making, microaggressions, 
and psychic anguish of being surrounded by Whiteness and White Supremacy  
● Sexual violence, especially the persistence of disproportionately high levels of rape, 
sexual assault, sexual harassment, and silencing of women, queer, and trans students and 
social movement activists - despite attempts to address patriarchal power structures  
● Financial violence, especially the burdening of students with fees and tuition, student 
loans, or bursaries and de facto indentured servitude to for-profit firms that range from 
complicit to active in their exploitation of overwhelmingly Black laborers and subjects  
● Institutional discrimination and exclusion, effected by means of the above intersecting 
violations of students, and which manifested as perpetual loss of power and access even 
once Black and non-White students or citizens achieved initial entry into White spaces  
 
Performative and artistic protests were the key to translating the message of 
decolonization from critical, rational theory to actual, visual, emotional understanding. 
Through jarring, provocative, transgressive, and Black-centric performance artwork, 
UCT:RMF made it clear that they experienced violence as colonial subjects. By re-centering 
narratives on the violence, pain, resilience, and beauty of Blackness and resistance, they 
connected in a visceral way that Zuma and the ANC, and even Malema and the EFF, remain 
unable to do. Much like their independence from the SRC, their independence from political 
parties and the associated constraints of speechmaking, campaigning, and organizational 
hierarchies allowed many different performances regarding Blackness being subjected to 
White Supremacy to flourish in a rapid amount of time and in highly accessible media. The 
proliferation of high-resolution photography and new media reporting on these protests and 
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events, as well as videos like the OS documentary #Luister and UCT:RMF documentary 
#Outsourced, meant that contemporary decolonization discussions were more accessible that 
they had ever been before.  
 
Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media  
 
As touched on above, (UCT:)RMF did not rely exclusively on social media or on 
conventional media. They instead used both, in conjunction with, and in order to facilitate, 
in-the-streets activities. The vast majority of the online presence of these social movements 
ironically remains with American-own corporations Twitter and Facebook - an irony 
acknowledged by UCT:RMF. However, these platforms allowed for rapid, decentralized 
coordination of protests, in conjunction with cheap SMS-capable cell phones. Combined with 
the anonymity of multiple users logging into the accounts, large groups of students could 
collaboratively send out requests for aid, or for more protesters to arrive at different locations 
- without the oversight of respectability politics constraining these militant calls to action. 
Furthermore, these calls to action were not, except in a few cases, more online than in-
person. While at times the robust social media presentation masked lower numbers in the 
streets, for the most part massive demonstrations were able to be organized, legitimizing the 
robust online assertions and demands as truly supported by larges parts of the population.  
Conventional media played a large role, as well as social media. Print newspapers in 
South Africa tend to be regarded as lower-quality and closer to tabloids, with large, flashy 
headlines. Many papers are stapled daily to telephone poles and taxi ranks, with especially 
eye-catching headlines drawing greater attention. While they may be derided as tabloids, they 
also serve as free advertisements. Allegations of apartheid-era racism, failed political parties, 
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and students rising up against authorities circulated in extremely simple terms by 
conventional media throughout working-class neighborhoods and Cape Town townships 
made it easier for UCT:RMF to approach laborers living there for collaboration and 
assistance.  
Finally, UCT:RMF and OS members extensively wrote opinions/editorials for online 
and print media sources, going head-to-head with professors and politicians who selectively 
castigated and praised different students or goals of student protests. Brian Kamanzi and 
Wanelisa Xaba especially wrote scathing and widely-read pieces that denounced the 
authoritarian tactics of universities and police, while further intellectually and socially 
legitimizing the cause of UCT:RMF’s stated goal of decolonization. All of these issues - the 
identity politics, the transgression, the performance art - came together through robust use of 
multiple media that transcended what had been previously done by students post-apartheid, 
and transformed the perceived power of students in South Africa - and beyond.  
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South Africa’s Neoliberal Global Context, Universities, and Students 
 
I have presented critical theories and specific examples of deep, colonial histories of 
South Africa, the Southern African region, and the world, especially focusing on the 
intersections of violence, education, and the covert authoritarianism of neoliberalism. I have 
further broken this down into spectacular, physical direct violence, as well as "slow 
violence," or environmental, financial, or otherwise systemic racism, sexism, and classism. I 
have recapped Southern Africa's definitive struggles to date: decolonization from Europe, 
including from the global hegemon of Imperial Britain, regional hegemon of Apartheid South 
Africa, and contemporary power imbalances at the sub-state level of South Africa.  
I have also hopefully clarified how, despite mainstream academia's and common 
sense's insistence to the alternative, there have been negligible de facto improvements to the 
quality of life for the majority of South Africans.  
Understanding the critical concepts of global neoliberalism and covert 
authoritarianism, combined with the historical context of contemporary South Africa’s 
university students, their demands for “decolonization” may appear transgressive, but they 
have, in fact, entirely legitimate claims that, although radical, make perfect sense in terms of 
ongoing colonialism. When comparing the demands and issues faced by other university 
student protests and social movements under similar circumstances, the themes of South 
Africa’s protests are visible. 
Because of my social positionality, prescribing solutions or jumping to conclusions 
about South Africa would risk my perpetuation of a colonial research methodology. For that 
reason, I have thus far taken extreme care to provide not only qualitative or only quantitative 
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analyses of immediate issues in South Africa, or to otherwise conform to mainstream, 
capitalist-realist academic methodologies. In keeping with this thesis as a critical GS project, 
I have incorporated multiple and various disciplines and perspectives on the issue, allowing 
for both a zoomed in “thick description” of events in the present, as well as a zoomed out, 
global-scale, “long duree” contextualization of those events. I provided detailed, critical-
theoretical, and global-colonial-historical contexts of South Africa in order to justify my 
historiography, interpretations, and analyses. As such, this Master’s level thesis is an almost 
unmanageable size, though it is hopefully a testament to the inability to simply summarize 
South Africa today in such misused terms as “globalization” or “democracy” or “corruption.”  
South Africa and its contemporary university students, their protests, and the counter- 
hegemonic social movements driven by them are clearly situated within the political, social-
cultural, and economic systems of post-Cold War Contemporary Globalization, which is 
defined by global neoliberalism. This de-democratization and covert authoritarianism on a 
global level has, on the one hand, sparked more and more radical forms of covert state 
violence, through securitization, in collusion with informal, common sense assumptions, 
alongside formal, post-apartheid instruction about how The Rainbow Nation is a country of 
progress and development under the tenure of the ANC. These neoliberal claims to 
legitimacy and power, or authority, render invisible their co-optation by agents of global 
capital. On the other hand, increasingly radical forms of neoliberalism have radicalized local 
resistance - which UCT:RMF students exploded into the local, national, regional, and global 
consciousness as “decolonization.”  
After dcades of austerity, privatization, and abandonment of Pan-Africanist socialism, 
the neoliberal university in South Africa - like elsewhere - is in ruins. The intersections of 
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securitization and privatization have led to increasingly desperate and exploited students 
unable to be served by the degrading NSFAS and the detached, unresponsive, and entrenched 
political elites of the state. These decades of governance by capital exacerbated the structural 
imbalances that centuries of colonialism imposed upon the region and its indigenous people. 
Once forced to teach themselves as criminals without access to decent facilities, South 
Africans now are taught by underpaid and underqualified teachers in a public school system 
that still lacks facilities, and still fails to go beyond basic numeracy, literacy, and simplistic 
capitalist-realist ideas of poli-socio-economics - almost all of which are imported from the 
Global North and West.  
So many students are criminalized, impoverished, denied access to quality resources, 
indebted, indefinitely unemployed, or otherwise marginalized by a system that talks about 
how it is meant to empower them. Much like how the 2011 Marikana Massacre marked a 
turning point for how labor exploitation and de facto enslavement to extractive firms under 
the ANC and neoliberalism, so too did 2014-2016 mark a turning point for how university 
students may take their protests beyond the walls of academia and drive social movements. 
So how, then, can these social movements be considered to move beyond national borders 
and become a global phenomena?  
 
Making Global Comparisons  
 
It is easy to start with conventional notions that disregard the similarities between 
apparently separate case studies. It is also difficult to avoid a totalizing, purely structural, 
top-down imposition of how everything is the same if everything is subject to global 
neoliberalism. As I recognized in my introduction, GS theory review, and critical premises, 
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there are varieties of neoliberalism and capitalism, and there are varieties of local resistances 
to global authorities. However, the shift towards conservative, post-structuralist, hyper-
individualist epistemologies in academia and beyond under Contemporary Globalization has 
overwhelmed and marginalized the vast majority of anti-capitalist thinking. Furthermore, the 
power imbalance of global neoliberal agents  against local anti-capital agents is also 
overwhelming. It is, on the one hand, inaccurate to theoretically erase individual and local 
agency by acknowledging the relative helplessness of anti-authoritarian protesters. It is 
another act of erasure, however, one which neoliberalism itself perpetrates through its 
invisibilization of its violence, to refuse to recognize the overwhelming totality of these 
power imbalances.  
For example, a typical case of a South African student attending a South African 
university may consist of their likely childhood in a township, where they were told they live 
in a democracy, were indoctrinated through near-mythical stories of the ANC, and studied 
hard to meet certain testing criteria in an under-equipped school. Following admission to a 
university that overwhelmingly employees White, male, English- or Afrikaans-speaking 
academics, and which uses overwhelmingly USA and UK varieties of capitalist-realism for 
their curricula, this student is given insufficient state funding and housing, and must take out 
incredible amounts of student loans, and/or become employed by a profitable USA- or UK-
based firm in order to mitigate their student loan debt. Upon graduation, they face likely 
long-term un-, under-, or mal-employment, and a relatively wretched quality of life.  
For another example, a typical case of a South African laborer working in a mine may 
consist of a similar childhood in a township, where they could not achieve the test scores 
required for university admission, and who were also indoctrinated into a certain political 
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party affiliation. They go on to years of unemployment, illness exacerbated by inadequate 
healthcare, housing, food, and general poverty, and finally find a job that pays better than 
others in the mines. In the case of Marikana and LonMin, this consists of literally bone-
breaking labor, reduced life expectancy, and inadequate political representation by a corrupt 
labor union. When it came time to strike, the dozens of miners held traditional spears as a 
symbol of resistance, but posed no actual threat to the dozens of riot police equipped with 
live ammunition.  
Most importantly, like formal HEIs, the police and the for-profit extractive firms 
possessed something that no anti-authority or anti-capitalist agent can under neoliberalism: 
legitimacy. Even in the few circumstances where students and laborers held the upper hand 
in terms of power, such as the October 23rd march on Pretoria’s capitol buildings, or when 
UCT students drove police off of the campus, they were never considered legitimate. 
Therefore, these anti-capitalists were never authorities, but rather marginalized, criminalized, 
insecure bodies in need of securitization as soon as possible - which has happened through 
arrests, trials, expulsions, and delegitimization of the original demands for decolonization. It 
would be an act of erasure to ignore this overwhelming intellectual and conceptual, as well as 
very physical and material, power asymmetry. This is not to say that there is no hope of 
successful resistance, but rather to say that given the realities of global neoliberalism, there 
are very few possible ways for local agents to successfully resist the entrenched, legitimate 
power of pro-capitalist state and non-state authorities, which are supported by the USA’s 
global, neoliberal hegemony.  
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Common Issues and Motivations  
Across South Africa, and across the world - including in my two proposed most 
viable alternative case studies of California and Germany - similar processes that are not 
qualitatively different are underway. Again, to re-iterate and clarify, I summarize 
neoliberalism as:  
● Ostensibly an economic model overtly tied to Eurocentrism;  
● Actually a poli-socio-economic logic with additional covert qualities;  
● Hyper-individualistic;  
● Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”;  
● Ostensibly smaller-government overtly identified as de-regulation;  
● Actually bigger-government that covertly re-regulates society through increased selective 
policing, militarism, and securitization 
 
Under Contemporary Globalization, and especially since the Global Capital Crisis, 
these fundamental components of neoliberalism threaten humans in almost every part of 
planet earth, with varieties of slow and indirect, or physical and direct, violence. Crises of 
imagination and critical thought, alongside increasing consolidation of authority by the 
agents of global capital, have all accelerated the destruction of public education.  These 
issues remain especially visible in former and potential sites of democratization, such as 
public universities and HEIs. Such sites of democratization, ruined and privatized though 
they may be, have offered one of the best examples of counter-hegemonic resistance to the 
totalitarian theories of neoliberalism. This is true even only in terms of how visible the 
radical restructuring and violence of neoliberalism appears when considering pre-neoliberal 
success of public universities. Because both California and Germany have previously 
represented some of the most robust, high quality, accessible, and affordable public HEIs and 
universities, they represent excellent case studies for the radical violence of neoliberalism in 
terms of education. Additionally, both California and Germany represent comparable 
histories, contemporary poli-socio-economics, and regional hegemony. 
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While somewhat dissimilar from South Africa, I argue they are dissimilar by a matter 
of degree and not by a matter of quality. I want to first acknowledge my own privilege and 
the general privilege distinctions between a student in academia’s Global North and West 
versus the Global South. Taking the analogies of the South African student and laborer 
above, I recognize that there are severe differences between the lived experiences of South 
African, Californian, and German students and laborers. A Californian student, even a 
student of color, deeply indebted, and perpetually un-/under-/mal-employed, has a 
significantly different material quality of life than their counterpart in South Africa. The 
same holds true for Germany and South Africa.  
However, comparing these three cases is not a comparison between apples and 
oranges. The local differences of quality of life, especially for historically colonized and 
marginalized populations, such as women, LGBTQ-identified individuals, and people of 
color, are differences of degree, and not quality. A Turkish or Syrian immigrant, educated in 
Germany, but barred from citizenship or facing constant microaggressions and lifetime 
earnings losses due to their race, ethnicity, and/or national origin, may not have an identical 
experience to a South African facing such exclusion, but this experience is more similar than 
dissimilar under global neoliberalism. The same applies to, for example, a Black Californian 
student who, despite achieving higher education, and perhaps even securing a living wage, 
stable career, family, and property, may at any point be killed by police or a White American 
with little to no justice ever being served by a broken court system.  
The most obvious similarities between these three apparently dissimilar cases, and 
which I do not spend much time on here, are their neoliberalized laborers. In every locale, 
including California and Germany, constant outsourcing and exploitation of labor is 
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increasing, leading to increasing securitization. Germany, with the remnants of its social 
democracy, perhaps experiences this the least within its own borders, although their 
capitalist-realist society still depends upon consumer-driven, constant growth, which 
necessitates securitized access to fossil fuels located in the Middle East, eastern Europe, and 
Russia, where similarly slavish and wretched work conditions make possible Germans’ 
affordable quality of life. In California, despite the best attempts to erase its histories of de 
facto slavery necessary for its agricultural economies, marginalized subjective studies have 
slowly accrued ample evidence for how Latin American migrant laborers have perpetually 
served as California’s, and the USA’s, necessarily  low-to-no cost laborers.  
Chicano Studies especially has revised the White Liberal histories of California by 
documenting the deportation-industrial complexes institutionalized by the state, from the 
Bracero Program and “Operation Wetback” from the 1940s to the 1960s, to the H2A visa 
programs in the 1980s, to NAFTA and “Operation Gatekeeper” from the 1990s to the 
present. The notion that Germans, Californians, and South Africans all are coerced into 
relying upon some form of de facto slave labor for their energy, food, and/or general 
economic growth is neither a popular nor legitimate narrative. The vast majority of today’s 
capitalist-realist society, or even academia, would dismiss this as hyperbole. Despite that, this 
thesis maintains that this underlying structure of advanced capitalist exploitation, which 
actually prefers and encourages firms to adopt de facto slave labor, is in fact the foundation 
of each of these societies under Contemporary Globalization. This predisposition towards 
radical exploitation, violence, and oppression informs how all public services, including 
formal education, have also been coerced into adopting increasingly exploitative labor 
practices and institutionalizing discrimination.  
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Commonalities Across Dissimilar Cases  
I have identified the following as critical themes within South Africa’s contemporary 
university student protests:  
● Renewed visibility of identity politics, respectability politics 
● Marginalized university students’ “leadership” 
● Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics 
● Performative and artistic protest re-centering narratives 
● Use of both social and conventional media 
 
I argue that across South Africa, Germany, and California, university students’ 
protests specifically have all seen these following themes emerge:  
1. Visibilization of, through the prioritization of, issues of racial, sexual, and financial 
violence and exclusion of students  
2. Prioritization of access to education as something to which humans are fundamentally 
entitled;  
3. Communication of demands in ways described as radical, transgressive, and criminal;  
4. Contestations of their legitimacy by right-wing students and civil society agents.  
 
It should be noted that while there is much overlap between these two sets of themes, 
and all three cases overlap in terms of their fundamental neoliberalism, the most significant 
divergences are outlined below.  
In Germany, a fundamentally less exclusive electoral system, combined with a culture 
and history of supporting formal education, and compounded by greater material resources 
due to European privilege, all resulted in fairly rapid governmental responses to demands for 
free higher education. In the simplest terms possible, Germany remains, in gross over-
simplified terms, fundamentally more democratic than either California in the USA, or South 
Africa in Southern Africa. Germany’s material power and higher quality of life encourages 
this. While neoliberalism continues in Germany through increasing outsourcing and 
management of HEI instruction, the outcomes of student protests in Germany were largely 
successful, and occurred within a relatively short amount of time. Furthermore, the 
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discourses in Germany were not dominated by calls for revolution or radical social 
restructuring, except for in some parts of social movements that explicitly discussed USA 
imperialism and neoliberalism. Instead, appeals to parties, electoral processes, and in-the-
streets protests ultimately led to parties being either voted out of office, or adopting policies 
conducive to free, public, tertiary education.  
Perhaps the most obvious connections between Germany and South Africa are, on the 
one hand, their deep histories of colonialism, as well as their 1990s major social restructuring 
and implementation of capitalist-realist procedural democracies. Germany, despite its 
relatively late formalization as a consolidated, territorially-bound, Westphalian style nation-
state in 1871, was a clear colonial and imperial power both in South-West Africa, as well as 
during the Nazi Regime. South Africa, as examined in detail in my third chapter, was 
extensively colonized by Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner powers. In another sense, 
however, both states underwent massive changes, both during WWII immediately before the 
Cold War, and in the 1990s immediately after the Cold War. The re-unification of Germany 
saw capitalist-realist West Germany, with the support of the USA and the emergent EU, 
absorb and impose advanced capitalism onto East Germany, not unlike how the ANC 
Regimes in South Africa behaved post-1994.  
California is something of a middle ground between Germany and South Africa. On 
the one hand, it too shares a significant history of accessible public tertiary education, but 
this is mostly derived from post-WWII, Cold War era expansion. It too has represented, on a 
global scale, an American model of robust public HEIs, albeit of a variety different from 
Germany’s academic communities. California, too, has seen education become a pivotal 
electoral issue, with the institutional and taxation mechanisms required to maintain 
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affordable education being a highly visible part of many campaigns. Both California and 
Germany, as well as South Africa, made the affordability, cost, and class-based exclusion of 
students a central part of their protests. Alternately framed as “exclusion” and 
“privatization,” as well as, to a lesser extent, “financial violence,” the issue of increasing 
private household fees and decreasing state investment have been central parts of California 
and Germany.  
Perhaps the most important similarities between California and Germany, and where 
South Africa diverges, is their loyalty to notions of incremental reform achieved through 
electoral and legislative processes. Unless considering California’s contemporary university 
student protests as part of the 1960s Free Speech Movement(s) (FSM), then California’s 
consistent, contiguous protests of 2016 are temporally bounded by the Global Capital Crisis, 
as were Germany’s and South Africa’s. In this sense, the timing of each of these protests is 
stirkingly similar: California’s ongoing protests for eight years, from 2008 to 2016; 
Germany’s concluded protests for six years from 2006 to 2012; and South Africa’s ongoing 
protests for at least two years from 2014 to 2016.  
While Germany lacked widespread visibility of protests targeting specific ideologies, 
except for neoliberalism, California and South Africa have both focused on various 
ideologies. Targets of protests in California and South Africa furthermore embraced identity 
politics, where this was less often the case in Germany. As such, Californian and South 
African university students extensively protested patriarchy, sexism, and racism, and made 
sexual violence critical parts both of their demands on universities, as well as a focus of their 
social movements’ organization. For this reason, although Germany indirectly addressed who 
can access universities, I interpret their lens as dependent more upon “class” rather than an 
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intersectional approach of race- and gender- and otherwise-determined class, such as that 
which has been present in California, and remains central to South Africa. Finally, in the 
simplest terms possible, the notions of massive social restructuring up to a revolution have 
been clearly and consistently visible from the start in South Africa. Demands for revolution, 
for abolition of existing systems, and even in some cases for abolishing a three-phase, 
primary-secondary-tertiary education system and HEIs entirely, has not been visible in 
California and Germany. Except for Harvard: Royall Must Fall, and the recent 2016 
#DecolonizeLACityHall protests, the most radical demand of “decolonization” has been 
limited to South Africa, relative to these three cases. See Table 5.1.  
TABLE 5.1: Student Protesters’ Rhetoric in South Africa, California, and Germany, post-2007 
 Revolution Intersectionality Racial Violence Sexual Violence 
Financial 
Violence 
South Africa x x x x x 
California  x x x x 
Germany     x 
 
Having summarized the similarities and dissimilarities between South Africa and two 
other anti-privatization protests driven by university students on two different continents, 
especially in terms of rhetoric and protesters’ demands, I want to briefly consider the larger 
context of how these social movements have played out. In Germany, as noted, protests and 
elections combined led to significant education policy changes, though not abolition of 
neoliberalism. In California and South Africa, however, the outcomes are depressingly 
similar.  
In both cases, students have faced severe police violence, been incarcerated, and the 
most ostensibly radical students have been expelled. In both cases, temporary tuition freezes 
were won after demanding abolition or reduction of tuition fees. In both cases, the viability 
and representation of elected student groups to effect any actual policy change has been 
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called into question, and yet these student groups remain perceived as the most legitimate 
voices of students. In both cases, outsourcing of workers has been highlighted, with little or 
delayed responses by universities, complemented by insistence that balancing the budget due 
to insourcing labor necessitates further cuts or fee increases. In both cases, state divestment 
from education continues, unless any sustainable, radical changes are implemented, and not 
rolled back when public attention shifts. Finally, in both cases, the financial, sexual, and 
racial violence against students continues, despite its increasing visibility.  
See Tables 5.2.A-5.2.C.  
TABLE 5.2A: Overview of South Africa’s Contemporary University Students’ Protests, post-2007 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Achieved 
Outcomes Rhetoric 
Critical 
Terms Visible Demands Visible Targets Tactics 
Time 
Frame 
Radically 
restructure society 
Tuition Frozen Revolution 
Racial 
Violence 
#RhodesMustFall Colonialism 
Protests and 
Performance 
2 years, 
ongoing 
"Transformation" 
“Revolution” 
“Decolonization” 
Students Tried / 
Expelled 
Cultural 
Sexual 
Violence 
#FeesMustFall Capitalism 
Coordinated 
Civil 
Disobedience  
 
Incremental 
Reforms  
Financial 
Violence 
#National Shutdown Extractivism 
  
 
Outsourcing 
Contested  
Intersec- 
tionality 
#OpenStellenbosch Racism 
  
   Revolution #EndOutsourcing Sexism   
   
Exprop- 
riation 
#ShackvilleTRC Patriarchy 
  
     Political Party Elites   
     University Mgmt.   
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TABLE 5.2B: Overview of California’s Contemporary University Students’ Protests, post-2007 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Achieved 
Outcomes Rhetoric Critical Terms Visible Demands 
Visible 
Targets Tactics 
Time 
Frame 
Reform 
existing 
institutions 
Tuition Frozen Legal / 
Rights-Based Racial Violence #FundTheUC 
University 
Mgmt. 
Protests and 
Performance 
8 years, 
ongoing 
 
Students Tried / 
Expelled Cultural Sexual Violence #FireKatehi 
Elected 
Officials Liberal Taxation  
 
Incremental 
Reforms  Financial Violence 
#Dear Governor 
Brown Taxation   
 
Outsourcing 
Contested  Intersectionality #WereFUCked Racism   
   Accessibility 
#Education Not 
Incarceration Sexism   
 
TABLE 5.2C: Overview of Germany’s Contemporary University Students’ Protests, post-2007 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Achieved 
Outcomes Rhetoric Critical Terms Visible Demands Visible Targets Tactics 
Time 
Frame 
Reform 
existing 
institutions 
Tuition 
Abolished 
Legal / Rights-
Based Financial Violence #UniBrennt Austerity 
Protests and 
Performance 6 years 
  
Cultural 
 
#UnsereUni Elected Officials 
Coordinated 
Civil 
Disobedience  
    #AudiMax Taxation 
Liberal 
Taxation  
    
#Bildung Statt 
Ausbildung    
 
Common Conclusions: Radical Oppression Necessitates Radical Resistance 
My conclusions after roughly 18 months focusing on Southern Africa, and roughly 12 
months studying its social movements and deep histories, are problematic and transgressive. I 
label them as such in order to note how they problematize contemporary thought regarding 
social movement change, especially violence, as well as the fact that I am analyzing these 
issues of global violence from a position of relative global privilege, and simultaneous 
relatively academic marginalization. I would fail in my aim to be critical and self-reflexive if 
I did not once again recognize the problematics of my own knowledge production. I seek to 
label these conclusions as transgressive because of my argument that critical GS needs to 
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transgress against existing political-realist epistemologies, but especially because my 
research has led me to conclude that without transgressing the accepted common sense and 
respectable notions that neoliberalism imposes, little change will occur. As I stated in my 
first chapter’s introductory iteration of my thesis, generally speaking, the more transgressive 
and radical protests were, the more they influenced policy and other protests and social 
movements.  
In Germany, gradual privatization and increase of tuition fees were at first met with 
scattered protests and appeals to politicians, with little response. Only once students took to 
the streets, occupied universities, and large populations began voting against pro-
privatization politicians, did tuition become free once again. In California, nearly a decade of 
protests that have focused on institutional reform have yielded only minimal, incremental 
reforms, and ongoing marginalization. The most transgressive acts of university student 
protests in California, such as militant occupations of buildings and highways, have been 
both (a) brutally suppressed and (b) relatively poorly attended compared to more respectable 
events, such as planned marches, petitioning, and electoral campaigning. In South Africa, 
while suppression has grown increasingly radical, the highly transgressive demands for 
decolonization by UCT students ultimately set the stage for protesters to ask for much greater 
change; therefore, when they were forced to accept less than their ideal, it was still a more 
significant relative change than that which California and Germany were forced to accept.  
Within two years, South African university students facilitated a national shutdown, 
froze tuition, and dramatically shifted the discourse around tertiary education and social 
problems in general. There is no comparable outcome, especially not within such a short time 
period, in California or Germany. Only after 8 years of incremental reforms, during which 
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time tuition and fees have steadily climbed and unsustainable rates, and coinciding with non-
university social movements such as Black Lives Matter and presidential elections. In 
California, relatively less radical and transgressive student protests have been at least equally 
led by non-university protests. In South Africa, university protests after 2014 have led almost 
all other significant social movements.  
I argue that this is because South African university students have been more radical, 
transgressed against a greater number of accepted norms, and self-reflexively critiqued their 
movements, all while employing historically successful tactics. Their success and radical 
transgression is also dependent upon their explicit engagement with concepts of violence, 
both in terms of its efficacy, the experience of violence by colonial subjects, and the 
inevitability of radical and/or violence resistance to a radically violent system.  
Complexly Confronting Violence 
Understanding anti-apartheid movements in South(ern) Africa through a lens of the 
efficacy of violent resistance in Angola, Namibia, and elsewhere problematizes common 
sense assumptions about the necessity of non-violence. As UCT:RMF has transgressively 
argued for over a year, dominant narratives of non-violence conveniently protect legitimized 
state authorities, while erasing the trauma and pain of anti-apartheid movements that resulted 
in tens of thousands of murdered and tortured indigenous South(ern) Africans. The 
legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence, increasingly used only to secure profitable 
flows of capital, has been forced to the center of the narrative by UCT:RMF’s focus on 
Marikana. Their post-Shackville demand for a TRC, or a student-on-university justice 
mechanism that is not dependent upon a corrupt court system, has forced debate about the 
state’s selective application of restorative justice, which serves only select populations.  
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Germany’s and California’s university students have not consistently embraced such 
radical or revolution-focused demands. When they do, they are often contingent upon non-
violence, as is understandable given their focus, in line with UCT:RMF’s, on no longer 
perpetuating oppression. However, these discussions often neglect the context of all students’ 
property damage being considered a type of “violence” that is punished more heavily than 
any universities’ or police forces’ direct physical violence against students’ bodies. 
Furthermore, these discussions of non-violence may be well-intentioned in their attempts to 
refine social movement strategies so that future oppressions are prevented. However, I fear 
they significantly delay transporting critical knowledge about social movements beyond 
relatively small academic circles into the streets, where the majority of the world lives and 
dies without the privilege of philosophizing about violence. Indeed, as universities have 
neoliberalized and encouraged mass overproduction of academic products, that increasingly 
saturate a marketplace of idea where only the most prestigious institutions’ and individuals’ 
products are consumed, it seems increasingly pointless to rely on academically-produced 
knowledge to ever have a tangible or timely impact on social movements.  
I believe that UCT:RMF in fact represents a model for other universities and students 
seeking radical change should adopt - a deliberate and direct engagement with complex ideas 
of violence, and not reductive assertions of “violence is bad” which is how mainstream 
discourse dilutes complex and nuanced discussions of violence, such as those offered by 
Foran, Lezra, and others. An honest and complex confrontation of violence, in some form, 
seems to have become necessary for counter-hegemonic social movements. intending to 
confront overwhelmingly violent systems of oppression, which remain equipped with all 
manner of weapons, from thermonuclear warheads, to always-surveilling smartphones, to a 
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monopolies on common sense assumptions that there is no alternative to capitalism. Both 
Lezra and Foran have done this, extensively. Foran’s driving question, to me, seems to be “is 
it possible to move beyond [directly violent] insurgency” like past social movements? I 
increasingly feel that the answer is that, while directly violent insurgency continues to be 
problematic, and there is hope for a sort of emotional insurgency, even direct, physical 
violence is increasingly becoming one of the few visible options of counter-hegemonic 
resistance. This is not to suggest that it is the ideal or least problematic option, but that it is 
increasingly appearing to be the only possibility to increasingly violated and oppressed 
peoples.  
On the one hand, in terms of confronting violence and creating empathy, Lezra 
understandably has prioritized how to not cause harm to students while teaching about 
inhumanity, atrocity, and violence. Their focus on empathy and emotion as central to this 
process is, I believe, correct, and exemplified through UCT:RMF. But what has been 
articulated within academia, and constrained by its institutional discrimination, UCT:RMF 
has rapidly actualized both within and beyond academia - but by doing so, in some senses, 
violently. Reparations are a form of justice that are at least structurally and financially 
violent, insofar as they are predicated on violating and damaging existing systems. Abolition 
of any system requires the violation of policies and procedures and employment of those 
involved in that system. UCT:RMF has advocated for both of these through advocating 
everything from abolishing universities in their current forms, to land expropriation and 
forced displacement and repatriation of White South Africans. Both of these revolutionary 
acts necessitate some form of violence, either as a clash between those with a vested interest 
in maintaining their own capital profitability, or through dismantling and violating existing 
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systematic norms. It is not a coincidence that these same conversations about land and other 
material possessions were held before 1994.  
UCT:RMF has consistently made the same appeals as militant anti-apartheid 
movements from the 1960s-1980s. UCT:RMF has intentionally forced emotional, often 
violent and unwanted, responses amongst bystanders, in order to force a social 
conscientization towards colonial subjects predicated on feeling terrible and being moved to 
action - without the promises of non-violence and happiness that some “joyful militancy” 
(Achmat, 1993; Esteva, 2014) theories rely upon. While positive alternatives are necessary 
for breaking the cycle of oppression, again, today’s context is the aforementioned hegemonic 
capitalist-realist media. This media dilutes nuanced ideas into ineffective platitudes that 
ensure the state retains a monopoly on violence, and uses it effectively in the suppression of 
non-violent, unarmed protesters, even when their demands are not radical.  
In simpler terms, joyful militancy appears to be a wonderful, non-problematic theory 
from the privilege of Global North and West academic circles. However, the likelihood of 
enslaved miners being able to prioritize joy and positive emotions while they are gunned 
downed, beaten, impoverished, assaulted, and detained seems implausible and unuseful - at 
least in the immediate term. The centrality of singing, chanting, and the toyi-toyi in South 
African protests may be one form of “joyful militancy,” but it is certainly one that prioritizes 
resistance and struggle against oppression and violence above happiness or joy. While I agree 
that "the ends of justice are no longer held to justify the means of violence," most of South 
Africa's history, and the contemporary cases of Marikana, OS, and (UCT:)RMF all provide 
evidence that invalidate the idea that "the means of non-violent resistance reflect and 
guarantee the ends that they seek.” (Foran, 2014: 9) This is because non-violence has never 
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before, despite centuries of struggle, “guarantee[d] the ends” sought in South(ern) Africa. I 
am not arguing that non-violence never will work, but I am arguing that an honest assessment 
of centuries of counter-hegemonic resistance in South(ern) Africa substantiates UCT:RMF’s 
radical and transgressive claims that, without an accompanying violence or threat thereof, 
non-violence has never worked. I argue this to discourage unrealistic optimism in the face of 
pessimism-inducing amounts of evidence to the contrary; I argue against this optimism 
because of the way that existing media-, military-, and academic-industrial complexes dilute 
and co-opt such optimistic rhetoric to the benefit of entrenched authorities.  
Is Comparably “Violent”, Transgressive Protest Possible or Effective Elsewhere?  
On a local level, as noted above, when California students do embrace revolution- 
focused demands, they are not always contingent on respectful, non-violent approaches - 
using my above complex notion of violence. The recent cases of the Afrika Black Coalition 
(ABC) and Black Student Unions (BSUs) forcing the UC to divest from private prisons, as 
well as growing pro-Palestinean Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) movement against 
Israel, have both violated existing norms. These groups have unapologetically put the 
survival of the oppressed above a commitment to the status quo, and in doing so have been 
labelled as violent and criminal. While BDS is explicitly described as a non-violent 
movement, it is in fact violating the financial business of Israeli, UK, and USA firms, and 
violating the unspoken rules of Global North and West academics ignoring Israeli human 
rights abuses due to a presumption that Israel is a liberal democracy. ABC and BSUs have 
variously embraced Pan-Africanism and some forms of socialism, or otherwise anti-capitalist 
ideologies, which inherently support the abolition, and violation of, capitalist systems. At the 
very least, all of these anti-authoritarian movements are prone to violating established 
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notions of respectability politics, and are consequently labelled as violent for doing so. 
Again, if such is the case, it seems that some similar embrace, not outright rejection, of 
necessary “violence” must prefigure actualization of movements seeking to address 
neoliberalism’s violence. This embrace must occur in a way that transgresses established 
capitalist-realist ideas of only direct physical violence that is only legitimate when it is 
applied by the state.  
As noted above, I perceive UCT:RMF as something of a model for other movements, 
given the increasingly similar qualities of societies and educational systems around the 
world, and UCT:RMF’s relative success compared to other cases. However, the internal 
antagonisms of UCT:RMF, as well as constant suppression by UCT and police, has led to its 
near collapse. The ostensibly legitimate SRCs in South Africa suffer from significant 
infighting and internalization of petty politics, too. Locally, elected student groups in 
California struggle with the same internalization of detrimental political practices, but are 
able to exert even less influence on university policies or official political parties than are 
SRCs in South Africa. The above-mentioned “radical” and potentially “violent” groups such 
as ABC, BSU, and pro-Palestinean groups are overwhelmingly marginalized within 
California politics, and are overwhelmingly comprised of marginalized students. Arab, 
progressive Israeli, and Black students within California’s HEIs constitute only a fraction of 
the overwhelmingly White and/or middle-class and/or respectability politics student body.  
How, then could the radical, transgressive, and potentially “violent” student protests’ 
strategies of UCT:RMF be effectively adopted within CA? I believe that, as this concluding 
chapter is titled, that radical oppression increasingly necessitates radical resistance. And, as 
Haiven and Khasnabish theorize, and as UCT:RMF have actualized, something truly radical 
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has to be imagined, enacted, and then effectively communicated. Without all three of these 
processes - imagination, action, effective communication - the radical resistance is likely to 
fail.  I believe that both endless, critical, abstract, academic analysis, which perpetuates 
purely intellectually satisfying academic activity, as well as physical, misogynistic, 
patriarchal, sexist  violence, have both contributed to UCT:RMF significantly losing 
momentum and increasing its internal antagonisms. These same obstacles degrade university 
students and protests in Germany and California, and must be addressed if the successful 
components of UCT:RMF’s radicalism are to be utilized by other, currently less-radical 
protesters.  
That said, what UCT:RMF accomplished in such a short amount of time is 
remarkable. Even if the group collapses, they have laid the discursive and social foundation 
for a radical anti-capitalist movement that has re-centered the narrative of violence, 
colonialism, and decolonization. As such, their five key themes could be adopted even by 
relatively small groups of students elsewhere, in order to make visible violence and pain 
suffered in highly advanced capitalist sites, such as California, the USA, Germany, or 
Europe. On the one hand, it is implausible and likely ineffective to return to the same 
radicalism of the 1960s FSM and anti-Vietnam protests. Additionally, it seems impossible to 
imagine protests of the scale seen in South Africa ever occurring in the respectable and 
orderly suburbs of California, or in the upper-class urban sites where most UCs are located. 
However, the entire point of UCT:RMF and the theory of the radical imagination, and the 
idea of resistance growing increasingly radical as oppression radically increases, is this: what 
common sense asserts is impossible, at some point, is forced to occur. The interregnum 
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between the dying old and the as-yet unbirthed new demands some sort of emergency 
operation.  
In the past two years in the USA, except for the sole instance of UC Santa Cruz 
students blocking Highway 17 (and subsequently being arrested, tried, and effectively 
expelled) the only visible shutdowns of profitable infrastructure in the USA has been 
executed by indigenous Americans leading the obstruction of extractive industries’ pipelines, 
or by Black Lives Matter, or by related racial justice groups operating outside of university 
students. It may seem impossible to imagine waves of students conducting hunger strikes, or 
occupying strategic buildings alongside laborers and family members, or taking the more 
radical initial steps of emotional and artistic interventions to conscientize Californians before 
these conventionally militant actions are possible. It seems impossible for the small, 
university-approved art exhibition at UCSB on solitary confinement to have an impact. It 
seems impossible for some truly radical, militant anti- incarceration, anti-police, or otherwise 
anti-authority performances to galvanize UC students into action on the basis of its violent 
emotionality alone. However, in the 1980s it was impossible for most in the Global North 
and West to imagine that the Berlin Wall and USSR, or apartheid, would collapse. In the 
1970s, it seemed impossible to imagine that the national guard would murder unarmed 
students at Kent State and Jackson State. In the 1960s it seemed impossible that dozens of 
Buddhist monks would self-immolate themselves to protest the brutality of Vietnam. It 
previously seemed impossible that slavery is thriving and even increasing in 2016, and yet 
neoliberalism has indeed perpetuated this practice. 
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And yet, much of what “was” impossible now simply “is,” and my research indicates 
it “is” because radical and transgressive acts, both violent and non-violent, actualized ideas 
that were formerly marginalized as purely intellectual, constrained within academia or 
otherwise made invisible and inaccessible. I believe that, with each escalation of 
neoliberalism’s violence, state divestment from education, and the ongoing violation of 
Black and Brown bodies, so too is it increasingly necessary for protesters seeking radical 
change to take actions seen as impossible, transgressive, and even “violent”.  
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